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Ortiz v. Court of Appeals

b. Formalities — Donation of immovables (Art. 749)
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Title

Ortiz v. Court of Appeals

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. L-7307 May 19, 1955

Grandparents donated three Samar parcels to their grandchildren by notarial deed in 1940, then a year later donated the same land to a nephew who would care for them. The Court of Appeals agreed the first donation stood but thought the grandchildren's claim to possession premature while a donor lived. The Supreme Court reversed: the public instrument was itself the delivery, and a usufruct not written into the deed was never reserved.

Core Doctrine

The execution of a public instrument of donation is a recognised mode of delivery (tradition) that vests both ownership and possession in the donee at the moment of perfection — unless a reservation of usufruct is expressly stated in the instrument. Article 749 requires the deed to specify the charges the donee must satisfy, so the absence of any express reservation is proof that none was intended.

Case Digest (G.R. No. L-7307)

Case DigestChapter XI — Donation

Ortiz v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-7307 · May 19, 1955 · Supreme Court

b. Formalities — Donation of immovables (Art. 749)

Gist

Grandparents donated three Samar parcels to their grandchildren by notarial deed in 1940, then a year later donated the same land to a nephew who would care for them. The Court of Appeals agreed the first donation stood but thought the grandchildren's claim to possession premature while a donor lived. The Supreme Court reversed: the public instrument was itself the delivery, and a usufruct not written into the deed was never reserved.

Core Doctrine

The execution of a public instrument of donation is a recognised mode of delivery (tradition) that vests both ownership and possession in the donee at the moment of perfection — unless a reservation of usufruct is expressly stated in the instrument. Article 749 requires the deed to specify the charges the donee must satisfy, so the absence of any express reservation is proof that none was intended.

Facts

  • On April 19, 1940, spouses Bonifacio Yupo and Vicenta de Guerra executed a notarial deed of donation over three parcels of land in Samar in favour of their grandchildren Cresencia, Alejandro and Pacita Ortiz.
  • The donors were duly notified of the donees' acceptance. That notification perfected the donation in 1940, and from that moment the spouses no longer owned the parcels they purported to give away a year later.
  • The 1940 deed was on its face absolute and unconditional, containing no reservation of usufruct. Article 749 obliges a donor to specify the charges the donee must satisfy, so silence is not ambiguity — it is proof that no reservation was intended.
  • On August 14, 1941, the same spouses executed a second notarial deed of donation over the same property in favour of their nephew Andres Basada, on condition that he care for them until their death. (A donor cannot revoke by donating again: a perfected donation stands until revocation is asked for and granted in the proper proceedings.)
  • Alejandro Ortiz died without issue during the Japanese occupation.
  • In 1946, Andres Basada entered and took possession of the land, and in 1947 the surviving Ortiz donees filed a reivindicatory action to recover it.
  • The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint, holding the first donation revoked for the "base ingratitude" of the Ortizes.
  • The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal on different reasoning: the first donation was validly perfected and not legally revoked, but the donors had reserved possession and use for their lifetime, making the Ortiz claim premature while a donor lived. (That reservation was inferred from the donors' continued occupation — an inference the Supreme Court rejected, occupation being "susceptible of varied explanations.")
  • The petitioners sought review from the Supreme Court, which decided on May 19, 1955.

Issue

Whether the execution of a public instrument of donation under Article 749§ is sufficient to vest the donee with both ownership and the right of possession, in the absence of an express reservation of usufruct by the donor.
Secondary issue. Whether a donor may revoke a perfected donation simply by executing a second deed of donation in favour of another person.

Ruling

Main issue. YES. Under Article 734§ a donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance, and once perfected ownership is acquired and transmitted. "The execution of a public instrument of the conveyance is one of the recognized ways in which delivery (tradition) of lands may be made" under Article 1498§. The 1940 deed was "on its face absolute and unconditional," and because Article 749§ requires a donation of an immovable to specify "the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy," "the absence in the deed of any express reservation of usufruct in favor of the donors is proof that no such reservation was ever intended." The Court of Appeals' inference from the donors' continued presence on the land was rejected: that fact "is susceptible of varied explanations and does not necessarily imply that possession or usufruct was excluded." From execution and acknowledged acceptance, the donees were vested with ownership and attendant possession.
Secondary issue. NO. A perfected donation "should stand until after its revocation should have been asked and granted in the proper proceedings." The donors could not unilaterally revoke by executing a subsequent deed to another party, having already divested themselves of title.
The decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Court of First Instance of Samar dismissing the complaint were REVERSED, and Andres Basada was sentenced to restore possession to petitioners Cresencia and Pacita Ortiz; the records were remanded for assessment of damages, with costs against Basada — all without prejudice to any action of revocation that may lawfully appertain to the donors.
"The absence in the deed of any express reservation of usufruct in favor of the donors is proof that no such reservation was ever intended."

Ratio

  • Perfection and tradition. Under Article 734§ a donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance, and once perfected ownership is acquired and transmitted. "The execution of a public instrument of the conveyance is one of the recognized ways in which delivery (tradition) of lands may be made" under Article 1498§.
  • Absolute nature of the instrument. The 1940 deed was "on its face absolute and unconditional." Because Article 749§ requires the deed to specify the charges the donee must satisfy, "the absence in the deed of any express reservation of usufruct in favor of the donors is proof that no such reservation was ever intended."
  • No presumption from occupation. The Court rejected the appellate court's inference that the donors' remaining on the property implied a reserved usufruct: the fact "is susceptible of varied explanations and does not necessarily imply that possession or usufruct was excluded."
  • Invalidity of a subsequent "revocation." A perfected donation "should stand until after its revocation should have been asked and granted in the proper proceedings." The donors could not unilaterally revoke by executing a later deed to another party, having already divested themselves of title.

Doctrine

  1. Public instrument as delivery (Art. 1498§): "The execution of a public instrument … is one of the recognized ways in which delivery (tradition) of lands may be made … unless from the terms of the deed, the contrary is expressed or inferable."
  2. Mandatory expression of charges (Art. 749§): the public document must specify the property and "the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy" — so an unwritten reservation is no reservation.
  3. Vesting of possession: from the moment a public instrument of donation is executed and acceptance acknowledged, the donees are "vested with ownership and attendant possession."
  4. Irrevocability of perfected donations: a donor who has perfected a donation cannot revoke it by making a second one; revocation must be asked for and granted in the proper proceedings.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

Relationship to requested topic: DIRECT.
This case involves a petition for review of a Court of Appeals decision that dismissed a recovery of possession action filed by the first donees of a parcel of land against a subsequent donee who had usurped the property. Although the appellate court recognised that the first donation was validly perfected and could not be revoked by a mere subsequent donation, it erroneously held that the first donees' right to possess was "premature" as long as the donors remained alive. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the first donees were entitled to immediate possession. The central doctrine is that under Article 749 of the Civil Code§ (and Article 633 of the Spanish Civil Code), the execution of a public instrument of donation is a recognised mode of delivery (tradition) that vests both ownership and possession in the donee at the moment of perfection, unless a reservation of usufruct is expressly stated in the instrument.

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

  • On April 19, 1940, spouses Bonifacio Yupo and Vicenta de Guerra executed a notarial deed of donation over three parcels of land in Samar in favour of their grandchildren: Cresencia, Alejandro and Pacita Ortiz.
  • The donors were duly notified of the donees' acceptance of the gift.
  • Subsequently, on August 14, 1941, the same donor spouses executed a second notarial deed of donation covering the same property in favour of their nephew, Andres Basada, on the condition that he care for them until their death.
  • Alejandro Ortiz died without issue during the Japanese occupation.
  • In 1946, Andres Basada entered and took possession of the land.
  • In 1947, the surviving Ortiz donees filed a reivindicatory action against Basada to recover the property.
  • The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint, ruling that the first donation had been revoked by the donors due to the "base ingratitude" of the Ortizes.
  • The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, finding that while the first donation was validly perfected and not legally revoked, the donors had reserved possession and use of the property for themselves during their lifetime, making the Ortiz claim for possession premature while a donor was still living.
  • The petitioners then sought review from the Supreme Court, which decided on May 19, 1955.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioners (Cresencia and Pacita Ortiz)

They acquired full ownership and attendant possession of the property since the execution and acknowledgment of the public instrument of donation in 1940. The donation being absolute and unconditional, the subsequent donation to Basada conferred no rights upon him.

B. Respondent (Andres Basada)

He is the rightful owner because the first donation to the Ortizes was revoked for ingratitude when they abandoned the donors. He also occupied the property on behalf of one of the donors, who was still alive and living with him.

C. Common Ground

The execution of both notarial deeds of donation is undisputed in the record.

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE

Whether the execution of a public instrument of donation under Article 749§ (previously Art. 633) is sufficient to vest the donee with both ownership and the right of possession, in the absence of an express reservation of usufruct by the donor.

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

Whether a donor may revoke a perfected donation by simply executing a second deed of donation in favour of another person.

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE

YES.

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

NO.
FALLO. "Wherefore, and without prejudice to any action of revocation that may lawfully apertain to the donors, the decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Court of First Instance of Samar dismissing the complaint are hereby reversed, and the respondent Andres Basada is sentenced to restore possession to petitioners Cresencia and Pacita Ortiz. The records of the case are ordered remanded to the Court of origin for assessment of the damages suffered by the petitioners. Cost against respondent Andres Basada."

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

  • Perfection and tradition (Art. 734§, Art. 1498§). Under Article 734, a donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee, and once perfected, ownership is acquired and transmitted. The Court held that "the execution of a public instrument of the conveyance is one of the recognized ways in which delivery (tradition) of lands may be made" under Article 1498 (formerly Art. 1463).
  • Absolute nature of the instrument (Art. 749§). The Court scrutinised the 1940 deed and found it "on its face absolute and unconditional." Because Article 749 requires the donation of an immovable to specify the "charges which the donee must satisfy," the Court reasoned that "the absence in the deed of any express reservation of usufruct in favor of the donors is proof that no such reservation was ever intended."
  • No presumption from possession. The Court rejected the Court of Appeals' inference that because the donors remained on the property they must have reserved a usufruct. Remaining on the land "is susceptible of varied explanations and does not necessarily imply that possession or usufruct was excluded."
  • Invalidity of subsequent revocation. A perfected donation "should stand until after its revocation should have been asked and granted in the proper proceedings." The donors cannot unilaterally revoke a perfected donation by simply executing a subsequent deed to another party, as they have already divested themselves of title.

B. Doctrines/Rules

  1. Public Instrument as Delivery: "The execution of a public instrument … is one of the recognized ways in which delivery (tradition) of lands may be made … unless from the terms of the deed, the contrary is expressed or inferable."
  2. Mandatory Expression of Charges: Under Article 749§, for a donation of an immovable to be valid, the public document must specify the property and "the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy."
  3. Vesting of Possession: From the moment a public instrument of donation is executed and acceptance is acknowledged, the donees are "vested with ownership and attendant possession."
  4. Irrevocability of Perfected Donations: A donation is a mode of acquiring ownership; once perfected, it denies the valid execution of a subsequent inconsistent donation under nemo dat qui non habet.

C. Limitations/Exceptions

  • The Court's ruling was expressly "without prejudice to any action of revocation that may lawfully appertain to the donors." A subsequent donation is not a valid mode of revocation, but the donors may still seek judicial revocation on recognised legal grounds such as ingratitude under Article 765§.
  • The reasoning on delivery is qualified by Article 1498's own proviso: constructive delivery follows unless the contrary appears or is inferable from the deed.

D. Topic Integration

  • This case is DIRECTLY controlling for "formalities — donation of immovables (Art. 749§)." It establishes that the public-instrument requirement is not merely a solemnity for validity but also the legal mode of delivery that transfers both title and the right to possess.
  • It clarifies that any reservation of rights — a usufruct above all — must be explicitly noted in the public instrument under the specification-of-charges requirement; otherwise the donee's right to immediate possession is presumed.
  • Read against Gestopa, Cuevas and Austria-Magat, where a reserved usufruct proved the naked title had passed, this case supplies the converse: an unwritten reservation is no reservation at all.

VII. Separate Opinions

NOT IN RECORD. (Unanimous among the nine concurring Justices.)

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Civil Code

Article 749, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title III (Donation), Chapter 2 (Persons Who May Give or Receive a Donation)

In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.

The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.

If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments. (633)

Why it is cited here

The article, read for a clause students usually pass over: the deed must specify "the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy."

That requirement is doing real work here. Because the law compels a donor to write down whatever burden he means to impose, silence in the deed is not ambiguous — it is evidence. The Court's inference is stated plainly: "the absence in the deed of any express reservation of usufruct in favor of the donors is proof that no such reservation was ever intended."

The 1940 deed was "on its face absolute and unconditional," so the grandchildren took everything, possession included.

That disposes of the Court of Appeals' reasoning, which had inferred a reserved usufruct from the mere fact that the donors stayed on the land. The Supreme Court refused the inference: remaining in occupation "is susceptible of varied explanations and does not necessarily imply that possession or usufruct was excluded."

Compare Gestopa, Cuevas and Austria-Magat, where a usufruct was expressly reserved and the reservation proved the naked title had passed. This case is the other half of the same point: write the reservation down or you have not made one.

Civil Code

Article 765, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title III (Donation), Chapter 4 (Revocation and Reduction of Donations)

The donation may also be revoked at the instance of the donor, by reason of ingratitude in the following cases:

(1) If the donee should commit some offense against the person, the honor or the property of the donor, or of his wife or children under his parental authority;

(2) If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or any act involving moral turpitude, even though he should prove it, unless the crime or the act has been committed against the donee himself, his wife or children under his authority;

(3) If he unduly refuses him support when the donee is legally or morally bound to give support to the donor. (648a)

Why it is cited here

The door the Court deliberately left open, and the reason the judgment is worded as it is.

A donation may be revoked for ingratitude where the donee commits an offence against the person, honour or property of the donor; imputes to him a crime or an act of moral turpitude; or unduly refuses him support.

The trial court thought the Ortizes' "base ingratitude" had already revoked the 1940 donation. That was the error. Ingratitude is a ground for revocation, not a self-executing event: the donation stands "until after its revocation should have been asked and granted in the proper proceedings."

So the Supreme Court restored possession to the donees while adding that its judgment was "without prejudice to any action of revocation that may lawfully appertain to the donors." If the grandparents really had a grievance, the remedy remained available — in a suit brought for that purpose, within the one-year period Article 769 fixes from knowledge.

Noceda v. Court of Appeals is the chapter's case on this article actually succeeding. Read together, the two make the point neatly: ingratitude can undo a perfected donation, but only through a court.

Civil Code

Article 1498, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book IV (Obligations and Contracts), Title VI (Sales), Chapter 4 (Obligations of the Vendor), Section 2 (Delivery of the Thing Sold)

When the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.

With regard to movable property, its delivery may also be made by the delivery of the keys of the place or depository where it is stored or kept. (1463a)

Why it is cited here

Why the grandchildren were entitled to walk onto the land, not merely to hold a title to it.

"When the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred."

The Court applied this to donations: "the execution of a public instrument of the conveyance is one of the recognized ways in which delivery (tradition) of lands may be made … unless from the terms of the deed, the contrary is expressed or inferable."

So the notarial deed of 1940 was not merely the form Article 749 demands for validity. It was also the act of delivery that completed the transfer of ownership and carried possession with it. One instrument, two functions.

Hold on to the proviso, because it is where the two halves of the doctrine meet: constructive delivery follows unless the contrary appears from the deed. A reserved usufruct written into the instrument is exactly such a contrary indication — and its absence here is why nothing held the possession back.

Pingol v. Court of Appeals uses the same article for a sale; this case shows it operating on a gift.

Civil Code

Article 734, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title III (Donation), Chapter 1 (Nature of Donations)

The donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. (623)

Why it is cited here

Why the 1941 deed to the nephew conveyed nothing, and the limit on what the donors could still do.

"The donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee."

The donors were "duly notified of the donees' acceptance" in 1940, so the donation perfected then and there and the spouses ceased to own the three parcels. A year later they purported to give the same land to Andres Basada — and by nemo dat qui non habet that second deed was worth nothing.

The point of principle is that a donor cannot revoke by donating again. A perfected donation "should stand until after its revocation should have been asked and granted in the proper proceedings." Revocation is a judicial remedy on statutory grounds; executing a fresh deed is not one of them. Del Rosario v. Ferrer and Austria-Magat make the identical point about a later deed of assignment and a later deed of sale.

Note the careful limit the Court kept open. The judgment is "without prejudice to any action of revocation that may lawfully appertain to the donors" — so the alleged ingratitude of the Ortizes remained available as a ground under Article 765, if properly pleaded and proved in the right proceeding. The trial court's error was in treating it as already accomplished.

Study digest — refer to the full text of the decision for accuracy. https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1955/may1955/gr_l-7307_1955.html

Cited laws & provisions

Article 749, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title III (Donation), Chapter 2 (Persons Who May Give or Receive a Donation)

In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.

The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.

If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments. (633)

Why it is cited here

The article, read for a clause students usually pass over: the deed must specify "the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy."

That requirement is doing real work here. Because the law compels a donor to write down whatever burden he means to impose, silence in the deed is not ambiguous — it is evidence. The Court's inference is stated plainly: "the absence in the deed of any express reservation of usufruct in favor of the donors is proof that no such reservation was ever intended."

The 1940 deed was "on its face absolute and unconditional," so the grandchildren took everything, possession included.

That disposes of the Court of Appeals' reasoning, which had inferred a reserved usufruct from the mere fact that the donors stayed on the land. The Supreme Court refused the inference: remaining in occupation "is susceptible of varied explanations and does not necessarily imply that possession or usufruct was excluded."

Compare Gestopa, Cuevas and Austria-Magat, where a usufruct was expressly reserved and the reservation proved the naked title had passed. This case is the other half of the same point: write the reservation down or you have not made one.

Full entry below ↓

Article 765, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title III (Donation), Chapter 4 (Revocation and Reduction of Donations)

The donation may also be revoked at the instance of the donor, by reason of ingratitude in the following cases:

(1) If the donee should commit some offense against the person, the honor or the property of the donor, or of his wife or children under his parental authority;

(2) If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or any act involving moral turpitude, even though he should prove it, unless the crime or the act has been committed against the donee himself, his wife or children under his authority;

(3) If he unduly refuses him support when the donee is legally or morally bound to give support to the donor. (648a)

Why it is cited here

The door the Court deliberately left open, and the reason the judgment is worded as it is.

A donation may be revoked for ingratitude where the donee commits an offence against the person, honour or property of the donor; imputes to him a crime or an act of moral turpitude; or unduly refuses him support.

The trial court thought the Ortizes' "base ingratitude" had already revoked the 1940 donation. That was the error. Ingratitude is a ground for revocation, not a self-executing event: the donation stands "until after its revocation should have been asked and granted in the proper proceedings."

So the Supreme Court restored possession to the donees while adding that its judgment was "without prejudice to any action of revocation that may lawfully appertain to the donors." If the grandparents really had a grievance, the remedy remained available — in a suit brought for that purpose, within the one-year period Article 769 fixes from knowledge.

Noceda v. Court of Appeals is the chapter's case on this article actually succeeding. Read together, the two make the point neatly: ingratitude can undo a perfected donation, but only through a court.

Full entry below ↓

Article 1498, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book IV (Obligations and Contracts), Title VI (Sales), Chapter 4 (Obligations of the Vendor), Section 2 (Delivery of the Thing Sold)

When the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.

With regard to movable property, its delivery may also be made by the delivery of the keys of the place or depository where it is stored or kept. (1463a)

Why it is cited here

Why the grandchildren were entitled to walk onto the land, not merely to hold a title to it.

"When the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred."

The Court applied this to donations: "the execution of a public instrument of the conveyance is one of the recognized ways in which delivery (tradition) of lands may be made … unless from the terms of the deed, the contrary is expressed or inferable."

So the notarial deed of 1940 was not merely the form Article 749 demands for validity. It was also the act of delivery that completed the transfer of ownership and carried possession with it. One instrument, two functions.

Hold on to the proviso, because it is where the two halves of the doctrine meet: constructive delivery follows unless the contrary appears from the deed. A reserved usufruct written into the instrument is exactly such a contrary indication — and its absence here is why nothing held the possession back.

Pingol v. Court of Appeals uses the same article for a sale; this case shows it operating on a gift.

Full entry below ↓

Article 734, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title III (Donation), Chapter 1 (Nature of Donations)

The donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. (623)

Why it is cited here

Why the 1941 deed to the nephew conveyed nothing, and the limit on what the donors could still do.

"The donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee."

The donors were "duly notified of the donees' acceptance" in 1940, so the donation perfected then and there and the spouses ceased to own the three parcels. A year later they purported to give the same land to Andres Basada — and by nemo dat qui non habet that second deed was worth nothing.

The point of principle is that a donor cannot revoke by donating again. A perfected donation "should stand until after its revocation should have been asked and granted in the proper proceedings." Revocation is a judicial remedy on statutory grounds; executing a fresh deed is not one of them. Del Rosario v. Ferrer and Austria-Magat make the identical point about a later deed of assignment and a later deed of sale.

Note the careful limit the Court kept open. The judgment is "without prejudice to any action of revocation that may lawfully appertain to the donors" — so the alleged ingratitude of the Ortizes remained available as a ground under Article 765, if properly pleaded and proved in the right proceeding. The trial court's error was in treating it as already accomplished.

Full entry below ↓