Cojuangco Jr. v. Sandiganbayan

IV.c — Requisites for Valid Exercise of Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction over the person of the accused

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Title

Cojuangco Jr. v. Sandiganbayan

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 134307 December 21, 1998

On the assigned subtopic the answer is twofold and both halves are worth memorising. Bail is submission: "the giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court," and, quoting older authority, even "[c]onceding … that the warrant issued in this case was void … the defendant waived all his rights to object to the same by appearing and giving bond." And an appearance must be purely objecting to remain a special one: "[i]f the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself." Since "petitioner's participation … was not confined to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for respondent court's exercise of its jurisdiction," he "may not be heard now to deny said court's jurisdiction over him."

Core Doctrine

Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be waived expressly or impliedly: "When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction" (La Naval Drug v. CA). Two applications follow. Posting bail is submission — "the giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court," so that even where "the warrant issued … was void for the reason that no probable cause was found by the court before issuing it, the defendant waived all his rights to object to the same by appearing and giving bond." And an objection preserved by special appearance must stay special: the appearance "must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself." An accused who both posts bail and seeks other affirmative reliefs has therefore submitted twice over — and "may not be heard now to deny said court's jurisdiction over him."

Case Digest (G.R. No. 134307)

Case DigestWeek 2 - Jurisdiction

Cojuangco Jr. v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 134307 · December 21, 1998 · First Division

IV.c — Requisites for Valid Exercise of Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction over the person of the accused

Petitioner: Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.Respondent: Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines

Gist

Core Doctrine

ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic

IV. Requisites for Valid Exercise of Jurisdiction — c. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1998/dec1998/gr_134307_1998.html

⚠️ What this case is actually about

The file this digest replaces described "Cojuangco, Jr. … charged with a criminal offense and the Sandiganbayan assumed jurisdiction … on the ground that Cojuangco was a public officer," with him arguing he was not a public officer. No such argument appears in the Decision. The case concerns a PCA Governing Board member charged under R.A. No. 3019, who argued that the warrant of arrest was void for want of a proper probable-cause determination and that the Sandiganbayan therefore never acquired jurisdiction over his person — and that the delay in the preliminary investigation violated his right to a speedy disposition.

ℹ️ The rule on bail and on the purpose of an appearance

"[T]he giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court." And: "Where the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court."

Facts

On January 12, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor General filed a complaint before the PCGG (I.S. No. 74) against the former PCA Administrator and former members of the PCA Governing Board, Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. among them, for violation of R.A. No. 3019 — charging that they "conspired and confederated together and taking undue advantage of their public positions … without authority, granted a donation."
Criminal Case No. 22018 was filed before the Sandiganbayan (First Division).
On February 20, 1995 the Sandiganbayan issued a warrant of arrest and a Resolution banning his travel abroad without prior approval pending resolution of the case.
The petitioner posted bail. This is the act that decides the jurisdictional question against him.
He opposed the issuance of the warrant, but his participation "was not confined" to that opposition — he also filed "various motions that sought other affirmative reliefs," covering "other matters which called for respondent court's exercise of its jurisdiction."
All of his previous requests to travel abroad were granted, and, as the Solicitor General confirmed, "petitioner has always returned to the Philippines and complied with the restrictions imposed on him."
By the time of decision he had been reinstated as Chairman and CEO of San Miguel Corporation, and the warrant had stood "more than three (3) years."
He filed a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 to dismiss Criminal Case No. 22018, to prohibit further proceedings, and to lift the travel ban, arguing that because "the warrant of arrest … is null and void, it never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner," and invoking his rights to due process and a speedy disposition. Decided December 21, 1998; Justice Vitug concurred and Justice Panganiban concurred and dissented in part.

Issue

Whether the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner notwithstanding that the warrant of arrest was invalid — that is, whether posting bail and filing motions seeking affirmative reliefs constituted submission, or whether his opposition to the warrant preserved the objection.

Secondary issue. Whether the case should be dismissed for violation of his rights to due process and a speedy disposition.

Ancillary issue. Whether the travel ban should be lifted.

Ruling

Main issue. The court DID acquire jurisdiction over his person. "[T]he rule is well-settled that the giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court" — and this holds even "[c]onceding again that the warrant issued in this case was void for the reason that no probable cause was found by the court before issuing it, the defendant waived all his rights to object to the same by appearing and giving bond."

His continued protest could not save him, because "his claim has been negated when he himself invoked the jurisdiction of respondent court through the filing of various motions that sought other affirmative reliefs." A special appearance "must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself." Hence "Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said court's jurisdiction over him."

Secondary issue. The petition to dismiss fails; the Sandiganbayan is ordered "to proceed with the resolution of the pending motions and incidents … with utmost dispatch."

Ancillary issue. The travel ban is lifted for three months. "[P]rescinding from our initial declaration that the issuance of warrant of arrest … is invalid, it now becomes necessary that there be strong and compelling reasons to justify the continued restriction," and the necessity "appears less than clear."

"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to DISMISS the petition insofar as the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 22018 against the petitioner is concerned. Respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) is hereby ordered to proceed with the resolution of the pending motions and incidents … with utmost dispatch. Meanwhile, the Resolution … dated February 20, 1995, imposing a ban on petitioner's travel abroad … is … hereby LIFTED for a period of three (3) months counted from the finality of this decision… SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The classic formulation lists the acts that submit: "in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question … at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person."
The rule applies even assuming the warrant void — the sharpest point in the case.
Applied: "By posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim exemption [from the] effect of being subject to the jurisdiction of respondent court."
The waiver principle is grounded in La Naval Drug v. CA: "lack of jurisdiction over the person … may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself … If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting."
The purity requirement for a special appearance is what defeats him, measured against a record in which his participation "was not confined to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for respondent court's exercise of its jurisdiction."
A "long line of precedents" holds that where the accused posted bail, "it becomes futile to assail the validity of the issuance of the warrants of arrest."
His "must I stay in jail?" objection was answered with a remedy, not a concession: "petitioner is not without a remedy. Petitioner could have filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, rather than actively participate in the proceedings."
On the travel ban the warrant's invalidity does real work: all previous requests had been granted, he "has always returned to the Philippines and complied with the restrictions," and "[t]he risk of flight is further diminished" by his reinstatement at San Miguel.

Doctrine

Bail is submission — "the giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court," even "[c]onceding … that the warrant issued in this case was void."
The objection must be raised at the earliest opportunity: "[i]f he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person."
Waiver may be express or implied.
A special appearance must be purely special — "for the sole and separate purpose of objecting"; "[i]f the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself."
Where bail has been posted, "it becomes futile to assail the validity of the issuance of the warrants of arrest." And continued restriction on travel, where the warrant was invalidly issued, requires "strong and compelling reasons."

Limits.

Two things survive the waiver, and keeping them apart is the whole skill here. Waiving the objection to jurisdiction over the person did not validate the warrant — the Court proceeds from its "initial declaration that the issuance of warrant of arrest … is invalid," and that invalidity is precisely what makes the travel ban unjustifiable.
So the accused loses the jurisdictional point and still wins relief on the consequences. The tension with Miranda v. Tuliao (2006) is real: Miranda holds a motion to quash a warrant is a special appearance that does not submit, and that it is likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it.
The two reconcile because Cojuangco lost by posting bail — the one relief for which custody and submission are always required — and by seeking other affirmative reliefs.
The travel-ban relief was narrow and temporary, three months from finality, further requests to be "addressed to that court."
And the case was not dismissed: the speedy-disposition ground failed, so do not cite this as an inordinate-delay dismissal case.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Classification: DIRECT. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., a former member of the Philippine Coconut Authority Governing Board, was charged under R.A. No. 3019 in Criminal Case No. 22018 before the Sandiganbayan, arising from a 1990 PCGG complaint over a donation granted allegedly by taking undue advantage of public position. He petitioned for prohibition to dismiss the case and to lift a February 20, 1995 order banning him from leaving the country, invoking due process and his right to a speedy disposition, and contending that because "the warrant of arrest issued by respondent Sandiganbayan is null and void, it never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner" and hence no power to restrict his travel. The Court dismissed the petition as to the case, ordered the Sandiganbayan to proceed with dispatch, and lifted the travel ban for three months.

Facts

On January 12, 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a complaint before the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), docketed as I.S. No. 74, against the former Administrator of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) and the former members of the PCA Governing Board — the petitioner among them — for violation of R.A. No. 3019. The complaint charged that they "conspired and confederated together and taking undue advantage of their public positions and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship with the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and former First Lady, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos," and "without authority, granted a donation."
Criminal Case No. 22018 was in due course filed before the Sandiganbayan (First Division), entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., et al."
On February 20, 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioner and a Resolution imposing a ban on his travel abroad without its prior approval, pending resolution of the case.
The petitioner posted bail. This is the act that decides the jurisdictional question against him.
He opposed the issuance of the warrant of arrest, but his participation before the Sandiganbayan "was not confined" to that opposition — he also filed "various motions that sought other affirmative reliefs," covering "other matters which called for respondent court's exercise of its jurisdiction."
All of the petitioner's previous requests to travel abroad were granted, and, as the Solicitor General confirmed, "petitioner has always returned to the Philippines and complied with the restrictions imposed on him."
By the time of this Decision the petitioner had been reinstated as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of San Miguel Corporation, and the warrant had stood for "more than three (3) years."
He filed the present petition for prohibition under Section 2, Rule 65, seeking to dismiss Criminal Case No. 22018, to prohibit further proceedings, and to enjoin enforcement of the February 20, 1995 travel ban, with a prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
On December 21, 1998, the First Division promulgated this Decision through Justice Quisumbing. Justice Vitug filed a Concurring Opinion and Justice Panganiban a Concurring and Dissenting Opinion; Justice Melo took no part.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner (Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.).

On the assigned point his argument was a chain running from the warrant to the travel ban: "since the warrant of arrest issued by respondent Sandiganbayan is null and void, it never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner; as a consequence, it never acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense charged and to issue any order adverse to the rights of petitioner, including an Order restricting his right to travel." The premise was that no probable cause had been determined in the manner Section 2, Article III of the Constitution requires.

He met the waiver argument head-on with a reductio: the prosecution's submission "is not only absurd but also oppressive and offensive to the Bill [of] Rights, since it would mean that to preserve his right against the issuance of a warrant of arrest without probable cause … petitioner should have allowed himself to be incarcerated or imprisoned from the time the warrant … was issued on February 20, 1995 up to the present, or for more than three (3) years, and continue to be imprisoned until the Supreme Court decides to declare the arrest void." He also invoked "his constitutional right to due process, a speedy trial, and a speedy determination of his cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies."

B. Respondents (the Sandiganbayan; the People, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor and the Office of the Solicitor General).

The prosecution maintained that "any infirmity that may have attended" the issuance of the warrant was cured, the petitioner having posted bail and thereafter invoked the court's jurisdiction by seeking affirmative reliefs. To the petitioner's complaint that preserving his objection would have required him to sit in jail, "the Office of the Special Prosecutor has pointed out that petitioner is not without a remedy": he "could have filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, rather than actively participate in the proceedings."

On the travel ban, the Solicitor General in fact took a moderate position, noting that the Sandiganbayan may relax its own rules under the second paragraph of Section 23, Rule 114, that "it has been shown in the past that the petitioner has always returned to the Philippines," and that the petitioner, "now Chairman of the Board of San Miguel Corporation, may be constrained to leave the country for business purposes." It recommended a three-month rather than six-month period, with an additional cash bond.

C. Common Ground.

It was not disputed that the petitioner posted bail, that he opposed the warrant while also filing other motions seeking affirmative relief, or that the February 20, 1995 warrant and travel ban were issued. Nor was it disputed that all his previous travel requests had been granted and that he had always returned and complied with the conditions imposed. Notably, the Court itself proceeds from an "initial declaration that the issuance of warrant of arrest against petitioner by respondent court is invalid" — so the invalidity of the warrant was, for the purposes of the travel-ban discussion, taken as established.

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered).

Whether the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner notwithstanding that the warrant of arrest was invalid — that is, whether his posting of bail and his filing of motions seeking affirmative reliefs constituted submission to the court's jurisdiction, or whether his opposition to the warrant preserved the objection.

B. Secondary Issues.

Whether Criminal Case No. 22018 should be dismissed for violation of his rights to due process and to a speedy trial and speedy disposition of his case, given the delay in the preliminary investigation.

C. Ancillary/Incidental Issues.

Whether the February 20, 1995 travel ban should be lifted, and on what conditions.

Ruling

Main Issue: the court DID acquire jurisdiction over his person. "On this score, the rule is well-settled that the giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court." The Court quotes the classic formulation: "When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court's jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person." And: "Conceding again that the warrant issued in this case was void for the reason that no probable cause was found by the court before issuing it, the defendant waived all his rights to object to the same by appearing and giving bond."

Applied: "By posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim exemption [from the] effect of being subject to the jurisdiction of respondent court. While petitioner has exerted efforts to continue disputing the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest despite his posting bail, his claim has been negated when he himself invoked the jurisdiction of respondent court through the filing of various motions that sought other affirmative reliefs." Under La Naval Drug v. CA, "lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction." Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court." Hence: "Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said court's jurisdiction over him." And "where the accused had posted bail … 'it becomes futile to assail the validity of the issuance of the warrants of arrest.'"

On the petitioner's reductio: he "is not without a remedy" — he "could have filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, rather than actively participate in the proceedings."

Secondary Issue: the petition to dismiss the case FAILS. The Court "resolves to DISMISS the petition insofar as the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 22018 against the petitioner is concerned," and orders the Sandiganbayan "to proceed with the resolution of the pending motions and incidents … with utmost dispatch."

Ancillary Issue: the travel ban is LIFTED for three months. "[P]rescinding from our initial declaration that the issuance of warrant of arrest against petitioner by respondent court is invalid, it now becomes necessary that there be strong and compelling reasons to justify the continued restriction on petitioner's right to travel abroad." Since all previous requests had been granted and he had always returned, "[t]he necessity of further denying petitioner's right to travel abroad … appears less than clear," and "[t]he risk of flight is further diminished" by his reinstatement at San Miguel.

Dispositive portion (verbatim):

"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to DISMISS the petition insofar as the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 22018 against the petitioner is concerned. Respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) is hereby ordered to proceed with the resolution of the pending motions and incidents in Criminal Case No. 22018 with utmost dispatch. Meanwhile, the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (First Division), dated February 20, 1995, imposing a ban on petitioner's travel abroad without its prior approval pending the resolution of Criminal Case No. 22018 is, for the reasons heretofore advanced, hereby LIFTED for a period of three (3) months counted from the finality of this decision. Any similar request during the pendency of said case before the Sandiganbayan shall be addressed to that court.

No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The Court states the bail rule as settled. "On this score, the rule is well-settled that the giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court."
The classic formulation is quoted, and it lists the acts that submit. "When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court's jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person" (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn. 534).
The rule is applied even on the assumption that the warrant was void — the sharpest point in the case. "Conceding again that the warrant issued in this case was void for the reason that no probable cause was found by the court before issuing it, the defendant waived all his rights to object to the same by appearing and giving bond."
Application to the petitioner. "By posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim exemption [from the] effect of being subject to the jurisdiction of respondent court. While petitioner has exerted efforts to continue disputing the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest despite his posting bail, his claim has been negated when he himself invoked the jurisdiction of respondent court through the filing of various motions that sought other affirmative reliefs."
The waiver principle is grounded in La Naval Drug v. CA. "[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction."
The purity requirement for a special appearance is then stated, and it is what defeats him. "Moreover, '[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person.'"
The record is measured against that standard. "Verily, petitioner's participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for respondent court's exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said court's jurisdiction over him." And: "Nor can we ignore the long line of precedents declaring that where the accused had posted bail, as required, to obtain his provisional liberty, 'it becomes futile to assail the validity of the issuance of the warrants of arrest.'"
His "must I stay in jail?" objection is answered with a remedy, not a concession. "[T]he Office of the Special Prosecutor has pointed out that petitioner is not without a remedy. Petitioner could have filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, rather than actively participate in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan."
On the travel ban, the invalidity of the warrant does real work — but only here. "[P]rescinding from our initial declaration that the issuance of warrant of arrest against petitioner by respondent court is invalid, it now becomes necessary that there be strong and compelling reasons to justify the continued restriction on petitioner's right to travel abroad." The Court notes that all previous requests had been granted, that he "has always returned to the Philippines and complied with the restrictions," and that "[t]he risk of flight is further diminished" by his reinstatement as Chairman and CEO of San Miguel Corporation, whose international operations required travel amid "the current economic crisis." Hence "[t]he necessity of further denying petitioner's right to travel abroad … appears less than clear."

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles.

Bail is submission. "[T]he giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court," and this holds "[c]onceding … that the warrant issued in this case was void."

The objection must be raised at the earliest opportunity. "[I]n order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question … at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person."

Waiver may be express or implied (La Naval Drug): "When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself … If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting."

A special appearance must be purely special. It "must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself."

Consequence for the warrant. Where the accused has posted bail to obtain provisional liberty, "it becomes futile to assail the validity of the issuance of the warrants of arrest."

Continued travel restriction requires justification. Where the warrant's issuance is invalid, "there be strong and compelling reasons to justify the continued restriction on [the] right to travel abroad."

C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications.

Two things survive the waiver, and keeping them apart is the whole skill here. Waiving the objection to jurisdiction over the person did not validate the warrant: the Court proceeds from its "initial declaration that the issuance of warrant of arrest … is invalid," and that invalidity is precisely what makes the travel ban unjustifiable. So the accused loses the jurisdictional point and still wins relief on the consequences.
The tension with Miranda vs. Tuliao is real and worth stating. Miranda (2006) holds that a motion to quash a warrant of arrest is a special appearance that does not submit the accused, and that it is likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Cojuangco (1998) tells this petitioner he should have sought certiorari instead of participating. The two are reconcilable — Cojuangco lost because he posted bail (for which custody and submission are always required) and sought other affirmative reliefs, not merely because he opposed the warrant. But recite Miranda for the special-appearance exception and Cojuangco for what forfeits it.
Bail is the one relief for which submission is unavoidable. Jimenez vs. Sorongon puts the same point positively: custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail.
The travel-ban relief was narrow and temporary — three months from finality, with any further request "addressed to that court." The Solicitor General had also recommended an additional cash bond.
The case was not dismissed. The speedy-disposition ground failed as to dismissal; the Sandiganbayan was ordered to proceed "with utmost dispatch." Do not cite this as an inordinate-delay dismissal case.
There are separate opinions. Justice Vitug concurred, and Justice Panganiban concurred and dissented in part; Justice Melo took no part. The ponencia is the controlling text, but the split signals that the balance struck on the travel ban was contested.
Verbatim caveat: the published text reads "petitioner cannot claim exemption effect of being subject to the jurisdiction" — a dropped word ("from the"); and "Bill Rights" for Bill of Rights.

D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

Consistent with the DIRECT classification, the Court squarely decides whether the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner's person and rests that holding on two settled propositions — bail as submission and the purity requirement for a special appearance. For this subtopic it supplies the sharpest illustration of how the objection is lost: not by neglect, but by taking the very steps a litigant naturally takes.

Within the week's IV.c group the cases now cover the full range. Antiporda vs. Garchitorena and Jimenez vs. Sorongon show submission by seeking affirmative relief; Valdepeñas vs. People by silence and conduct; Villa Gomez v. People states the modern rule that the objection is waived "by silence or inaction before the entering of a plea"; Miranda vs. Tuliao carves the special-appearance exception and separates custody of the law from jurisdiction over the person; and Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan shows a litigant who kept the objection alive across seven pleadings because every one preserved it. Cojuangco is the mirror of Garcia: same principle, opposite result, because his appearances were not confined to the objection — and because he posted bail.

Separate Opinions

Two. Justice Vitug filed a Concurring Opinion, and Justice Panganiban a Concurring and Dissenting Opinion. Chief Justice Davide, Jr. concurred in the ponencia; Justice Melo took no part. The Decision was penned by Justice Quisumbing for the First Division.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Implementing Rules

Section 26, Rule 114, Rules of Court

Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 114 (Bail)

An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case. (n)

LawPhil posts the text as amended effective 1 December 2000. Later amendments — notably to the bail and preliminary-investigation rules — are not reflected here, so check the date of the decision against the date of the amendment.

Why it is cited here

Bail as submission, and the one thing it does not waive.

"An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation … provided that he raises them before entering his plea."

The rule is well settled that "the giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court."

This section is the carve-out from that submission, and it is narrow in two ways: it preserves only challenges to the arrest, the warrant, and the preliminary investigation, and only if raised before plea. Everything else is submitted.

Implementing Rules

Section 1, Rule 113, Rules of Court

Definition of arrest

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 113 (Arrest)

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. (1)

Why it is cited here

The two routes, and the acts that count as the second.

"Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense."

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired either by arrest or by voluntary appearance — a closed list.

The classic formulation enumerates the acts that submit: posting bail, filing a motion for reinvestigation, entering a plea, filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief, and participating in the trial.

What unites them is that each asks the court to act on the accused's behalf. A litigant cannot invoke a court's power while denying it has any over him.

Implementing Rules

Section 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court

Grounds

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 117 (Motion to Quash)

The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (3a)

Why it is cited here

Why the two jurisdictions must be tracked apart.

A motion to quash lies where "the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged" — and under Section 9 that ground is never waived.

Jurisdiction over the person behaves in the opposite way: it may be conferred by consent and is lost by any act seeking affirmative relief.

So an accused who posts bail has conceded jurisdiction over his person while keeping every objection to subject-matter jurisdiction intact.

That asymmetry is the whole of this subtopic: the person is submitted by conduct; the offense is conferred only by law.

Related notes:

Garcia v. Sandiganbayan — the mirror case: appearances that stayed special and preserved the objection.
Miranda v. Tuliao — the special-appearance exception, and why bail always requires custody.
Jimenez v. Sorongon — custody is not required for reliefs other than bail.
Antiporda v. Garchitorena — submission by seeking affirmative relief.
Gomez v. People — waiver of the objection by silence or inaction before plea.

Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1998/dec1998/gr_134307_1998.html

Cited laws & provisions

Section 26, Rule 114, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 114 (Bail)

Why it is cited here

Bail as submission, and the one thing it does not waive.

The rule is well settled that "the giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court."

Full entry below ↓

Section 1, Rule 113, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Definition of arrest

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 113 (Arrest)

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. (1)

Why it is cited here

The two routes, and the acts that count as the second.

"Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense."

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired either by arrest or by voluntary appearance — a closed list.

What unites them is that each asks the court to act on the accused's behalf. A litigant cannot invoke a court's power while denying it has any over him.

Full entry below ↓

Section 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Grounds

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 117 (Motion to Quash)

The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (3a)

Why it is cited here

Why the two jurisdictions must be tracked apart.

A motion to quash lies where "the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged" — and under Section 9 that ground is never waived.

Jurisdiction over the person behaves in the opposite way: it may be conferred by consent and is lost by any act seeking affirmative relief.

So an accused who posts bail has conceded jurisdiction over his person while keeping every objection to subject-matter jurisdiction intact.

That asymmetry is the whole of this subtopic: the person is submitted by conduct; the offense is conferred only by law.

Full entry below ↓

ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic

IV. Requisites for Valid Exercise of Jurisdiction — c. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1998/dec1998/gr_134307_1998.html

⚠️ What this case is actually about

ℹ️ The rule on bail and on the purpose of an appearance

Facts

On January 12, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor General filed a complaint before the PCGG (I.S. No. 74) against the former PCA Administrator and former members of the PCA Governing Board, Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. among them, for violation of R.A. No. 3019 — charging that they "conspired and confederated together and taking undue advantage of their public positions … without authority, granted a donation."
Criminal Case No. 22018 was filed before the Sandiganbayan (First Division).
On February 20, 1995 the Sandiganbayan issued a warrant of arrest and a Resolution banning his travel abroad without prior approval pending resolution of the case.
The petitioner posted bail. This is the act that decides the jurisdictional question against him.
He opposed the issuance of the warrant, but his participation "was not confined" to that opposition — he also filed "various motions that sought other affirmative reliefs," covering "other matters which called for respondent court's exercise of its jurisdiction."
All of his previous requests to travel abroad were granted, and, as the Solicitor General confirmed, "petitioner has always returned to the Philippines and complied with the restrictions imposed on him."
By the time of decision he had been reinstated as Chairman and CEO of San Miguel Corporation, and the warrant had stood "more than three (3) years."
He filed a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 to dismiss Criminal Case No. 22018, to prohibit further proceedings, and to lift the travel ban, arguing that because "the warrant of arrest … is null and void, it never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner," and invoking his rights to due process and a speedy disposition. Decided December 21, 1998; Justice Vitug concurred and Justice Panganiban concurred and dissented in part.

Issue

Secondary issue. Whether the case should be dismissed for violation of his rights to due process and a speedy disposition.

Ancillary issue. Whether the travel ban should be lifted.

Ruling

Secondary issue. The petition to dismiss fails; the Sandiganbayan is ordered "to proceed with the resolution of the pending motions and incidents … with utmost dispatch."

"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to DISMISS the petition insofar as the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 22018 against the petitioner is concerned. Respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) is hereby ordered to proceed with the resolution of the pending motions and incidents … with utmost dispatch. Meanwhile, the Resolution … dated February 20, 1995, imposing a ban on petitioner's travel abroad … is … hereby LIFTED for a period of three (3) months counted from the finality of this decision… SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The classic formulation lists the acts that submit: "in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question … at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person."
The rule applies even assuming the warrant void — the sharpest point in the case.
Applied: "By posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim exemption [from the] effect of being subject to the jurisdiction of respondent court."
The waiver principle is grounded in La Naval Drug v. CA: "lack of jurisdiction over the person … may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself … If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting."
The purity requirement for a special appearance is what defeats him, measured against a record in which his participation "was not confined to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for respondent court's exercise of its jurisdiction."
A "long line of precedents" holds that where the accused posted bail, "it becomes futile to assail the validity of the issuance of the warrants of arrest."
His "must I stay in jail?" objection was answered with a remedy, not a concession: "petitioner is not without a remedy. Petitioner could have filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, rather than actively participate in the proceedings."
On the travel ban the warrant's invalidity does real work: all previous requests had been granted, he "has always returned to the Philippines and complied with the restrictions," and "[t]he risk of flight is further diminished" by his reinstatement at San Miguel.

Doctrine

Bail is submission — "the giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court," even "[c]onceding … that the warrant issued in this case was void."
The objection must be raised at the earliest opportunity: "[i]f he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person."
Waiver may be express or implied.
A special appearance must be purely special — "for the sole and separate purpose of objecting"; "[i]f the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself."
Where bail has been posted, "it becomes futile to assail the validity of the issuance of the warrants of arrest." And continued restriction on travel, where the warrant was invalidly issued, requires "strong and compelling reasons."

Limits.

Two things survive the waiver, and keeping them apart is the whole skill here. Waiving the objection to jurisdiction over the person did not validate the warrant — the Court proceeds from its "initial declaration that the issuance of warrant of arrest … is invalid," and that invalidity is precisely what makes the travel ban unjustifiable.
So the accused loses the jurisdictional point and still wins relief on the consequences. The tension with Miranda v. Tuliao (2006) is real: Miranda holds a motion to quash a warrant is a special appearance that does not submit, and that it is likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it.
The two reconcile because Cojuangco lost by posting bail — the one relief for which custody and submission are always required — and by seeking other affirmative reliefs.
The travel-ban relief was narrow and temporary, three months from finality, further requests to be "addressed to that court."
And the case was not dismissed: the speedy-disposition ground failed, so do not cite this as an inordinate-delay dismissal case.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Facts

On January 12, 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a complaint before the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), docketed as I.S. No. 74, against the former Administrator of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) and the former members of the PCA Governing Board — the petitioner among them — for violation of R.A. No. 3019. The complaint charged that they "conspired and confederated together and taking undue advantage of their public positions and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship with the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and former First Lady, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos," and "without authority, granted a donation."
Criminal Case No. 22018 was in due course filed before the Sandiganbayan (First Division), entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., et al."
On February 20, 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioner and a Resolution imposing a ban on his travel abroad without its prior approval, pending resolution of the case.
The petitioner posted bail. This is the act that decides the jurisdictional question against him.
He opposed the issuance of the warrant of arrest, but his participation before the Sandiganbayan "was not confined" to that opposition — he also filed "various motions that sought other affirmative reliefs," covering "other matters which called for respondent court's exercise of its jurisdiction."
All of the petitioner's previous requests to travel abroad were granted, and, as the Solicitor General confirmed, "petitioner has always returned to the Philippines and complied with the restrictions imposed on him."
By the time of this Decision the petitioner had been reinstated as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of San Miguel Corporation, and the warrant had stood for "more than three (3) years."
He filed the present petition for prohibition under Section 2, Rule 65, seeking to dismiss Criminal Case No. 22018, to prohibit further proceedings, and to enjoin enforcement of the February 20, 1995 travel ban, with a prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
On December 21, 1998, the First Division promulgated this Decision through Justice Quisumbing. Justice Vitug filed a Concurring Opinion and Justice Panganiban a Concurring and Dissenting Opinion; Justice Melo took no part.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner (Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.).

B. Respondents (the Sandiganbayan; the People, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor and the Office of the Solicitor General).

C. Common Ground.

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered).

B. Secondary Issues.

C. Ancillary/Incidental Issues.

Whether the February 20, 1995 travel ban should be lifted, and on what conditions.

Ruling

Dispositive portion (verbatim):

"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to DISMISS the petition insofar as the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 22018 against the petitioner is concerned. Respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) is hereby ordered to proceed with the resolution of the pending motions and incidents in Criminal Case No. 22018 with utmost dispatch. Meanwhile, the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (First Division), dated February 20, 1995, imposing a ban on petitioner's travel abroad without its prior approval pending the resolution of Criminal Case No. 22018 is, for the reasons heretofore advanced, hereby LIFTED for a period of three (3) months counted from the finality of this decision. Any similar request during the pendency of said case before the Sandiganbayan shall be addressed to that court.

No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The Court states the bail rule as settled. "On this score, the rule is well-settled that the giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court."
The classic formulation is quoted, and it lists the acts that submit. "When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court's jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person" (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn. 534).
The rule is applied even on the assumption that the warrant was void — the sharpest point in the case. "Conceding again that the warrant issued in this case was void for the reason that no probable cause was found by the court before issuing it, the defendant waived all his rights to object to the same by appearing and giving bond."
Application to the petitioner. "By posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim exemption [from the] effect of being subject to the jurisdiction of respondent court. While petitioner has exerted efforts to continue disputing the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest despite his posting bail, his claim has been negated when he himself invoked the jurisdiction of respondent court through the filing of various motions that sought other affirmative reliefs."
The waiver principle is grounded in La Naval Drug v. CA. "[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction."
The purity requirement for a special appearance is then stated, and it is what defeats him. "Moreover, '[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person.'"
The record is measured against that standard. "Verily, petitioner's participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for respondent court's exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said court's jurisdiction over him." And: "Nor can we ignore the long line of precedents declaring that where the accused had posted bail, as required, to obtain his provisional liberty, 'it becomes futile to assail the validity of the issuance of the warrants of arrest.'"
His "must I stay in jail?" objection is answered with a remedy, not a concession. "[T]he Office of the Special Prosecutor has pointed out that petitioner is not without a remedy. Petitioner could have filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, rather than actively participate in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan."
On the travel ban, the invalidity of the warrant does real work — but only here. "[P]rescinding from our initial declaration that the issuance of warrant of arrest against petitioner by respondent court is invalid, it now becomes necessary that there be strong and compelling reasons to justify the continued restriction on petitioner's right to travel abroad." The Court notes that all previous requests had been granted, that he "has always returned to the Philippines and complied with the restrictions," and that "[t]he risk of flight is further diminished" by his reinstatement as Chairman and CEO of San Miguel Corporation, whose international operations required travel amid "the current economic crisis." Hence "[t]he necessity of further denying petitioner's right to travel abroad … appears less than clear."

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles.

Consequence for the warrant. Where the accused has posted bail to obtain provisional liberty, "it becomes futile to assail the validity of the issuance of the warrants of arrest."

C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications.

Two things survive the waiver, and keeping them apart is the whole skill here. Waiving the objection to jurisdiction over the person did not validate the warrant: the Court proceeds from its "initial declaration that the issuance of warrant of arrest … is invalid," and that invalidity is precisely what makes the travel ban unjustifiable. So the accused loses the jurisdictional point and still wins relief on the consequences.
The tension with Miranda vs. Tuliao is real and worth stating. Miranda (2006) holds that a motion to quash a warrant of arrest is a special appearance that does not submit the accused, and that it is likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Cojuangco (1998) tells this petitioner he should have sought certiorari instead of participating. The two are reconcilable — Cojuangco lost because he posted bail (for which custody and submission are always required) and sought other affirmative reliefs, not merely because he opposed the warrant. But recite Miranda for the special-appearance exception and Cojuangco for what forfeits it.
Bail is the one relief for which submission is unavoidable. Jimenez vs. Sorongon puts the same point positively: custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail.
The travel-ban relief was narrow and temporary — three months from finality, with any further request "addressed to that court." The Solicitor General had also recommended an additional cash bond.
The case was not dismissed. The speedy-disposition ground failed as to dismissal; the Sandiganbayan was ordered to proceed "with utmost dispatch." Do not cite this as an inordinate-delay dismissal case.
There are separate opinions. Justice Vitug concurred, and Justice Panganiban concurred and dissented in part; Justice Melo took no part. The ponencia is the controlling text, but the split signals that the balance struck on the travel ban was contested.
Verbatim caveat: the published text reads "petitioner cannot claim exemption effect of being subject to the jurisdiction" — a dropped word ("from the"); and "Bill Rights" for Bill of Rights.

D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).