Facts

• On October 30, 1986 Alvin Calma Vinculado was shot dead and Levi and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr. seriously wounded at San Ildefonso, Bulacan.
• On November 12, 1993 Honorato Galvez, incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego were charged in Branch 14, RTC Malolos (Judge Villajuan) in three separate Informations for Homicide and two counts of Frustrated Homicide (Crim. Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93). Both posted cash bail and were released.
• On November 16, 1993 Judge Villajuan deferred the arraignment on the Provincial Prosecutor's motion "to review the evidence on record and determine once more the proper crimes chargeable."
• Under DOJ Department Order No. 369, Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan and directed to re-investigate.
• On December 15, 1993 — before petitioners could be arraigned — Villa-Ignacio filed an ex parte "Motion to Withdraw Informations," which Judge Villajuan granted the same day. No plea had been entered; no jeopardy had attached.
• On the same day he filed four new Informations for Murder, two counts of Frustrated Murder, and violation of P.D. No. 1866, raffled to Branch 10 (Judge Pornillos). No bail was recommended for Murder, and warrants of arrest issued.
• On January 20, 1994 Judge Villajuan reversed himself, set aside the dismissal and reinstated the original three cases — while on January 24, 1994 Judge Pornillos denied the motion to quash and, on petitioners' refusal to plead, directed the interpreter to enter pleas of not guilty. Two branches now held the same accused.
• On February 18, 1994 the Court of Appeals (17th Division) dismissed petitioners' certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 33261).
• On March 1, 1994 this Court ordered all seven cases transferred to the RTC of Quezon City and raffled as a single case (Branch 103, Judge Salazar). Decided October 24, 1994 (Second Division).

Issue

• Whether an ex parte motion to withdraw, without notice and hearing under Rule 15, is void.
• Whether the first court's order of withdrawal terminated its jurisdiction, letting another branch take the new Informations.
• Whether the Secretary of Justice may designate an outside prosecutor.
• Whether the court may enter a plea for a refusing accused.
• Whether habeas corpus lies.

Ruling

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition for certiorari and mandamus together with the petition for habeas corpus; DENYING, for lack of merit, the motion to cite respondent judge and prosecutor for contempt and to annul proceedings; and ORDERING the withdrawal and invalidation of the three informations for homicide and frustrated homicide against petitioners from the docket of Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

• The Court set out the four-part Teehankee framework distinguishing amendment from substitution: "1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution necessarily involves a substantial change from the original charge; 2. Amendment before plea … without leave of court, but substitution … must be with leave of court as the original information has to be dismissed; 3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary investigation and the retaking of the plea; in substitution … another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew; and 4. An amended information refers to the same offense … or to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge … substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves a different offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy§."
• Applied, the case turns on the plea. No arraignment having occurred, no first jeopardy had attached under Section 7, Rule 117§, so the prosecution could validly withdraw and refile. Citing Dimalibot v. Salcedo: "the change may also be made even if it may result in altering the nature of the charge so long as it can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant." The primary index of prejudice is whether the accused has already pleaded.
• The Crespo v. Mogul doctrine supplies the judicial check. "[O]nce a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control … he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court." Here the prosecutor did not act unilaterally — he obtained the court's express imprimatur.
• Want of notice on a pre-plea dismissal is an irregularity, not a nullity: "[t]he order … granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing … is merely an irregularity … It cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction," the remedy being to have it set aside or cured — and here the defect was cured when Judge Villajuan heard the motion for reconsideration in full.
• The rule of exclusion in concurrent jurisdiction yields to voluntary relinquishment: "no accused has a vested right to be tried in any particular court of concurrent jurisdiction; and when one court … voluntarily relinquishes it by a nolle prosequi or dismissal, there can be no legal or logical reason for preventing the other court from proceeding."
• The designation was valid under P.D. No. 1275, the Secretary's supervision and control including "the authority to act directly on any matter within the jurisdiction of the Prosecution Staff … and to review, modify or revoke any decision or action."
• Habeas corpus cannot substitute for certiorari to resolve preliminary jurisdictional questions, nor is it "the proper vehicle for asserting the right to bail."

Doctrine

• Amendment versus substitution — the four Teehankee distinctions above, keyed to form/substance, leave of court, fresh preliminary investigation and re-plea, and whether double jeopardy may be invoked.
• The arraignment threshold: substantial changes are permitted as of right before plea, without leave; after plea they are proscribed unless beneficial to the accused or arising from a supervening event.
• The Crespo rule: once filed, disposition "rests in the sound discretion of the Court," and the fiscal "cannot impose his opinion on the trial court."
• Pre-plea dismissal without notice is "merely an irregularity" that does not defeat jurisdiction.
• Relinquishment by nolle prosequi frees another court of concurrent jurisdiction to proceed, no accused having "a vested right to be tried in any particular court."
• Plea on silence: under Section 1, Rule 116, if the accused refuses to plead the court must enter a plea of not guilty.

• Substitution is available only where the new charge is a different offence not necessarily included in the original — otherwise the prosecution is confined to amendment.
• And if the first Information is withdrawn after the plea, the accused may successfully invoke double jeopardy; everything here depends on the withdrawal preceding arraignment.
• After arraignment, a substantial amendment is allowed only if beneficial — e.g. downgrading Murder to Homicide.
• Note the procedural chaos the case tolerated but did not endorse: two branches simultaneously holding the same accused, one having reinstated the withdrawn Informations, resolved only by this Court's transfer order and its final direction to withdraw and invalidate the three original Informations.
• Read with Fronda-Baggao v. People, which cites Galvez for exactly this: before plea, the number and gravity of the Informations are the State's to restructure.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Facts

• October 30, 1986: [Date of the shooting incident as indicated in the record] Alvin Calma Vinculado was shot to death, while Levi Calma Vinculado and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr. were seriously wounded at San Ildefonso, Bulacan.
• November 12, 1993: Petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and Godofredo Diego were charged before Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, presided over by Judge Felipe N. Villajuan, in three separate Informations for Homicide and two counts of Frustrated Homicide, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93. Both accused posted their respective cash bail bonds and were subsequently released from detention.
• November 15, 1993: Bulacan Provincial Prosecutor Liberato L. Reyes filed a "Motion to Defer Arraignment and Subsequent Proceedings" before Judge Villajuan to enable his office "to review the evidence on record and determine once more the proper crimes chargeable against the accused."
• November 16, 1993: Judge Villajuan issued an Order granting the Provincial Prosecutor's motion to defer the arraignment.
• Subsequent Date (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD): Pursuant to Department Order No. 369 of the Department of Justice (DOJ), respondent Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio (then First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Pasig, Rizal) was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan and was instructed to conduct a re-investigation of the criminal cases against the petitioners.
• November 23, 1993: Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed a "Manifestation with Ex-parte Motion" before the trial court. Consequently, Judge Villajuan ordered the suspension of the proceedings until the prosecution's request for a change of venue was resolved by the Supreme Court and the preliminary investigation conducted by Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio terminated.
• December 2, 1993: Private complainants, through their counsel Atty. Silvestre R. Bello III, filed a "Petition for Change of Venue" of Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 with the Supreme Court to safeguard the lives of the victims and witnesses.
• December 15, 1993: Before petitioners could be arraigned in Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93, respondent Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed an ex parte "Motion to Withdraw Informations." On the very same day, Judge Villajuan issued an Order granting the motion, and the original cases were considered withdrawn from the docket of Branch 14.
• December 15, 1993 (Simultaneous with the withdrawal): Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new Informations against the petitioners for Murder, two counts of Frustrated Murder, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for Illegal Possession of Firearms. These cases were raffled to Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, presided over by Judge Victoria Pornillos, and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93. Because no bail was recommended for the crime of Murder, Judge Pornillos ordered the arrest of petitioners.
• December 23, 1993: Judge Pornillos issued an Order setting the arraignment of the accused in the new cases for December 27, 1993.
• December 27, 1993: The scheduled arraignment before Judge Pornillos was reset due to the absence of the respondent prosecutor. On the same date, petitioners filed before Judge Villajuan of Branch 14 a "Motion for Reconsideration" of the December 15, 1993 order that had granted the withdrawal of the original Homicide Informations.
• January 3, 1994: Petitioners filed a "Motion to Quash" the four new Informations before Judge Pornillos of Branch 10 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
• January 20, 1994: Judge Villajuan of Branch 14 issued an Order granting the petitioners' "Motion for Reconsideration," setting aside his previous order of dismissal, and ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93, setting their arraignment for February 8, 1994.
• January 24, 1994: Judge Pornillos of Branch 10 issued an Order denying the petitioners' "Motion to Quash." At the same proceeding, when the petitioners refused to plead to the new Informations, Judge Pornillos directed the court interpreter to enter a plea of not guilty for them in Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93.
• February 8, 1994: The scheduled arraignment of petitioners under the reinstated cases in Branch 14 was suspended because petitioners had filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 33261), challenging Judge Pornillos' order of January 24, 1994.
• February 18, 1994: The Court of Appeals (17th Division) issued a Resolution dismissing the petitioners' petition for certiorari.
• Subsequent Date (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD): Petitioners filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with a petition for habeas corpus before the Supreme Court.
• February 24, 1994: The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order in Administrative Matter No. 94-1-13-RTC (re: the petition for change of venue filed by the Vinculados), enjoining both Judge Villajuan (Branch 14) and Judge Pornillos (Branch 10) from proceeding with the cases.
• March 1, 1994: The Supreme Court issued a Resolution directing the Executive Judge of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, to transfer all seven cases to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City for raffle as a single case. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-94-55481 to Q-94-55487 and assigned to Branch 103 under Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.
• May 26, 1994: During a trial hearing before Judge Salazar in Quezon City, the prosecution and defense entered into an agreement that the trial on the merits would proceed on the condition that: (a) the defense shall not be deemed to have waived any objection raised in G.R. No. 114046; and (b) the trial shall be without prejudice to whatever decision the Supreme Court may render.
• October 24, 1994: The Supreme Court Second Division promulgated its Decision dismissing the petition.

Arguments of the Parties

1. Void Withdrawal of Informations for Lack of Notice: Petitioners argued that the prosecution's failure to serve them with a copy of the motion to withdraw the original Informations and to set it for hearing violated their right to be informed of the proceedings and breached Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, they claimed the ex parte motion was a worthless scrap of paper, making the order of dismissal null and void.
2. Amendment, Not Withdrawal, as the Only Proper Remedy: They contended that under Section 14, Rule 110§, when the prosecution seeks to change the nature of the charge from Homicide to Murder (by adding the qualifying circumstance of treachery), the exclusive and proper legal remedy is through the filing of an amended Information. They argued that the withdrawal of an Information is allowed only where the new Information involves an entirely different offense which does not include, and is not included in, the offense originally charged.
3. Prejudice to the Substantive Right to Bail: Petitioners asserted that the outright dismissal of the bailable Homicide charges and the simultaneous filing of non-bailable Murder charges substantially prejudiced their right to bail.
4. Lack of Authority of the Prosecuting Officer: They claimed that the designation of Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio (First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Pasig) to act as Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan was arbitrary and lacked legal basis, thereby rendering the new Informations signed by him null and void.
5. Invalid Arraignment: They maintained that their arraignment on January 24, 1994, was void because they were not furnished copies of the new Informations with a list of witnesses, in violation of Section 1, Rule 116.
6. Violation of Jurisdictional Exclusion and Forum Shopping: They argued that because Branch 14 had first acquired jurisdiction over the accused and the subject matter, Branch 10 was barred from taking cognizance of the new cases under the rule of jurisdictional exclusion, and that the prosecution's maneuver constituted malicious forum shopping.

1. Arraignment as the Threshold of Jeopardy: Respondents countered that because the motion to withdraw the original Informations was filed and granted before the petitioners were arraigned, no first jeopardy had attached under Section 7, Rule 117§. Thus, there was no mandatory procedural requirement for notice and hearing.
2. Procedural Defect Cured by Reconsideration: They argued that even assuming there was a procedural lapse in the ex parte motion, the defect was fully cured when Judge Villajuan gave the petitioners a full hearing on their motion for reconsideration, which resulted in the temporary reinstatement of the original cases.
3. Complete Prosecutorial Discretion with Leave of Court: They contended that while the disposition of a case once filed in court rests in the sound discretion of the judge, the prosecutor retains control over the direction of the prosecution. Because the trial court gave its explicit imprimatur to the withdrawal, the prosecutor did not exceed his authority.
4. Broad Supervisory Power of the DOJ: Respondents asserted that the designation of Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio by the Secretary of Justice was a valid exercise of the broad power of supervision and control over the National Prosecution Service under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1275, which superseded the narrow restrictions of the old Revised Administrative Code.
5. No Double Jeopardy or Prejudice: They maintained that the petitioners were not prejudiced because had the original Informations been amended to Murder instead of substituted, bail would still be a matter of judicial discretion once the evidence of guilt was shown to be strong.

• Undisputed Facts: Both parties agreed that the original three Informations for Homicide and Frustrated Homicide were filed on November 12, 1993; that both petitioners posted bail and were released; that no arraignment was conducted under the first set of cases before the prosecutor filed the motion to withdraw on December 15, 1993; and that a new set of four Informations was filed on the same day.

Issue

1. Whether an ex parte motion to withdraw or dismiss a criminal Information filed by the prosecution prior to the arraignment of the accused is null and void for lack of notice and hearing under Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
2. Whether the trial court's order granting the withdrawal of the original Informations terminates the first court's jurisdiction, thereby allowing another branch of concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the newly filed Informations without violating the rule of jurisdictional exclusion or constituting forum shopping.
3. Whether the Secretary of Justice possesses the authority under P.D. No. 1275 to designate an acting provincial prosecutor from another district to conduct a re-investigation and sign new Informations.
4. Whether the trial court possesses the authority to enter a plea of not guilty for the accused when the latter refuse to plead during arraignment, and whether such proceeding is valid under Section 1, Rule 116.
5. Whether a petition for habeas corpus is the proper remedy to challenge the pre-trial jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the offense.

Ruling

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition for certiorari and mandamus together with the petition for habeas corpus; DENYING, for lack of merit, the motion to cite respondent judge and prosecutor for contempt and to annul proceedings; and ORDERING the withdrawal and invalidation of the three informations for homicide and frustrated homicide against petitioners from the docket of Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

1. Distinction Between Amendment and Substitution Under Rule 110, Section 14§: The Court clarified the structural boundaries of Section 14, Rule 110§, adopting the four-part comparative framework established in Teehankee, Jr. vs. Madayag (207 SCRA 134):

   "The first paragraph provides the rule for amendment of the information or complaint, while the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint.

   It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may be made before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects:

   1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution necessarily involves a substantial change from the original charge;

   2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but substitution of information must be with leave of court as the original information has to be dismissed;

   3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new information; and

   4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge, hence substantial amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy§. On the other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves a different offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy."

   Applying these rules, the Court observed that because the petitioners had not yet been arraigned under the original Homicide Informations, no first jeopardy had attached under Section 7, Rule 117§. Therefore, the prosecution could validly withdraw the original Informations and file new ones, as no substantial rights of the accused were impaired. The Court cited Dimalibot vs. Salcedo (107 Phil. 843), confirming that "the change may also be made even if it may result in altering the nature of the charge so long as it can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant." The primary index of prejudice is whether the accused has already entered his plea; prior to arraignment, the prosecution is free to substitute or amend the charges.
2. The Mogul Doctrine of Judicial Discretion Over Filed Cases: The Court reiterated that once an Information is filed in court, the sole and exclusive authority to determine its disposition rests with the trial judge. Quoting the landmark rule in Crespo vs. Mogul (151 SCRA 462):

   "Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case. ... the rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court."

   In the present case, the prosecutor did not act unilaterally but sought and obtained the trial court's explicit imprimatur through its order of December 15, 1993, which dismissed the original cases.
3. Absence of Notice on Pre-Plea Dismissals is a Non-Jurisdictional Irregularity: The Court rejected the petitioners' contention that the lack of notice and hearing under Rule 15 rendered the dismissal void. Prior to arraignment, there is no "imperative need for notice and hearing thereof." Citing established precedent:

   "The order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the complaint, or to appeal from the dismissal and not certiorari."

   Furthermore, because Judge Villajuan subsequently gave the petitioners a full opportunity to argue their Motion for Reconsideration, the procedural defect was deemed fully cured.
4. Relinquishment of Jurisdiction via nolle prosequi: The Court explained that the rule of exclusion in concurrent jurisdiction (where the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes all others) does not apply when the first court voluntarily relinquishes its cognizance. The entry of a nolle prosequi or a voluntary withdrawal of the Information terminates the first proceeding:

   "... no accused has a vested right to be tried in any particular court of concurrent jurisdiction; and when one court of concurrent jurisdiction voluntarily relinquishes it by a nolle prosequi or dismissal of the case, there can be no legal or logical reason for preventing the other court from proceeding."

   Once Branch 14 dismissed the first cases, Branch 10 was fully vested with jurisdiction to entertain the new Informations.
5. Broad Supervisorial Authority of the Secretary of Justice: Under P.D. No. 1275, the Secretary of Justice has broad supervisorial authority over the National Prosecution Service, which includes the power to directly designate prosecutors to handle and sign specific cases:

   "The power of supervision and control vested in the Secretary of Justice includes the authority to act directly on any matter within the jurisdiction of the Prosecution Staff, the Regional State Prosecution Office or the Office of the Provincial or City Fiscal and to review, modify or revoke any decision or action of the Chief of said staff or office."

   This statutory provision completely swept away the narrow limitations of the old Revised Administrative Code of 1917, making Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio's designation and his signature on the new Informations legally valid.
6. Habeas Corpus Inapplicable as a Pre-Trial Substitute for Certiorari: The Court ruled that habeas corpus cannot be used to bypass the orderly course of trial or to resolve preliminary jurisdictional questions. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, the usual remedies of certiorari and appeal must be exhausted. Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus is not the proper vehicle for asserting the right to bail or challenging its denial.

Doctrine

• The Prejudice Test for Post-Plea Amendments: Under Section 14, Rule 110§, an amendment made after the plea of the accused is formal and permissible only if: (a) it does not change the nature or essence of the crime, (b) it does not expose the accused to a higher penalty, (c) it does not cause surprise or alter the prosecution's theory, and (d) the defenses and evidence prepared by the accused remain equally applicable.
• The Arraignment Threshold: Arraignment is the absolute dividing line in criminal procedure. Substantial amendments in form or substance are permitted as a matter of right before the accused enters a plea, without needing leave of court. Post-plea, substantial amendments are strictly proscribed unless they are beneficial to the accused or arise due to a supervening event.
• Plea Entry Upon Silence of the Accused: Under Section 1, Rule 116, if the accused refuses to plead or makes a conditional plea, the trial court is procedurally mandated to enter a plea of not guilty for him to join the issues.

• The Double Jeopardy Limitation: Substitution of an Information is permitted because it presupposes that the new charge is a completely different offense that is not necessarily included in the original Information. Thus, the accused cannot invoke double jeopardy. However, if the new Information charges an offense that is necessarily included in the first charge, the prosecution is confined to an amendment. If the prosecutor withdraws the first Information after the plea is taken, the accused may successfully invoke double jeopardy.
• Substantial Amendments beneficial to the Accused: A substantial amendment may be allowed after arraignment only if it is beneficial to the accused, such as when a charge is downgraded from Murder to Homicide.

Separate Opinions