Garcia v. CA

IV.b — Complaint or Information: Sufficiency

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Case DigestWeek 3 - Rule 110 - Prosecution of Offenses

Garcia v. CA

G.R. No. 119063 · January 27, 1997 · Third Division

IV.b — Complaint or Information: Sufficiency

Petitioner: Jose G. Garcia (petitioner)Respondent: Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines (public respondents); Adela Teodora P. Santos (private respondent — real party in interest)

Gist

The relationship of this case to the requested topic of Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110) > IV. Complaint or Information > b. Sufficiency is DIRECT.

Core Doctrine

Where the ground of a motion to quash is that criminal liability has been extinguished by prescription, the court is not confined to the four corners of the Information: Section 2, Rule 117 requires the motion to state its factual and legal grounds, so the accused may prove facts aliunde that contradict the date of discovery alleged. In bigamy, Article 91 draws no distinction between public and private crimes, so both the first and the second innocent spouse are offended parties and discovery by either starts the period running. The absence from the Philippines that suspends prescription must be a continuous, non-transient departure; brief trips abroad with consistent return do not toll it.

ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic

IV.b — Complaint or Information: Sufficiency Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/jan1997/gr_119063_1997.html

Facts

On December 1, 1951 Adela Teodora P. Santos married Reynaldo Quiroca in Manila, using the name "Adela Santos."
On or before February 2, 1957 she married petitioner Jose G. Garcia in Quezon City, the first marriage remaining valid and undissolved.
In 1974 Jose discovered the prior marriage. Confronting her guardian Eugenia R. Balingit about their impending separation, Balingit asked whether Adela's former boyfriend "Rey" was the reason, then collapsed into her chair and said "hindi na nagbago," confirming the previous marriage and revealing she had seen Quiroca recently. 1974 is the date the case turns on.
Between June 3, 1977 and November 14, 1988 Adela made sixteen (16) brief trips abroad — Hong Kong, Australia, Singapore, Japan, San Francisco — returning to the Philippines every time.
On January 23, 1991 Jose testified under oath in Civil Case No. 90-52730, admitting on cross-examination that he discovered the prior marriage in 1974.
On October 16, 1991 he filed a Civil Service Commission complaint containing a verified statement that the facts of the prior marriage "were discovered by him in the year 1974." His own two sworn admissions defeat him.
On January 8, 1992 the Information for Bigamy was filed in the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 83 (Crim. Case No. Q-92-27272) — alleging the discovery as "1989."
On March 2, 1992 Adela moved to quash on prescription under Article 89(5), pointing to those two admissions.
On June 29, 1992 Judge Estrella T. Estrada granted the motion and dismissed, the 15-year period having run from 1974 to 1989. Reconsideration, supplemented by a BID certification of Adela's travels, was denied.
On February 13, 1995 the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto. Decided January 27, 1997 (Third Division).

Issue

Whether an Information for bigamy alleging discovery in "1989" withstands a motion to quash on prescription where the accused introduces evidence aliunde — the complainant's own sworn admissions — proving discovery in 1974; and whether discovery by the private "offended party" under Article 91 starts the period running in a public offence.

Secondary issues. Whether a motion to quash on extinction of criminal liability is confined to the four corners of the Information; and whether brief trips abroad constitute "absence from the Philippine Archipelago" suspending prescription.

Ruling

The crime had prescribed. The private innocent spouse is an "offended party" under Article 91; discovery in 1974 triggered the 15-year period, which expired in 1989; the Information having been filed January 8, 1992, prosecution was barred.

Secondary issues. YES, the court may consider facts aliunde — Section 2, Rule 117 requires the motion to specify "factual and legal grounds." NO, brief transient trips with consistent return "do not constitute the 'absence' contemplated by Article 91."

"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the challenged decision of 13 February 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14324 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The Court dismantled the public-crime argument from the text of the statute. Article 91 runs the period "from the day the crime is discovered by the 'offended party, the authorities, or their agents,'" and — the decisive sentence — "This rule makes no distinction between a public crime and a private crime. In both cases then, the discovery may be by the 'offended party, the authorities, or their agents.'"
It then defined "offended party" by integrating three provisions. Rule 110's Section 12 defines him as "the person against whom or against whose property, the offense was committed"; Article 100 makes every person criminally liable also civilly liable; and under Section 1, Rule 111 the civil action is impliedly instituted with the criminal. Since the civil liability runs to the private individual, that individual is the offended party — and here the petitioner was himself named as the offended party in the Information.
On procedure, the Court rejected confinement to the face of the Information. Section 2, Rule 117 requires a motion to quash to state "factual and legal grounds," so it necessarily follows that facts outside the information itself may be introduced to prove such grounds.
The practical rationale is candid: it would be "a pure technicality for the court to close its eyes" to proven prescription and proceed to trial, wasting the time of court and parties.
On "absence," the Court read Article 91 strictly: "These trips were brief, and in every case the private respondent returned to the Philippines. Besides, these were made long after the petitioner discovered the offense and even if the aggregate number of days of these trips are considered, still the information was filed well beyond the prescriptive period."

Doctrine

The bigamy discovery rule. Both the first and second innocent spouses are "offended parties" under Article 91, and discovery by either starts the prescriptive period; the rule "makes no distinction between a public crime and a private crime." Motions to quash and matters aliunde: where the ground is extinction of criminal liability, the court is not confined to the allegations of the Information — the accused may introduce facts outside it, Section 2, Rule 117 requiring "factual and legal grounds." "Absence" under Article 91 must be a continuous, non-transient departure; brief travels with consistent return do not toll prescription.

Both the first and second innocent spouses are "offended parties" under Article 91, and discovery by either starts the prescriptive period; the rule "makes no distinction between a public crime and a private crime."
Motions to quash and matters aliunde: where the ground is extinction of criminal liability, the court is not confined to the allegations of the Information — the accused may introduce facts outside it, Section 2, Rule 117 requiring "factual and legal grounds."
"Absence" under Article 91 must be a continuous, non-transient departure; brief travels with consistent return do not toll prescription.

Limits.

The aliunde rule is an exception, not the general rule. A motion to quash for failure of the allegations to charge an offence still "rests on the hypothetical admission of the facts alleged on the face of the Information"; the exception is carved out for prescription and double jeopardy, where facts aliunde admitted or not denied by the prosecution may be looked at.
The admissions that carried the case were the complainant's own: "[a] party's own voluntary declarations under oath in another judicial proceeding are not hearsay as to him," being party admissions under Rule 130, Section 26.
Note the structural point for Rule 110: Sections 6 and 11 require only an approximate date, but Garcia holds that the prosecution's chosen "discovery" date in the Information is not an unassailable shield — a complainant cannot "hide behind a prosecutor's self-serving, belated date of 'discovery'" when his own prior sworn admissions establish earlier knowledge.
And prescription here is substantive, totally extinguishing the State's authority to prosecute — which is why it may be raised and proved this way at all.
Compare Arambulo v. Laqui and Corpus, Jr. v. People: the three cases together cover when the clock starts, what stops it, and what happens if it runs out.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

The relationship of this case to the requested topic of Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110) > IV. Complaint or Information > b. Sufficiency is DIRECT.

This case arose from a criminal prosecution for bigamy initiated by petitioner Jose G. Garcia against his wife, private respondent Adela Teodora P. Santos, based on an Information alleging that the second marriage was "discovered in 1989," which the private respondent countered with a Motion to Quash on the ground of prescription by establishing through the petitioner’s own prior judicial admissions that he had actually discovered her prior subsisting marriage as early as 1974. The Regional Trial Court granted the Motion to Quash and dismissed the case, a ruling subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the dismissal, declaring that under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescriptive period for bigamy commences upon its discovery by the private innocent spouse as the "offended party," since the law makes no distinction between public and private offenses in terms of who may discover the crime. Furthermore, the Court established that under Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, a motion to quash is not strictly limited to the four corners of the Information, and the accused may introduce facts outside the indictment (matters aliunde) to prove the factual and legal grounds of the extinction of criminal liability.

Facts

December 1, 1951: Adela Teodora P. Santos contracted a lawful marriage with Reynaldo Quiroca in Manila, using the name "Adela Santos".
February 2, 1957 (on or before): Adela Teodora P. Santos contracted a second marriage with petitioner Jose G. Garcia in Quezon City, Philippines, while her prior marriage to Reynaldo Quiroca remained valid and undissolved.
1974: Jose G. Garcia discovered Adela’s prior marriage. Upon confronting her guardian, Eugenia R. Balingit, about their impending separation, Balingit asked if Adela's former boyfriend "Rey" was the reason. Balingit collapsed into her chair and said, "hindi na nagbago," confirming Adela's previous marriage and revealing she had seen Quiroca recently.
June 3, 1977 – November 14, 1988: Adela Teodora P. Santos made sixteen (16) brief, temporary trips abroad (e.g., departing for Hong Kong on June 3, 1977, and returning on July 2, 1977; departing for Australia, Singapore, Japan, and San Francisco on various dates), returning to the Philippines in every instance.
1989: The year of "discovery" of the bigamous marriage as subsequently alleged in the criminal Information.
January 23, 1991: Jose G. Garcia testified under oath in Civil Case No. 90-52730, entitled "Jose G. Garcia v. Delia S. Garcia" before the Regional Trial Court, admitting during cross-examination that he discovered Adela’s prior marriage in the year 1974.
August 28, 1991: Jose G. Garcia filed an "Affidavit of Complaint" with the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office, charging Adela with Bigamy, Violation of C.A. No. 142 (as amended by R.A. No. 6085), and Falsification of Public Documents.
October 10, 1991: Jose G. Garcia sent a letter to Assistant City Prosecutor George F. Cabanilla, formally electing to limit his criminal action to the charge of bigamy.
October 16, 1991: Jose G. Garcia filed an administrative complaint against Adela before the Civil Service Commission (CSC), containing a verified statement in Paragraph 7 declaring that the facts of the prior marriage were discovered by him in the year 1974.
November 15, 1991: Assistant Prosecutor George F. Cabanilla drafted the criminal Information for Bigamy against Adela.
January 8, 1992: The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City filed the Information with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272 and assigned to Branch 83.
March 2, 1992: Private respondent Adela Teodora P. Santos filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground of prescription under Article 89, Paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, pointing to the petitioner's Civil Case testimony and CSC complaint.
June 29, 1992: The RTC Branch 83, presided by Judge Estrella T. Estrada, issued an Order granting the Motion to Quash and dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272, holding that the 15-year prescriptive period for bigamy commenced in 1974 and expired in 1989.
August 26, 1992: Jose G. Garcia filed a Motion for Reconsideration, supplemented by a Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) certification of Adela's travels, which the RTC subsequently denied.
Subsequent Date (NOT IN RECORD): Jose G. Garcia filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 14324).
February 13, 1995: The Court of Appeals, Seventh Division, rendered its Decision (penned by Associate Justice Artemio G. Luna, with C. Garcia and G. Jacinto, JJ., concurring) affirming the RTC's dismissal in toto.
January 27, 1997: The Supreme Court, Third Division, promulgated its Decision denying the Petition for Review on Certiorari and affirming the Court of Appeals.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner Jose G. Garcia.

The State as the Sole Offended Party: Petitioner argued that because bigamy is a public offense, the only true "offended party" is the State whose laws and public policies were transgressed, and not the private spouses. Consequently, the prescriptive period should run only from the day the State/prosecution discovered the offense (August 28, 1991), rather than from his private discovery in 1974.
Strict Four-Corners Rule of the Information: Petitioner contended that in resolving a motion to quash, the court is strictly confined to the allegations on the face of the Information. Since the Information alleged that the crime was "discovered in 1989," the RTC committed a fatal error by looking at evidence aliunde (his civil case testimony and CSC complaint) to dismiss the case. He further asserted that Section 4 of the old Rule 117 was impliedly repealed, precluding the introduction of outside facts.
Inconclusiveness of Prior Admissions: The petitioner argued that his testimony in Civil Case No. 90-52730 was hearsay, and his CSC complaint was vague because the term "These facts" in Paragraph 7 did not clearly refer to Adela's prior marriage but merely to "raw, unconfirmed, and uninvestigated" information.
Suspension of Prescription via Absence: He maintained that Adela’s sixteen (16) trips abroad between 1977 and 1988 constituted "absence from the Philippine Archipelago" under the second paragraph of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which legally suspended the running of the prescriptive period.

B. Respondent Adela Teodora P. Santos (alias "Delia Santos").

Discovery by Private Offended Party Commences Prescription: Private respondent argued that Article 91 of the RPC explicitly lists the "offended party" as one of the entities whose discovery triggers the running of the prescriptive period, making no distinction between public and private crimes.
Factual Grounds Permitted in Motions to Quash: She argued that under Section 2 of the revised Rule 117, a motion to quash must specify its "factual and legal grounds," which preserves the right to present evidence aliunde to prove the extinction of criminal liability.
Uncompromising Admissions Under Oath: She asserted that the petitioner's explicit, uncontradicted judicial testimony and CSC complaint constituted binding admissions under oath that established his discovery of the bigamous marriage in 1974.
Transient Trips Not Contemplated as Legal Absence: She argued that her brief, temporary sojourns abroad, where she returned to the Philippines in every instance, did not constitute the "absence" contemplated by Article 91 of the RPC.

C. Common Ground.

Execution of Marriages: Both parties agreed that the first marriage between Adela and Reynaldo Quiroca took place on December 1, 1951, and the second marriage between Jose and Adela took place on February 2, 1957.
Travel Dates: Both parties accepted the factual accuracy of the BID certification detailing Adela's arrivals and departures.

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered). Whether an Information charging the crime of bigamy (an offense punishable by prision mayor with a 15-year prescriptive period) is sufficient to withstand a motion to quash based on prescription when the Information alleges a discovery date of "1989," but the accused introduces evidence aliunde—consisting of the complainant's own admissions under oath—proving that the private innocent spouse discovered the prior marriage in "1974"; and whether the discovery of a public offense by the private "offended party" under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code commences the running of the prescriptive period.

B. Secondary Issues.

Whether a motion to quash on the ground of extinction of criminal liability under Rule 117, Section 3 is strictly limited to the four corners of the Information, or whether the court may receive and consider facts outside the Information (aliunde) under Section 2 of Rule 117.
Whether brief, temporary trips abroad, followed by immediate return to the Philippines, constitute "absence from the Philippine Archipelago" under the second paragraph of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code so as to suspend the running of the prescriptive period.

Ruling

MAIN ISSUE: NO (to the sufficiency of the Information); YES (to the commencement of prescription by private discovery). The Supreme Court ruled that the private innocent spouse is an "offended party" under Article 91 of the RPC. The discovery of the bigamous marriage by Jose G. Garcia in 1974 triggered the 15-year prescriptive period, which expired in 1989. Since the Information was filed only on January 8, 1992, the crime had already prescribed.
SECONDARY ISSUE 1: YES (the court may consider facts aliunde). The Court held that Section 2 of Rule 117 requires the motion to quash to specify "factual and legal grounds," meaning that facts outside the Information may be introduced to prove the ground of prescription.
SECONDARY ISSUE 2: NO. The Court ruled that brief, transient trips abroad with subsequent returns do not constitute the "absence" contemplated by Article 91 of the RPC.

VERBATIM DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the challenged decision of 13 February 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14324 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

Reconciliation of Public Crime Status with the "Offended Party" Rule: The Court systematically dismantled the petitioner's argument that only the State's discovery can trigger prescription in a public offense. Prowling the text of the statute, the Court ruled that Article 91 of the RPC provides that the period of prescription commences from the day the crime is discovered by the "offended party, the authorities, or their agents." The Court emphasized that:

"This rule makes no distinction between a public crime and a private crime. In both cases then, the discovery may be by the 'offended party, the authorities, or their agents.'"
Definition of "Offended Party" and Codal Integration: To define the "offended party" under Article 91 of the RPC, the Court integrated Section 12, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court (which defines the offended party as "the person against whom or against whose property, the offense was committed") and Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code ("Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable"). Under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, the civil action is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Since the civil liability (indemnity and Civil Code damages) is owed to the private individual, that individual is the "offended party." The Court held that in bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the circumstances, and the petitioner himself was named as the offended party in the subject Information.
The Admissibility of Factual Grounds Aliunde in Rule 117: The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the court is confined to the face of the Information. Analyzing the evolution of Rule 117, the Court held that Section 2 of Rule 117 explicitly requires a motion to quash to specify its "factual and legal grounds." The Court ruled:

"It is clear from this Section that a motion to quash may be based on factual and legal grounds, and since extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy are retained as among the grounds for a motion to quash in Section 3 of the new Rule 117, it necessarily follows that facts outside the information itself may be introduced to prove such grounds." Relying on People v. De la Rosa and People v. Navarro, the Court declared that it would be a "pure technicality for the court to close its eyes" to the fact of prescription and proceed with a trial when prescription is already proven, causing a waste of court and party time.
Strict Construction of "Absence" under Article 91 RPC: The Court scrutinized the Immigration certification and agreed with the CA that Adela's brief trips did not suspend prescription:

"We agree with the Court of Appeals that these trips abroad did not constitute the 'absence' contemplated in Article 91. These trips were brief, and in every case the private respondent returned to the Philippines. Besides, these were made long after the petitioner discovered the offense and even if the aggregate number of days of these trips are considered, still the information was filed well beyond the prescriptive period."

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules.

The Bigamy Discovery Rule: Both the first and second innocent spouses are considered "offended parties" under Article 91 of the RPC for the purpose of commencing the prescriptive period. Discovery of the bigamous marriage by either spouse begins the running of the period of prescription.
The Rule on Motions to Quash and Matters Aliunde: When a motion to quash is based on the extinction of criminal liability (prescription) under Rule 117, the court is not confined to the allegations of the Information. The accused may introduce factual evidence outside the Information (aliunde) to demonstrate that the crime has prescribed.
Absence under Article 91 RPC: "Absence from the Philippine Archipelago" which suspends the prescriptive period must be a continuous, non-transient departure. Brief, temporary travels where the accused consistently returns do not toll the running of prescription.

C. Limitations/Exceptions.

Exceptions to the Face of the Information Rule: While a motion to quash based on the failure of the allegations to charge an offense generally rests on the hypothetical admission of the facts alleged on the face of the Information, an exception is carved out when the ground is prescription or double jeopardy, where the court must look at facts aliunde admitted or not denied by the prosecution.
Hearsay Admissions: A party's own voluntary declarations under oath in another judicial proceeding are not hearsay as to him; they constitute admissible party admissions under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules on Evidence.

D. Topic Integration. This case represents a landmark integration of Rule 110, Sections 6 and 11 with Rule 117, Section 2. While Section 6 of Rule 110 requires only an approximate date of commission, and Section 11 permits an approximate date, Garcia v. CA establishes that the prosecution's formal allegation of a discovery date in the Information (e.g., "1989") is not an unassailable shield against a motion to quash.

The decision serves as an essential limitation on the State's prosecutorial power under Rule 110: a private complainant cannot plead ignorance or hide behind a prosecutor's self-serving, belated date of "discovery" in the Information to bypass prescription when the complainant's own prior judicial admissions establish actual knowledge at a much earlier date. By validating the use of evidence aliunde to quash an Information, Garcia v. CA preserves the integrity of the statute of limitations in criminal law as a substantive right that completely extinguishes the State's authority to prosecute under Rule 110.

Separate Opinions

None.

The decision was a unanimous decision of the Third Division. The concurring justices are listed as Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concurring. No separate concurring or dissenting opinions were recorded.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Special Law

Article 91, Revised Penal Code

Computation of prescription of offenses

Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815)

The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.

Why it is cited here

Whose discovery starts the clock — the text answers it directly.

"The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents."

The argument was that in a public offense only the State's discovery can trigger prescription. The Court read the statute: it names three discoverers, disjunctively, and the offended party is the first of them.

So discovery by the private complainant starts the period even where the offense is public and the prosecution is the State's. The clock is not the State's to control by remaining unaware.

Special Law

Article 90, Revised Penal Code

Prescription of crimes

Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815)

Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty years.

Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.

Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.

The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in two years.

The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.

Light offenses prescribe in two months.

When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this article.

Why it is cited here

The period that then runs.

Crimes prescribe in twenty years, fifteen, ten, five, one year for libel and similar offenses, six months for oral defamation and slander by deed, and two months for light offenses — each tier keyed to the penalty.

So the analysis has two independent steps that are easy to run together: which tier applies, from the penalty; and when the period began, from Article 91's discovery rule.

Getting the first wrong changes the answer by years; getting the second wrong changes it by however long the offended party knew before the authorities did.

Implementing Rules

Section 1, Rule 110, Rules of Court

Institution of criminal actions

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses)

Criminal actions shall be instituted as follows:

(a) For offenses where a preliminary investigation is required pursuant to section 1 of Rule 112, by filing the complaint with the proper officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation.

(b) For all other offenses, by filing the complaint or information directly with the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, or the complaint with the office of the prosecutor. In Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charters.

The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running period of prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws. (1a)

LawPhil posts the text as amended effective 1 December 2000. Later amendments — notably to the bail and preliminary-investigation rules — are not reflected here, so check the date of the decision against the date of the amendment.

Why it is cited here

What stops the clock once it has started.

"Criminal actions shall be instituted as follows: (a) For offenses where a preliminary investigation is required … by filing the complaint with the proper officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation."

Under Article 91 and the Olarte line, that filing interrupts prescription — so an offended party who discovers the offense and complains promptly preserves the case whatever the prosecutor's pace.

The symmetry is the point worth carrying: the offended party's knowledge starts the period, and the offended party's complaint stops it. Both ends of the clock are within his control, which is why diligence after discovery matters so much.

Implementing Rules

Section 2, Rule 117, Rules of Court

Form and contents

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 117 (Motion to Quash)

The motion to quash shall be in writing, signed by the accused or his counsel and shall distinctly specify its factual and legal grounds. The court shall consider no ground other than those stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. (2a)

Why it is cited here

The words that let a court look outside the Information.

"The motion to quash shall be in writing, signed by the accused or his counsel and shall distinctly specify its factual and legal grounds. The court shall consider no ground other than those stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged."

Garcia's bigamy Information alleged the second marriage was "discovered in 1989." His wife moved to quash for prescription, proving through his own prior judicial admissions that he had known since 1974.

Those admissions are facts aliunde — outside the four corners of the Information. The Court allowed them because this section requires the motion to state "factual and legal grounds," and a ground that is factual cannot be tested on the pleading alone.

That is the answer to the familiar objection that a motion to quash is confined to the face of the Information. It is — except where the ground is one that by nature depends on facts not pleaded.

Implementing Rules

Section 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court

Grounds

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 117 (Motion to Quash)

The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (3a)

Why it is cited here

Paragraph (g) — the ground prescription falls under.

"The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds: … (g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished …"

Prescription extinguishes criminal liability, so it is a paragraph (g) ground — not a defect in the Information at all.

That classification is what carries the evidentiary point. Grounds like (a) — facts charged do not constitute an offense — are tested on the pleading; grounds like (g) are tested on facts, and the accused may introduce them.

Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code the period for bigamy runs from discovery by the offended party. Garcia's admissions put discovery at 1974; the Information was filed 8 January 1992; the prosecution was barred, and the dismissal was affirmed.

Related notes:

Assigned under the same subtopic — IV.b — Complaint or Information: Sufficiency:

(and 20 more under this subtopic — see the Week 3 coverage table.)

Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/jan1997/gr_119063_1997.html

Cited laws & provisions

Article 91, Revised Penal Code

Special Law

Computation of prescription of offenses

Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815)

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.

Why it is cited here

Whose discovery starts the clock — the text answers it directly.

"The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents."

So discovery by the private complainant starts the period even where the offense is public and the prosecution is the State's. The clock is not the State's to control by remaining unaware.

Full entry below ↓

Article 90, Revised Penal Code

Special Law

Prescription of crimes

Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815)

Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty years.

Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.

Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.

The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in two years.

The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.

Light offenses prescribe in two months.

When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this article.

Why it is cited here

The period that then runs.

So the analysis has two independent steps that are easy to run together: which tier applies, from the penalty; and when the period began, from Article 91's discovery rule.

Getting the first wrong changes the answer by years; getting the second wrong changes it by however long the offended party knew before the authorities did.

Full entry below ↓

Section 1, Rule 110, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Institution of criminal actions

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses)

Criminal actions shall be instituted as follows:

The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running period of prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws. (1a)

Why it is cited here

What stops the clock once it has started.

Full entry below ↓

Section 2, Rule 117, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Form and contents

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 117 (Motion to Quash)

Why it is cited here

The words that let a court look outside the Information.

Full entry below ↓

Section 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Grounds

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 117 (Motion to Quash)

The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (3a)

Why it is cited here

Paragraph (g) — the ground prescription falls under.

"The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds: … (g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished …"

Prescription extinguishes criminal liability, so it is a paragraph (g) ground — not a defect in the Information at all.

Full entry below ↓

ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic

IV.b — Complaint or Information: Sufficiency Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/jan1997/gr_119063_1997.html

Facts

On December 1, 1951 Adela Teodora P. Santos married Reynaldo Quiroca in Manila, using the name "Adela Santos."
On or before February 2, 1957 she married petitioner Jose G. Garcia in Quezon City, the first marriage remaining valid and undissolved.
In 1974 Jose discovered the prior marriage. Confronting her guardian Eugenia R. Balingit about their impending separation, Balingit asked whether Adela's former boyfriend "Rey" was the reason, then collapsed into her chair and said "hindi na nagbago," confirming the previous marriage and revealing she had seen Quiroca recently. 1974 is the date the case turns on.
Between June 3, 1977 and November 14, 1988 Adela made sixteen (16) brief trips abroad — Hong Kong, Australia, Singapore, Japan, San Francisco — returning to the Philippines every time.
On January 23, 1991 Jose testified under oath in Civil Case No. 90-52730, admitting on cross-examination that he discovered the prior marriage in 1974.
On October 16, 1991 he filed a Civil Service Commission complaint containing a verified statement that the facts of the prior marriage "were discovered by him in the year 1974." His own two sworn admissions defeat him.
On January 8, 1992 the Information for Bigamy was filed in the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 83 (Crim. Case No. Q-92-27272) — alleging the discovery as "1989."
On March 2, 1992 Adela moved to quash on prescription under Article 89(5), pointing to those two admissions.
On June 29, 1992 Judge Estrella T. Estrada granted the motion and dismissed, the 15-year period having run from 1974 to 1989. Reconsideration, supplemented by a BID certification of Adela's travels, was denied.
On February 13, 1995 the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto. Decided January 27, 1997 (Third Division).

Issue

Ruling

"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the challenged decision of 13 February 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14324 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The Court dismantled the public-crime argument from the text of the statute. Article 91 runs the period "from the day the crime is discovered by the 'offended party, the authorities, or their agents,'" and — the decisive sentence — "This rule makes no distinction between a public crime and a private crime. In both cases then, the discovery may be by the 'offended party, the authorities, or their agents.'"
It then defined "offended party" by integrating three provisions. Rule 110's Section 12 defines him as "the person against whom or against whose property, the offense was committed"; Article 100 makes every person criminally liable also civilly liable; and under Section 1, Rule 111 the civil action is impliedly instituted with the criminal. Since the civil liability runs to the private individual, that individual is the offended party — and here the petitioner was himself named as the offended party in the Information.
On procedure, the Court rejected confinement to the face of the Information. Section 2, Rule 117 requires a motion to quash to state "factual and legal grounds," so it necessarily follows that facts outside the information itself may be introduced to prove such grounds.
The practical rationale is candid: it would be "a pure technicality for the court to close its eyes" to proven prescription and proceed to trial, wasting the time of court and parties.
On "absence," the Court read Article 91 strictly: "These trips were brief, and in every case the private respondent returned to the Philippines. Besides, these were made long after the petitioner discovered the offense and even if the aggregate number of days of these trips are considered, still the information was filed well beyond the prescriptive period."

Doctrine

Both the first and second innocent spouses are "offended parties" under Article 91, and discovery by either starts the prescriptive period; the rule "makes no distinction between a public crime and a private crime."
Motions to quash and matters aliunde: where the ground is extinction of criminal liability, the court is not confined to the allegations of the Information — the accused may introduce facts outside it, Section 2, Rule 117 requiring "factual and legal grounds."
"Absence" under Article 91 must be a continuous, non-transient departure; brief travels with consistent return do not toll prescription.

Limits.

The aliunde rule is an exception, not the general rule. A motion to quash for failure of the allegations to charge an offence still "rests on the hypothetical admission of the facts alleged on the face of the Information"; the exception is carved out for prescription and double jeopardy, where facts aliunde admitted or not denied by the prosecution may be looked at.
The admissions that carried the case were the complainant's own: "[a] party's own voluntary declarations under oath in another judicial proceeding are not hearsay as to him," being party admissions under Rule 130, Section 26.
Note the structural point for Rule 110: Sections 6 and 11 require only an approximate date, but Garcia holds that the prosecution's chosen "discovery" date in the Information is not an unassailable shield — a complainant cannot "hide behind a prosecutor's self-serving, belated date of 'discovery'" when his own prior sworn admissions establish earlier knowledge.
And prescription here is substantive, totally extinguishing the State's authority to prosecute — which is why it may be raised and proved this way at all.
Compare Arambulo v. Laqui and Corpus, Jr. v. People: the three cases together cover when the clock starts, what stops it, and what happens if it runs out.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

The relationship of this case to the requested topic of Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110) > IV. Complaint or Information > b. Sufficiency is DIRECT.

Facts

December 1, 1951: Adela Teodora P. Santos contracted a lawful marriage with Reynaldo Quiroca in Manila, using the name "Adela Santos".
February 2, 1957 (on or before): Adela Teodora P. Santos contracted a second marriage with petitioner Jose G. Garcia in Quezon City, Philippines, while her prior marriage to Reynaldo Quiroca remained valid and undissolved.
1974: Jose G. Garcia discovered Adela’s prior marriage. Upon confronting her guardian, Eugenia R. Balingit, about their impending separation, Balingit asked if Adela's former boyfriend "Rey" was the reason. Balingit collapsed into her chair and said, "hindi na nagbago," confirming Adela's previous marriage and revealing she had seen Quiroca recently.
June 3, 1977 – November 14, 1988: Adela Teodora P. Santos made sixteen (16) brief, temporary trips abroad (e.g., departing for Hong Kong on June 3, 1977, and returning on July 2, 1977; departing for Australia, Singapore, Japan, and San Francisco on various dates), returning to the Philippines in every instance.
1989: The year of "discovery" of the bigamous marriage as subsequently alleged in the criminal Information.
January 23, 1991: Jose G. Garcia testified under oath in Civil Case No. 90-52730, entitled "Jose G. Garcia v. Delia S. Garcia" before the Regional Trial Court, admitting during cross-examination that he discovered Adela’s prior marriage in the year 1974.
August 28, 1991: Jose G. Garcia filed an "Affidavit of Complaint" with the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office, charging Adela with Bigamy, Violation of C.A. No. 142 (as amended by R.A. No. 6085), and Falsification of Public Documents.
October 10, 1991: Jose G. Garcia sent a letter to Assistant City Prosecutor George F. Cabanilla, formally electing to limit his criminal action to the charge of bigamy.
October 16, 1991: Jose G. Garcia filed an administrative complaint against Adela before the Civil Service Commission (CSC), containing a verified statement in Paragraph 7 declaring that the facts of the prior marriage were discovered by him in the year 1974.
November 15, 1991: Assistant Prosecutor George F. Cabanilla drafted the criminal Information for Bigamy against Adela.
January 8, 1992: The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City filed the Information with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272 and assigned to Branch 83.
March 2, 1992: Private respondent Adela Teodora P. Santos filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground of prescription under Article 89, Paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, pointing to the petitioner's Civil Case testimony and CSC complaint.
June 29, 1992: The RTC Branch 83, presided by Judge Estrella T. Estrada, issued an Order granting the Motion to Quash and dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272, holding that the 15-year prescriptive period for bigamy commenced in 1974 and expired in 1989.
August 26, 1992: Jose G. Garcia filed a Motion for Reconsideration, supplemented by a Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) certification of Adela's travels, which the RTC subsequently denied.
Subsequent Date (NOT IN RECORD): Jose G. Garcia filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 14324).
February 13, 1995: The Court of Appeals, Seventh Division, rendered its Decision (penned by Associate Justice Artemio G. Luna, with C. Garcia and G. Jacinto, JJ., concurring) affirming the RTC's dismissal in toto.
January 27, 1997: The Supreme Court, Third Division, promulgated its Decision denying the Petition for Review on Certiorari and affirming the Court of Appeals.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner Jose G. Garcia.

The State as the Sole Offended Party: Petitioner argued that because bigamy is a public offense, the only true "offended party" is the State whose laws and public policies were transgressed, and not the private spouses. Consequently, the prescriptive period should run only from the day the State/prosecution discovered the offense (August 28, 1991), rather than from his private discovery in 1974.
Strict Four-Corners Rule of the Information: Petitioner contended that in resolving a motion to quash, the court is strictly confined to the allegations on the face of the Information. Since the Information alleged that the crime was "discovered in 1989," the RTC committed a fatal error by looking at evidence aliunde (his civil case testimony and CSC complaint) to dismiss the case. He further asserted that Section 4 of the old Rule 117 was impliedly repealed, precluding the introduction of outside facts.
Inconclusiveness of Prior Admissions: The petitioner argued that his testimony in Civil Case No. 90-52730 was hearsay, and his CSC complaint was vague because the term "These facts" in Paragraph 7 did not clearly refer to Adela's prior marriage but merely to "raw, unconfirmed, and uninvestigated" information.
Suspension of Prescription via Absence: He maintained that Adela’s sixteen (16) trips abroad between 1977 and 1988 constituted "absence from the Philippine Archipelago" under the second paragraph of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which legally suspended the running of the prescriptive period.

B. Respondent Adela Teodora P. Santos (alias "Delia Santos").

Discovery by Private Offended Party Commences Prescription: Private respondent argued that Article 91 of the RPC explicitly lists the "offended party" as one of the entities whose discovery triggers the running of the prescriptive period, making no distinction between public and private crimes.
Factual Grounds Permitted in Motions to Quash: She argued that under Section 2 of the revised Rule 117, a motion to quash must specify its "factual and legal grounds," which preserves the right to present evidence aliunde to prove the extinction of criminal liability.
Uncompromising Admissions Under Oath: She asserted that the petitioner's explicit, uncontradicted judicial testimony and CSC complaint constituted binding admissions under oath that established his discovery of the bigamous marriage in 1974.
Transient Trips Not Contemplated as Legal Absence: She argued that her brief, temporary sojourns abroad, where she returned to the Philippines in every instance, did not constitute the "absence" contemplated by Article 91 of the RPC.

C. Common Ground.

Execution of Marriages: Both parties agreed that the first marriage between Adela and Reynaldo Quiroca took place on December 1, 1951, and the second marriage between Jose and Adela took place on February 2, 1957.
Travel Dates: Both parties accepted the factual accuracy of the BID certification detailing Adela's arrivals and departures.

Issue

B. Secondary Issues.

Whether a motion to quash on the ground of extinction of criminal liability under Rule 117, Section 3 is strictly limited to the four corners of the Information, or whether the court may receive and consider facts outside the Information (aliunde) under Section 2 of Rule 117.
Whether brief, temporary trips abroad, followed by immediate return to the Philippines, constitute "absence from the Philippine Archipelago" under the second paragraph of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code so as to suspend the running of the prescriptive period.

Ruling

MAIN ISSUE: NO (to the sufficiency of the Information); YES (to the commencement of prescription by private discovery). The Supreme Court ruled that the private innocent spouse is an "offended party" under Article 91 of the RPC. The discovery of the bigamous marriage by Jose G. Garcia in 1974 triggered the 15-year prescriptive period, which expired in 1989. Since the Information was filed only on January 8, 1992, the crime had already prescribed.
SECONDARY ISSUE 1: YES (the court may consider facts aliunde). The Court held that Section 2 of Rule 117 requires the motion to quash to specify "factual and legal grounds," meaning that facts outside the Information may be introduced to prove the ground of prescription.
SECONDARY ISSUE 2: NO. The Court ruled that brief, transient trips abroad with subsequent returns do not constitute the "absence" contemplated by Article 91 of the RPC.

VERBATIM DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the challenged decision of 13 February 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14324 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

Reconciliation of Public Crime Status with the "Offended Party" Rule: The Court systematically dismantled the petitioner's argument that only the State's discovery can trigger prescription in a public offense. Prowling the text of the statute, the Court ruled that Article 91 of the RPC provides that the period of prescription commences from the day the crime is discovered by the "offended party, the authorities, or their agents." The Court emphasized that:

"This rule makes no distinction between a public crime and a private crime. In both cases then, the discovery may be by the 'offended party, the authorities, or their agents.'"
Definition of "Offended Party" and Codal Integration: To define the "offended party" under Article 91 of the RPC, the Court integrated Section 12, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court (which defines the offended party as "the person against whom or against whose property, the offense was committed") and Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code ("Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable"). Under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, the civil action is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Since the civil liability (indemnity and Civil Code damages) is owed to the private individual, that individual is the "offended party." The Court held that in bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the circumstances, and the petitioner himself was named as the offended party in the subject Information.
The Admissibility of Factual Grounds Aliunde in Rule 117: The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the court is confined to the face of the Information. Analyzing the evolution of Rule 117, the Court held that Section 2 of Rule 117 explicitly requires a motion to quash to specify its "factual and legal grounds." The Court ruled:

"It is clear from this Section that a motion to quash may be based on factual and legal grounds, and since extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy are retained as among the grounds for a motion to quash in Section 3 of the new Rule 117, it necessarily follows that facts outside the information itself may be introduced to prove such grounds." Relying on People v. De la Rosa and People v. Navarro, the Court declared that it would be a "pure technicality for the court to close its eyes" to the fact of prescription and proceed with a trial when prescription is already proven, causing a waste of court and party time.
Strict Construction of "Absence" under Article 91 RPC: The Court scrutinized the Immigration certification and agreed with the CA that Adela's brief trips did not suspend prescription:

"We agree with the Court of Appeals that these trips abroad did not constitute the 'absence' contemplated in Article 91. These trips were brief, and in every case the private respondent returned to the Philippines. Besides, these were made long after the petitioner discovered the offense and even if the aggregate number of days of these trips are considered, still the information was filed well beyond the prescriptive period."

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules.

The Bigamy Discovery Rule: Both the first and second innocent spouses are considered "offended parties" under Article 91 of the RPC for the purpose of commencing the prescriptive period. Discovery of the bigamous marriage by either spouse begins the running of the period of prescription.
The Rule on Motions to Quash and Matters Aliunde: When a motion to quash is based on the extinction of criminal liability (prescription) under Rule 117, the court is not confined to the allegations of the Information. The accused may introduce factual evidence outside the Information (aliunde) to demonstrate that the crime has prescribed.
Absence under Article 91 RPC: "Absence from the Philippine Archipelago" which suspends the prescriptive period must be a continuous, non-transient departure. Brief, temporary travels where the accused consistently returns do not toll the running of prescription.

C. Limitations/Exceptions.

Exceptions to the Face of the Information Rule: While a motion to quash based on the failure of the allegations to charge an offense generally rests on the hypothetical admission of the facts alleged on the face of the Information, an exception is carved out when the ground is prescription or double jeopardy, where the court must look at facts aliunde admitted or not denied by the prosecution.
Hearsay Admissions: A party's own voluntary declarations under oath in another judicial proceeding are not hearsay as to him; they constitute admissible party admissions under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules on Evidence.

Separate Opinions

None.