Facts

• On September 26, 2000 at 3:00 p.m. Rael Delfin, Rene Villanueva and two companions left for a fishing trip in the seas of Bataan — as Villanueva, a defense witness, admitted on cross-examination.
• On September 27, 2000 at 4:00 p.m. they returned to shore, putting Delfin back in Navotas City hours before the shooting. His own corroborating witness destroyed his alibi.
• That night at about 10:45 p.m., Joan Cruz, live-in partner of 51-year-old fisherman Emilio Enriquez, stood outside his house on R. Domingo St., Tangos, Navotas, and saw Emilio telephoning at a store across the street, with Delfin seated on a bench to his left.
• She stepped inside and almost immediately heard a gunshot; rushing out she saw Emilio shot in the head and sprawled on the ground, and saw Delfin, gun in hand, fire another shot into his chest, killing him.
• On March 13, 2001 the Information for Murder was filed in the RTC of Malabon — erroneously alleging the offence "on or about the 27th day of November 2000" instead of September 27, 2000. A two-month clerical error in the month, same year.
• All the supporting prosecutor's resolutions and Joan Cruz's Sworn Statement consistently gave September 27, 2000.
• Delfin was arraigned and pleaded not guilty, and never objected to the September 27 evidence at trial — instead building "a highly specific alibi in direct refutation of the September 27 date."
• On July 20, 2009 the RTC convicted him of Murder and imposed reclusion perpetua. The Court of Appeals affirmed, modifying damages. Decided July 9, 2014 (Second Division).

Issue

Ruling

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 29 August 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04160 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) that the amount of civil indemnity is increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00; (2) that the amount of moral damages is increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00; and (3) that the appellant must pay, in addition to civil indemnity and moral damages, exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00. The civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages payable by the appellant are subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

• The Court read Sections 6 and 11 together: Section 6 requires only the "approximate date," and Section 11 that "[i]t is not necessary to state … the precise date … except when it is a material ingredient of the offense."
• Date is not an element of murder. The gravamen of the crime is the unlawful killing of a person with qualifying circumstances, not the temporal setting. Hence "the allegation in an information of a date of commission different from the one eventually established during the trial would not, as a rule, be considered as an error fatal to prosecution" — the erroneous allegation being "deemed supplanted by the evidence" or corrected by formal amendment.
• The Court then marked the outer limit by distinguishing People v. Opemia. There a five-year gap between the alleged date (June 18, 1952) and the proved date (July 1947) was "so massive" that it created the perception that the prosecution was dealing with an entirely different and separate offense.
• Three features distinguished this case: the discrepancy was "merely a two-month clerical error in the month" of the same year; every supporting document gave the correct date; and "the appellant was never caught off-guard," as shown by his failure to object to the September 27 evidence and by an alibi built specifically to meet that date.
• On alibi the standard is physical impossibility — the accused must show "not only that he was elsewhere … but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis" — and his own witness defeated it.
• On treachery, both prongs concurred: "(a) the employment of means … which ensures the safety of the offender from defensive or retaliatory acts"; and "(b) the deliberate or conscious adoption of such means."

Doctrine

• Where the date is not a material element, a discrepancy between the date alleged and the date proved is "a formal, non-fatal defect," the erroneous allegation being "deemed supplanted by the evidence presented during trial" — provided the accused had reasonable notice of the true transaction through the accompanying documents and was not prejudiced in his defense.
• The fatal-variance limit: discrepancies become fatal … only when the gap in time is so immense (such as several years) that the court is led to believe the Information and the trial evidence refer to two entirely different offenses.
• Alibi requires physical impossibility, not mere absence.
• Treachery requires both means ensuring the offender's safety and their deliberate adoption.

• The rule is about non-material dates only — where prescription or an element turns on timing, the analysis changes: [i]f the date change changes the entire nature of the defense (such as if prescription has intervened during the gap), the amendment is substantial and must be disallowed.
• The notice element is doing real work here, and should not be dropped from the recitation: what made the error harmless was not the size of the gap alone but that every other document in the case carried the right date and the accused defended against it.
• And note the procedural alternative the Court mentions: the prosecution could have cured this by formal amendment under Section 14 — the variance rule simply made that unnecessary.
• Read with People v. Cristobal (four-day variance in qualified theft) and People v. Buca (proof on a date the Information said was "before"); the three cases together fix the Opemia boundary from the safe side.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Facts

• September 26, 2000, at 3:00 p.m.: Accused-appellant Rael Delfin, Rene Villanueva, and two other companions left for a fishing trip in the seas of Bataan, as subsequently revealed and admitted by defense witness Rene Villanueva during cross-examination.
• September 27, 2000, at 4:00 p.m.: Rael Delfin, Rene Villanueva, and their companions returned to shore, placing them back in Navotas City prior to the shooting incident.
• September 27, 2000, at approximately 10:45 p.m.: Joan Cruz, the live-in partner of 51-year-old fisherman Emilio Enriquez, was standing outside Emilio's house at R. Domingo St., Tangos, Navotas City, and observed Emilio talking over the telephone at a store directly across his house. Joan saw appellant Rael Delfin seated on a bench to the left of Emilio.
• September 27, 2000 (Almost immediately after 10:45 p.m.): Joan Cruz went inside Emilio's house and almost immediately heard a gunshot. Upon rushing outside, she saw Emilio shot in the head and sprawled on the ground, and she positively witnessed appellant Rael Delfin, now holding a gun, firing another shot at Emilio's chest, which caused his immediate death.
• March 13, 2001: The public prosecutor formally filed an Information before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon, charging Rael Delfin with the crime of Murder under Article 248(1) of the Revised Penal Code. The Information erroneously alleged that the offense was committed "on or about the 27th day of November 2000" instead of September 27, 2000.
• Subsequent Date (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD): Appellant Rael Delfin, assisted by counsel, was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of murder. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
• July 20, 2009: The RTC, Branch 170, Malabon City, rendered a Decision in Criminal Case No. 24311-MN, finding appellant Rael Delfin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the victim's heirs ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as consequential damages.
• April 29, 2011 (Also referred to as August 29, 2012 in the dispositive portion): The Court of Appeals (CA), Seventh Division, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04160, rendered its Decision affirming the RTC's conviction of the appellant but modifying the civil awards by deleting the ₱50,000.00 consequential damages and replacing it with an award of ₱50,000.00 moral damages.
• July 9, 2014: The Supreme Court Second Division promulgated its Decision denying Rael Delfin's appeal, affirming his conviction for Murder, and modifying the damages.

Arguments of the Parties

• Sufficiency of the Information: The prosecution argued that the variance between the date of the crime alleged in the Information (November 27, 2000) and the date established in evidence (September 27, 2000) was a non-fatal, minor discrepancy. The date of the commission of murder is not an essential element of the offense.
• Absence of Prejudice and Surprise: The state contended that the appellant was never misled, caught off-guard, or surprised by the two-month discrepancy because all supporting documents attached to the Information—specifically the Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon-Navotas sub-station and the Sworn Statement of eyewitness Joan Cruz—consistently and repeatedly referred to the murder as having been committed on September 27, 2000.
• Proof of Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The prosecution asserted that the direct, positive, and straightforward eyewitness testimony of Joan Cruz, coupled with the medical report confirming two gunshot wounds to the victim's head and chest, fully discharged the burden of proof.

• Violation of the Right to Be Informed: The appellant argued that the Information was fatally defective and violated his fundamental constitutional right under Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. He maintained that the two-month variance in the date of commission severely impaired his ability to intelligently prepare his defense.
• Defense of Alibi: Appellant insisted on his alibi that he was physically on the seas of Bataan engaged in a fishing trip from 3:00 p.m. on September 27, 2000, until 4:00 a.m. the following day, making it physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis in Navotas City.
• Absence of Treachery: The defense argued that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proved because the eyewitness did not see how the confrontation started or what words were spoken before the shots were fired.

• Cause of Death: Both parties recognized that the victim Emilio Enriquez died immediately from gunshot wounds to the head and chest.

Issue

1. Whether the accused-appellant's defense of alibi is sufficient to overturn the positive identification made by the prosecution's eyewitness.
2. Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery was properly appreciated to qualify the killing to Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling

• MAIN ISSUE: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the variance in the date of commission of the murder does not invalidate the Information. Since the date of commission is not a material element of the crime of murder, an approximate date is legally sufficient. The two-month clerical error in the month was deemed supplanted by the trial evidence and did not cause prejudice because all supporting prosecutor resolutions and witness affidavits consistently stated the correct date of September 27, 2000, of which the appellant was fully aware.
• SECONDARY ISSUE 1: NO. The Court rejected the appellant's alibi, noting that his own corroborating witness admitted they had returned to Navotas City by 4:00 p.m. on September 27, 2000, making it physically possible for the appellant to commit the crime at 10:45 p.m.
• SECONDARY ISSUE 2: YES. The Court held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was fully established because the sudden, unprovoked, and deliberate shooting of the unarmed victim while he was conversing on the telephone left him with no opportunity to defend himself or evade the attack.

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 29 August 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04160 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) that the amount of civil indemnity is increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00; (2) that the amount of moral damages is increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00; and (3) that the appellant must pay, in addition to civil indemnity and moral damages, exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00. The civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages payable by the appellant are subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this decision until fully paid."

"SO ORDERED."

Ratio

1. Statutory Sufficiency Standards of Rule 110§: The Court analyzed the sufficiency of the Information through the lens of Sections 6 and 11, Rule 110§ of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under Section 6, an Information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense, the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate date of commission, and the place of commission. Under Section 11, "It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission."
2. Date of Commission as a Non-Essential Element in Murder: The Court emphasized that in crimes like murder, the date of commission is not a material element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the unlawful killing of a person with qualifying circumstances, not the temporal setting. Thus, "the allegation in an information of a date of commission different from the one eventually established during the trial would not, as a rule, be considered as an error fatal to prosecution." In such cases, the erroneous allegation in the Information is simply deemed supplanted by the evidence presented during the trial or corrected by a formal amendment under Section 14, Rule 110§.
3. The Limits of the Tolling and Variance Exceptions (The Opemia Standard): The Court distinguished this case from the exception established in People v. Opemia (98 Phil. 698). In Opemia, the five-year variance between the alleged date of cattle-theft (June 18, 1952) and the proved date (July 1947) was so massive that it violated the accused's constitutional right because the long stretch of time created the perception that the prosecution was dealing with an entirely different and separate offense. In contrast, in the present case:
   • The discrepancy was merely a two-month clerical error in the month (September vs. November of the same year, 2000).
   • All supporting prosecutor resolutions and Joan Cruz's Sworn Statement consistently pointed to September 27, 2000.
   • The appellant was never caught off-guard, as demonstrated by his active participation, his failure to object to the September 27, 2000 evidence during trial, and his preparation of a highly specific alibi in direct refutation of the September 27 date.
4. Physical Impossibility Standard in Alibi: To sustain the defense of alibi, the accused must prove not only that he was elsewhere when the crime occurred but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis. Because defense witness Rene Villanueva admitted on cross-examination that their fishing trip occurred on September 26 and they returned to shoreline at 4:00 p.m. on September 27, 2000, Delfin was already back in Navotas City hours before the 10:45 p.m. shooting. Consequently, the defense failed to meet the threshold of physical impossibility.
5. The Two-Pronged Test for Treachery: For treachery to qualify a killing to murder, two elements must concur:
   • (a) the employment of means, method, or manner of execution which ensures the safety of the offender from defensive or retaliatory acts on the part of the victim; and
   • (b) the deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method, or manner of execution. The sudden and unprovoked gunning down of Emilio Enriquez while he was defenselessly talking on the public phone satisfies both prongs of the test.

• The Supplantation of Erroneous Date Allegations: In criminal offenses where the date of commission is not a material element, any discrepancy between the date alleged in the Information and the date proved during trial is a formal, non-fatal defect. The erroneous allegation is deemed supplanted by the evidence presented during trial, provided that the accused had reasonable notice of the true transaction through the accompanying documents and was not prejudiced in his defense.
• The Jurisprudential Distinction on Fatal Variance: Discrepancies in the date of commission only become fatal and violate the constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the accusation when the gap in time is so immense (such as several years) that the court is led to believe the Information and the trial evidence refer to two entirely different offenses, thereby caught the accused by sudden and unfair surprise.

• Clerical Errors vs. Substance Changes: An amendment to correct a date discrepancy before the plea is entered is a matter of right. Post-plea, only formal amendments that do not prejudice the rights of the accused are allowed. If the date change changes the entire nature of the defense (such as if prescription has intervened during the gap), the amendment is substantial and must be disallowed.

Separate Opinions