Facts

• On December 24, 2002 at about 1:00 p.m., AAA, a seven-year-old, was at home in Bangkal, Davao City with her younger siblings when neighbour Joel "Anjoy" Buca entered and ordered the siblings into another room to sleep.
• Once alone with her, he placed her on his lap, pulled down her panties and inserted his penis into her vagina. Her younger brother CCC, hiding under a bench, came out and pulled her away. Buca threatened to kill her parents if she told.
• Her mother BBB returned; CCC met her at the door with Mie, Mie, si Ate gani no ky gibastos ni Anjoy. She pretended to ignore it because Buca was still inside. Ten minutes later he left, and AAA disclosed that he had raped her many times.
• The same day they reported to the police and to a physician, whose certificate recorded perihymenal erythema and discharge, "suspicious for sexual abuse."
• Three Informations were filed: 52,260-2003 ("sometime in the months prior to December 2002"), 52,261-2003 ("sometime before December 24, 2002"), and 52,262-2003 ("sometime in the months after December 25, 2002").
• On August 24, 2004 he was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to all three, without objecting to the dates. That silence is half the holding.
• On May 28, 2007 the first case was dismissed on the prosecution's motion, the child being unable to recall dates before December 2002.
• On November 11, 2010 the RTC acquitted him in the third case and convicted him in 52,261-2003, imposing reclusion perpetua — even though the proof showed the rape occurred exactly on December 24, 2002, and the Information said "before" that date.
• On June 17, 2013 the Court of Appeals affirmed, adding "without the benefit of parole." Decided September 23, 2015 (Third Division).

Issue

Ruling

"WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision dated June 17, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00888-MIN is AFFIRMED with a clarification that the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Costs against accused-appellant. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

• The Court applied the text of Section 11: "It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission."
• Time is not a material ingredient of rape (Lizada, Salalima) — "the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 266§-A" — so [p]leading that the rape occurred 'sometime before December 24, 2002' is a valid approximation of a crime committed exactly on December 24, 2002.
• The right to be informed was satisfied, the Court giving two concrete reasons: the date alleged was "not vague or covering an unreasonable period," and the accused was fully prepared to, and did in fact, testify in detail regarding his exact whereabouts and conversations at the victim's house on December 24, 2002. He defended the very day he says he was not charged with.
• The waiver point closes it (People v. Gianan): "an accused-appellant's failure to raise a timely objection that the time difference alleged in the information covered a broad period constitutes a waiver of his right to object." He did not object at arraignment, during AAA's testimony, or at the formal offer of exhibits.
• On credibility (People v. Laog), what matters is the witness's absolute consistency in relating the principal elements of the crime and the positive identification of the accused.
• On penalty the Court applied A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC's two-branch guideline — the qualification is used only where circumstances warranting death are present but death is not imposed because of R.A. No. 9346. No qualifying circumstance under Article 266§-B having been alleged or proved, the addition was error.

Doctrine

• "The date of the commission of an offense need not be stated with absolute precision … unless it is a material ingredient of the crime," a date "as near as possible" sufficing, and conviction may follow upon proof of the commission of the crime on a different but approximate date.
• The right-to-be-informed test (Andaya): "every element constituting the offense must be alleged," the purpose being "to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense because he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts."
• Waiver: failure to object before plea to a broad or imprecise date waives the objection.
• Credibility of young victims: "testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence … Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth."
• Parole: the qualification is unnecessary where the death penalty is not warranted.

• Where the date is a material ingredient — "violation of Sunday laws, trespassing during specific prohibited hours, or where the prescription of the action rests on a precise operational date" — it "must be alleged with mathematical specificity."
• And a date span can still be fatal: if the range "is so unconscionably broad or vague as to completely deprive the accused of the ability to construct an alibi," the Information is substantively defective and quashable — unless the defect is waived by entering a plea. That escape hatch is why this case turns on waiver as much as on materiality.
• The remedy must be sought before arraignment, by motion for a bill of particulars or motion to quash; active participation in trial operates as an absolute waiver.
• Read with Kummer and Pangilinan — those cases ask whether a date may be amended; this one asks whether a date may be departed from in proof, and both answers run through Section 11.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Facts

• December 24, 2002, at approximately 1:00 p.m.: The earliest operative fact occurred when private complainant AAA, a seven (7) year old minor, along with her younger siblings CCC, DDD, and EEE, were in their house at Taal 2, Royal Valley, Bangkal, Davao City. Accused-appellant Joel "Anjoy" Buca, a neighbor of the family, entered the house and ordered AAA's siblings to go to another room to sleep.
• December 24, 2002 (Minutes later): Once Anjoy and AAA were alone, Anjoy placed AAA on his lap, pulled down her panties, and forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina to consummate the rape. The younger brother, CCC, who was hiding below a bench, witnessed the act, came out, and pulled AAA away from Anjoy. Anjoy warned AAA that he would kill her parents if she told anyone.
• December 24, 2002 (Shortly thereafter): The victim’s mother, BBB, returned home from buying food. CCC met her at the door and reported: "Mie, Mie, si Ate (referring to AAA) gani no ky gibastos ni Anjoy". BBB pretended to ignore the information because Anjoy was still inside their house. About ten minutes later, Anjoy left. AAA then disclosed that Anjoy had raped her many times.
• December 24, 2002 (Same day): AAA and BBB reported the incident to the police and immediately proceeded to a physician for medical examination. The provisional medical certificate recorded perihymenal erythema and whitish/yellowish discharge, concluding that the genital findings were "suspicious for sexual abuse."
• January 7, 2003: BBB executed her formal Affidavit-Complaint against accused-appellant before the City Prosecutor of Davao City.
• Subsequent Date (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD): The Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City filed three separate Informations against accused-appellant, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 52,260-2003 (alleging rape "sometime in the months prior to December 2002"), 52,261-2003 (alleging rape "sometime before December 24, 2002"), and 52,262-2003 (alleging rape "sometime in the months after December 25, 2002").
• August 24, 2004: Accused-appellant was arraigned before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 12, entering separate pleas of not guilty to all three charges.
• May 28, 2007: During trial, the prosecution moved for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 52,260-2003 because the child-witness could not recall the exact dates prior to December 2002, which motion the RTC granted.
• November 11, 2010: The RTC rendered its Judgment dismissing Criminal Case No. 52,260-2003, acquitting accused-appellant in Criminal Case No. 52,262-2003, but convicting him in Criminal Case No. 52,261-2003. The RTC sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
• Subsequent Date (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD): Accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA).
• June 17, 2013: The CA, Special Eighteenth Division, in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00888-MIN, rendered its Decision affirming the conviction but modifying the awards of damages to P75,000.00 civil indemnity, P75,000.00 moral damages, P30,000.00 exemplary damages, and legal interest at 6% per annum, qualifying the reclusion perpetua with the phrase "without the benefit of parole."
• Subsequent Date (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD): Accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal before the Supreme Court.
• September 23, 2015: The Supreme Court Third Division promulgated its Decision, dismissing the appeal, affirming the conviction, and clarifying that accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua without any qualification.

Arguments of the Parties

• Establishment of the Material Facts: The prosecution argued that all the elements of rape under Article 266§-A of the RPC were established beyond reasonable doubt by the straightforward testimony of the seven-year-old victim, AAA, and the corroborating eyewitness account of her brother, CCC, who witnessed the act and intervened.
• Sufficiency of the Date Allegation: The prosecution contended that under Section 11, Rule 110§, the precise date is not an essential element of rape. Pleading that the offense was committed "sometime before December 24, 2002" was sufficiently compliant because it alleged a time as near as possible to the actual date (December 24, 2002).
• Procedural Waiver: The prosecution asserted that since the accused-appellant did not raise any objection regarding the time span at the time of arraignment, during the formal offer of exhibits, or when AAA took the witness stand to testify, any objection to the sufficiency of the date in the Information was procedurally waived.

• Objection on Inconsistent Testimonies: The defense argued that the testimonies of the minor victim AAA and her brother CCC were inconsistent and contradictory regarding how AAA was released—with AAA stating CCC pulled her away, and CCC stating Anjoy released her—thereby creating reasonable doubt.
• Violation of Constitutional Due Process: Accused-appellant argued that his conviction under the Information in Criminal Case No. 52,261-2003 violated Section 11 of Rule 110§ and his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. He maintained that since the Information alleged the crime was committed "sometime before December 24, 2002," convicting him for an act committed on December 24, 2002, was prejudicial and prevented him from preparing an adequate defense.
• Alibi and Denial: He vehemently denied the charges, claiming that on the morning of December 24, 2002, he merely watched the crying children briefly at AAA's request because their mother was away, and then left for work without any unusual incident.

• Presence at the House: Both parties stipulated that accused-appellant Joel "Anjoy" Buca was present at AAA's house on the morning of December 24, 2002, and had a physical interaction/conversation with the victim.

Issue

1. Whether minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of child-witnesses regarding the physical mechanics of the victim's release from the accused-appellant's hold affect their essential credibility and undermine the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in qualifying the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the phrase "without eligibility for parole" under the guidelines of A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC when the death penalty was not legally warranted.

Ruling

• MAIN ISSUE: YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the conviction of accused-appellant under the Information is valid. The precise date of commission is not an essential element of rape, and Section 11, Rule 110§ does not require the precise date to be stated unless it is a material ingredient of the offense. Since the Information alleged a date as near as possible to the actual date, and because the accused-appellant failed to raise any timely objection prior to trial and actually testified about his actions on December 24, 2002, his constitutional right to be informed was not violated, and any procedural objections were waived.
• SECONDARY ISSUE 1: NO. The Court held that minor discrepancies in testimonies referring to collateral or minor matters—such as how AAA was released, which is not an element of rape—do not affect the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of the witnesses' declarations as long as they are coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole.
• SECONDARY ISSUE 2: YES. The Court ruled that under the En Banc guidelines of A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC, there is no need to use the phrase "without eligibility for parole" to qualify the penalty of reclusion perpetua when the death penalty is not initially warranted by the presence of qualified circumstances under Article 266§-B of the Revised Penal Code.

"WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision dated June 17, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00888-MIN is AFFIRMED with a clarification that the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua."

"Costs against accused-appellant."

"SO ORDERED."

Ratio

1. Strict Construction of Section 11, Rule 110§: The Court applied the explicit text of Section 11, Rule 110§ of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which governs the date of commission in criminal indictments. The provision mandates that:

   "It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission."

2. Rape and the Non-Essentiality of Time: The Court reiterated the established jurisprudential principle that the precise date of the commission of rape is not an essential element of the crime. Citing People v. Lizada (444 Phil. 67) and People v. Salalima (415 Phil. 414), the Court held that the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 266§-A. Because time is not a material ingredient of rape, the prosecution's failure to specify the exact date does not render the Information defective. Pleading that the rape occurred "sometime before December 24, 2002" is a valid approximation of a crime committed exactly on December 24, 2002.
3. The Purview of the Right to be Informed: The constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him under Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is satisfied when the Information contains the essential elements of the crime with sufficient particularity to allow the accused to prepare his defense. The Court found that accused-appellant was not prejudiced or surprised by the variance because:
   • (a) The date alleged was not vague or covering an unreasonable period;
   • (b) The accused-appellant was fully prepared to, and did in fact, testify in detail regarding his exact whereabouts and conversations at the victim's house on December 24, 2002.
4. Waiver of formal Defects under the Gianan Rule: The Court ruled that any objection regarding a broad or defective date in the Information must be raised prior to the entry of a plea. Because the accused-appellant did not object at his arraignment, during AAA's testimony, or during the formal offer of exhibits, he waived his right to challenge the sufficiency of the Information. Citing People v. Gianan (394 Phil. 822), the Court held that "an accused-appellant's failure to raise a timely objection that the time difference alleged in the information covered a broad period constitutes a waiver of his right to object."
5. Minor Inconsistencies and Collateral Matters: Applying People v. Laog (674 Phil. 444), the Court held that discrepancies in testimonies regarding collateral matters—such as the exact physical manner of the victim's release—do not detract from the essential credibility of the witness. What remains paramount is the witness's absolute consistency in relating the principal elements of the crime and the positive identification of the accused.
6. Application of Indivisible Penalties under A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC: The Court systematically reviewed the CA's imposition of reclusion perpetua "without the benefit of parole." Under the En Banc guidelines of A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC:
   • (1) In cases where the death penalty is not warranted, there is no need to use the phrase "without eligibility for parole" to qualify the penalty of reclusion perpetua; it is understood that convicted persons penalized with an indivisible penalty are not eligible for parole; and
   • (2) When circumstances are present warranting the imposition of the death penalty, but this penalty is not imposed because of R.A. 9346, the qualification of "without eligibility for parole" shall be used to qualify reclusion perpetua in order to emphasize that the accused should have been sentenced to suffer the death penalty had it not been for R.A. No. 9346. Because the accused-appellant committed simple rape under Article 266§-A, which is penalized only by reclusion perpetua (no qualifying circumstances under Article 266§-B being alleged or proved), the CA erred in adding the parole restriction, which the Court ordered deleted.

• The Codal Rule on the Sufficiency of Date (Section 11, Rule 110§): The date of the commission of an offense need not be stated with absolute precision in the Information, unless it is a material ingredient of the crime. Pleading a date "as near as possible" to the actual date is sufficient, and the prosecution may convict the accused upon proof of the commission of the crime on a different but approximate date.
• The Andaya Right to Be Informed Test: Verbatim from Andaya v. People (526 Phil. 480):

  "It is fundamental that every element constituting the offense must be alleged in the information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense because he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense..."

• Young and Immature Credibility Badge: Verbatim from the Court's ruling:

  "The Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth."

• Where Date is a Material Ingredient: If the date of commission is a material ingredient of the offense (e.g., violation of Sunday laws, trespassing during specific prohibited hours, or where the prescription of the action rests on a precise operational date), the precise date must be alleged with mathematical specificity.
• Unreasonable or Prejudicial Date Spans: If the date range alleged in the Information is so unconscionably broad or vague as to completely deprive the accused of the ability to construct an alibi, the Information is substantively defective and can be quashed, unless the defect is waived by entering a plea.

Separate Opinions