People v. Lucas

IV.b — Complaint or Information: Sufficiency

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Case DigestWeek 3 - Rule 110 - Prosecution of Offenses

People v. Lucas

G.R. Nos. 108172-73 · May 25, 1994 · First Division

IV.b — Complaint or Information: Sufficiency

Petitioner: People of the PhilippinesRespondent: Jose Conrado Lucas y Briones

Gist

The Supreme Court, through Justice Davide, Jr., held that the date variance was not fatal, the accused having raised no objection and time not being an essential element; but that the conviction could not exceed the charge, so that on the 12 February 1991 incident the accused "cannot be convicted of consummated rape" and was found guilty of attempted rape only. The charge, in short, sets the outer limit of the judgment.

Core Doctrine

Two sufficiency rules meet in this case. First, on the date: where time is not an essential element, "conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appear that the crime was not committed at the precise time or placed alleged … providing it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or information within the period of the statute of limitations, and at a place within the jurisdiction of the court" (U.S. vs. Arcos); indeed unobjected proof of a different date "could even be the basis for an amendment of the complaint to make it conform to the evidence" under Section 14, Rule 110. Second, on the offence charged: the charge is a ceiling. Where the complaint charges attempted rape and the evidence proves consummated rape, Section 4, Rule 120 governs — "the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved" — and the accused "should be convicted of attempted rape only."

ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic

IV.b — Complaint or Information: Sufficiency Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/may1994/gr_108172_1994.html

⚡ Coverage-sheet citation defect — the sheet points at a different case

The sheet cites this row as "People vs. Lucas, G.R. No. 50450, March 16, 1984." That docket resolves to People v. Lucas Ramos y Macasiray (Second Division, Abad Santos, J.), where "Lucas" is the accused's given name, not his surname — a rape conviction reviewed on the issues of force, the credibility of the lone witness, and the penalty. It contains no sufficiency holding at all: the word "information" does not appear in it, and neither does Rule 110.

The case that fits IV.b Sufficiency is People v. Jose Conrado Lucas y Briones, G.R. Nos. 108172-73, May 25, 1994, digested here. Raise the discrepancy in class rather than reciting the sheet's docket.

For completeness: in G.R. No. 50450 the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, imposed reclusión perpetua, and ordered indemnity of ₱10,000.00 to Elisa Malana as moral damages — "We have reviewed the records of the case and We can add nothing to the lucid opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin."

Facts

Chanda Lucas y Austria was born on 2 June 1973, to unmarried parents. Her father Jose Conrado Lucas was detained for gunrunning when she was born and "it was only when she was four years old … when he rejoined his 'family.'" Their house in Baesa, Quezon City had "only one bedroom," and "all the members of the family slept in one room."
On 26 November 1983, about 2:00 to 3:00 a.m., Chanda woke to find her father removing her panty and shorts. "He cautioned her to keep quiet," "went on top of her and placed his sexual organ inside her vagina." "She was hurt but did not resist because her father threatened to kill her." Her sister Cynthia witnessed it. Chanda was then ten years, five months and twenty-four days old.
She reported it to her mother and her aunt, but her mother "only got angry but did not do anything," and when the aunt said the father should be jailed, "her mother did not agree."
"The 26 November 1983 incident was only the first of many atrocities."
On 12 February 1991 at 3:00 a.m., the accused — "who had a balisong with him" — moved the other children, threatened her, "removed her shorts and panty and then moved on top of her and inserted 'his organ to her organ.'" That is a consummated rape.
On 19 February 1991 two sworn complaints were filed in the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 104: Q-91-18465 for rape, alleging the offence "on or about the 26th day of November 1982 and sometime thereafter"; and Q-91-18466 for attempted rape, on the 12 February 1991 incident.
So the first complaint understated the year by one, and the second understated the stage of execution.
He pleaded not guilty; the cases were tried jointly; and on 28 October 1992 he was convicted in both. Decided 25 May 1994 (Davide, Jr., J.).

Issue

(a) Whether the variance between the date alleged (26 November 1982) and the date proved (26 November 1983) is fatal; and (b) whether the accused may be convicted of consummated rape on a complaint charging attempted rape.

Secondary issues. Whether the offence in Q-91-18465 was statutory rape, and whether the delay in reporting impaired credibility.

Ruling

(a) The date variance is NOT fatal. "The accused offered no objection to such evidence. Consequently, the variance was not fatal to the prosecution."

(b) The conviction is capped by the charge. "Considering, however, that the complaint … charges the accused with the crime of attempted rape, then … he cannot be convicted of consummated rape." Under Section 4, Rule 120, "[t]he offense charged in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 (attempted rape) is necessarily included in the offense that was proved (consummated rape). Accordingly, the accused should be convicted of attempted rape only."

Secondary issues. It was statutory rape — she was "exactly ten years, five months, and twenty-four days old," and under the third paragraph of Article 335 "carnal knowledge alone is sufficient for conviction." And the delay was excused: "The equanimity or the wisdom of more mature persons cannot be expected from a young and immature girl like Chanda," who was "completely under the moral ascendancy and control of her father."

"WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision of 28 October 1992 … is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modifications indicated above. As modified: (1) In Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465, accused JOSE CONRADO LUCAS y BRIONES is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Thirty-four (34) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of reclusion perpetua and to pay the offended party the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and (2) In Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466, said accused is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED RAPE only and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from Four (4) years, TWO (2) months and One (1) day of prision correccional maximum as minimum to Ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as maximum and to pay the offended party the sum of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity.

Costs against the accused-appellant. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

An unobjected variance in a non-essential fact is waived, and time is not an essential element unless made so. From U.S. v. Arcos: "Where time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appear that the crime was not committed at the precise time or placed alleged … providing it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint … within the period of the statute of limitations, and at a place within the jurisdiction of the court." Those three provisos are what keep the rule fair.
The remedy for a divergent date is amendment, not acquittal: "[t]he unobjected testimony of another date … could even be the basis for an amendment of the complaint to make it conform to the evidence," Section 14, Rule 110 permitting amendment "as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused."
But the charge caps the conviction, and this is the half students drop. Section 4, Rule 120 lets a court convict either of "the offense proved included in that which is charged," or "of the offense charged included in that which is proved" — here the second limb, so the accused takes the lesser charged offence.
The Court applied this even though the greater offence was fully proved, and even though the point was raised by the accused and conceded by the Solicitor General.
Delay is assessed against the victim's circumstances, not an abstract standard: she "was a victim of poverty and a virtual captive in the only 'home' her natural parents could provide," and her mother's indifference caused "despair."
Relationship is aggravating — "In crimes against chastity, such as rape, relationship is aggravating," the offended party being his descendant.

Doctrine

Date variance.

A variance between the date alleged and the date proved is not fatal where time is not an essential element, the accused does not object, and the offence was committed before filing, within the prescriptive period, and within the court's territory; the pleading may be amended to conform.
The charge caps the conviction. "[A]n accused cannot be convicted of an offence greater than the one charged"; under Section 4, Rule 120, conviction lies for the offence charged that is included in the offence proved.
Statutory rape requires only carnal knowledge where the victim is under twelve.
Relationship is aggravating in crimes against chastity where the offended party is the offender's descendant.

Limits.

The two holdings pull in opposite directions, and that is the point. A defect of detail (the date) is curable and waivable; a defect of charge (attempted versus consummated) is not, because it defines what the accused came to answer. Recite both or the case is only half understood.
The variance here was a full year — wider than Kummer (one month) or Delfin (two months) — but note that the Court leaned on the absence of objection; it did not hold that any variance is immaterial.
The prosecution conceded the second point, so the Rule 120 holding was not adversarial — it is nonetheless the Court's own ruling and is routinely cited.
Do not attribute the "and sometime thereafter" duplicity ruling to this Decision — the 25 May 1994 Decision does not decide it; readers conflate it with the later resolution on reconsideration.
Citation caveat: the coverage sheet cites "G.R. No. 50450, March 16, 1984," which is People v. Lucas Ramos y Macasiray — a different case, with no sufficiency holding at all. The case that fits is G.R. Nos. 108172-73, May 25, 1994.
Read with People v. Guillen (no finding on an offence not charged) and People v. Domingo (conviction for the offence the charge supports).

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Classification: DIRECT. Chanda Lucas y Austria, then seventeen, charged her natural father Jose Conrado Lucas with rape and attempted rape. Two sworn complaints were filed in the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 104. The rape complaint (Q-91-18465) alleged the offence occurred "on or about the 26th day of November 1982 and sometime thereafter," when Chanda "was then nine (9) years old"; the evidence at trial established that the first rape in fact occurred on 26 November 1983, when she was ten. The attempted-rape complaint (Q-91-18466) charged an incident of 12 February 1991 — but the evidence showed that on that date the rape was consummated.

Facts

Chanda Lucas y Austria was born on 2 June 1973. Her parents were not married. Her father was under detention for gunrunning when she was born and "it was only when she was four years old (1977) when he rejoined his 'family.'" Their house at 23-X Daropa Road, Baesa, Quezon City had "only one bedroom," and "all the members of the family slept in one room."
On 26 November 1983, at about 2:00 to 3:00 a.m., Chanda awoke to find her father removing her panty and shorts. "He cautioned her to keep quiet." He "went on top of her and placed his sexual organ inside her vagina." "She was hurt but did not resist because her father threatened to kill her." Her older sister Cynthia witnessed the incident. Chanda was then ten years, five months and twenty-four days old.
She reported the incident to her mother and her aunt, but her mother "only got angry but did not do anything." "When her aunt said that her father should be jailed, her mother did not agree."
"The 26 November 1983 incident was only the first of many atrocities." Her father "had been repeatedly molesting her, especially when her mother was not around."
On 12 February 1991, at 3:00 a.m., the accused — "who had a balisong with him" — moved her brothers and sisters who slept in the same room, "laid down beside her, threatened her that she had only one life which he can take away any time; removed her shorts and panty and then moved on top of her and inserted 'his organ to her organ.'" "Thereafter, he stood up holding his balisong and reiterated his earlier threat."
On 16 February 1991 a sworn statement was taken in which Chanda charged her father with attempted rape committed on 12 February 1991, revealing that she was first raped at nine years old, with a handwritten note at the left-hand margin reading "noong Nov. 26, 1982 . . . at naulit ng maraming beses."
On 19 February 1991, assisted by her mother Ofelia Austria-Lucas, Chanda filed two separate sworn criminal complaints in the RTC of Quezon City: Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465 for rape, alleging the offence "on or about the 26th day of November 1982 and sometime thereafter"; and Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 for attempted rape, alleging the 12 February 1991 incident. Both were assigned to Branch 104.
The accused pleaded not guilty and the cases were tried jointly. The prosecution presented Chanda, her sister Cynthia, and Dr. Emmanuel Aranas; the defense presented only the accused.
On 28 October 1992 the trial court convicted him in both cases.
On 25 May 1994 the Supreme Court affirmed with modifications, reducing the conviction in Q-91-18466 to attempted rape.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Accused-Appellant (Jose Conrado Lucas y Briones).

That the evidence showed a different date (1983) from the one charged (1982). That Chanda's long silence — from age nine or ten until seventeen — was incredible, "since she had all the available remedies for redress as well as relatives who could help her." And, in his second assigned error, that he could not be convicted of consummated rape in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 because the complaint there charged only attempted rape.

B. Plaintiff-Appellee (People of the Philippines).

The Office of the Solicitor General concurred in the accused's second assigned error — that he could not be convicted of consummated rape on a complaint for attempted rape — while sustaining the convictions otherwise.

C. Common Ground.

The accused "offered no objection" to the evidence that the incident took place on 26 November 1983 rather than 1982. Both the accused and the OSG agreed that the complaint in Q-91-18466 charged attempted rape. Chanda's date of birth, 2 June 1973, was established.

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered).

(a) Whether the variance between the date alleged in the complaint (26 November 1982) and the date established by the evidence (26 November 1983) is fatal; and (b) whether the accused may be convicted of consummated rape on a complaint charging attempted rape.

B. Secondary Issues.

Whether the offence proved in Q-91-18465 was statutory rape, Chanda being under twelve; and whether her delay in reporting impaired her credibility.

C. Ancillary/Incidental Issues.

The appreciation of the alternative circumstance of relationship under Article 15, and the computation of the penalties following the amendment of Article 27 by R.A. No. 7659.

Ruling

Main Issue (a) — the date variance is NOT fatal. "The accused offered no objection to such evidence. Consequently, the variance was not fatal to the prosecution." Quoting United States vs. Arcos: "Where time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appear that the crime was not committed at the precise time or placed alleged, or if the proof fails to sustain the existence of some immaterial fact set out in the complaint, providing it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or information within the period of the statute of limitations, and at a place within the jurisdiction of the court." The Court added that "[t]he unobjected testimony of another date of the commission of the crime charged … could even be the basis for an amendment of the complaint to make it conform to the evidence," citing Section 14, Rule 110: "The information or complaint may be amended, in substance and form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused."

Main Issue (b) — conviction is capped by the charge. "Considering, however, that the complaint for this incident subject of Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 charges the accused with the crime of attempted rape, then, as correctly pointed out by the accused in his second assigned error and concurred in by the Office of the Solicitor General, he cannot be convicted of consummated rape." Section 4, Rule 120 "provides that '[w]hen there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved.' The offense charged in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 (attempted rape) is necessarily included in the offense that was proved (consummated rape). Accordingly, the accused should be convicted of attempted rape only."

Secondary Issues — statutory rape, and credibility unimpaired. "Chanda was less than twelve years old when she was raped by the accused on 26 November 1983," being "exactly ten years, five months, and twenty-four days old." Under the third paragraph of Article 335, "known as statutory rape," "carnal knowledge alone is sufficient for conviction as the presence of any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 … is not required." On the delay: "The equanimity or the wisdom of more mature persons cannot be expected from a young and immature girl like Chanda"; "the workings of a human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable and … people react differently to various situations." The Court observed that she "was a victim of poverty and a virtual captive in the only 'home' her natural parents could provide," "completely under the moral ascendancy and control of her father," and that her mother's indifference must have caused "despair." Hence "[h]er delay in reporting the sexual assaults to the authorities is thus understandable and does not affect her credibility."

Ancillary Issues — relationship aggravating; penalties recomputed. "The alternative circumstance of relationship provided for in Article 15 … should be appreciated against the accused considering that the offended party, Chanda, is his descendant. In crimes against chastity, such as rape, relationship is aggravating." The Court then worked through the effect of Section 21 of R.A. No. 7659 on Article 27, noting that although reclusión perpetua now has "a defined duration, i.e., from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years," the legislature "did not make explicit its intention to convert it into a divisible penalty," and applied Article 65 to divide it into three periods.

Dispositive portion (verbatim):

"WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision of 28 October 1992 of Branch 104 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465 and Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modifications indicated above. As modified: (1) In Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465, accused JOSE CONRADO LUCAS y BRIONES is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Thirty-four (34) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of reclusion perpetua and to pay the offended party the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and (2) In Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466, said accused is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED RAPE only and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from Four (4) years, TWO (2) months and One (1) day of prision correccional maximum as minimum to Ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as maximum and to pay the offended party the sum of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity.

Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

An unobjected variance in a non-essential fact is waived. "The accused offered no objection to such evidence. Consequently, the variance was not fatal to the prosecution."
Time is not an essential element unless made so. U.S. vs. Arcos supplies the standard, with the two limits that keep it fair: the crime must have been committed before the filing of the complaint, within the prescriptive period, and within the court's territory.
The remedy for a divergent date is amendment, not acquittal — Section 14, Rule 110 permits conforming the pleading to the evidence.
But the charge caps the conviction. Where the offence proved is greater than the offence charged, the accused is convicted of the lesser offence charged — Section 4, Rule 120. The Court applies this even though the greater offence was fully proved and even though the point was raised by the accused and conceded by the prosecution.
The age element governs the characterisation in Q-91-18465: below twelve, "carnal knowledge alone is sufficient for conviction."
Delay in reporting is assessed against the victim's circumstances, not against an abstract standard of what a reasonable adult would do.

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles.

A variance between the date alleged and the date proved is not fatal where time is not an essential element, the accused does not object, and the offence was committed before filing and within the prescriptive period; the pleading may be amended to conform.

An accused cannot be convicted of an offence greater than the one charged. Under Section 4, Rule 120, conviction lies for the offence charged that is included in the offence proved.

Statutory rape requires only carnal knowledge where the victim is under twelve.

Relationship is aggravating in crimes against chastity where the offended party is the offender's descendant.

C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications.

The two holdings pull in opposite directions and that is the point. A defect of detail (the date) is curable and waivable; a defect of charge (attempted versus consummated) is not, because it defines what the accused came to answer. Recite both or the case is only half understood.
The variance here was a full year, which makes this the widest date variance in the Week 3 cluster — wider than Zapanta (one month) or People vs. Delfin (two months). Note, though, that the Court leaned on the absence of objection; it did not hold that any variance is immaterial.
The prosecution conceded the second point. The OSG "concurred" in the accused's second assigned error, so the Rule 120 holding was not adversarial. It is nonetheless the Court's own ruling and is routinely cited.
Do not attribute the "and sometime thereafter" duplicity ruling to this Decision. The 25 May 1994 Decision does not decide the effect of that phrase; readers sometimes conflate it with the Court's later resolution on reconsideration.
Verbatim caveats: the reported text prints "at the precise time or placed alleged" (for place), "commencing the commission of a felony by over acts" and "she was sleeping" dates rendered inconsistently — the sworn statement's marginal note says 1982 while the body of the Decision fixes the incident at 26 November 1983.

D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

Consistent with the DIRECT classification, both holdings are sufficiency holdings. Within the IV.b cluster the date ruling joins Zapanta vs. People, Kummer vs. People and People vs. Delfin, while the Rule 120 ruling joins People vs. Domingo (conviction for the offence the charge supports) and People vs. Guillen (no finding on an offence not charged). Together they mark the boundary between what an information may leave imprecise and what it must contain.

Separate Opinions

None. Penned by Justice Davide, Jr., with Justices Bellosillo and Quiason concurring; Justices Cruz and Kapunan were on leave.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Implementing Rules

Section 11, Rule 110, Rules of Court

Date of commission of the offense

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses)

It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. (11a)

LawPhil posts the text as amended effective 1 December 2000. Later amendments — notably to the bail and preliminary-investigation rules — are not reflected here, so check the date of the decision against the date of the amendment.

Why it is cited here

The rule, and the two limits from U.S. v. Arcos that keep it fair.

"It is not necessary to state … the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense."

Time is not an essential element unless made so — and Arcos supplies the standard together with the limits: the crime must be identified by everything else in the information, and the accused must not be misled or prejudiced in his defence.

Those two conditions are what stop the rule from becoming a licence. Approximation is permitted because the date is immaterial, not because pleading may be careless.

Implementing Rules

Section 4, Rule 120, Rules of Court

Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 120 (Judgment)

When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved. (4a)

Why it is cited here

What happens when the proof departs from the allegation.

"When there is variance between the offense charged … and that proved," conviction follows for whichever offense is included in the other.

A variance in a non-essential fact — the date, where date is not an element — is not a variance in the offense at all. The offense charged and the offense proved are the same one, so nothing in this section is engaged.

Which is why the date discrepancy did not disturb the conviction: there was no variance of the kind the rules care about.

Implementing Rules

Section 6, Rule 110, Rules of Court

Sufficiency of complaint or information

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses)

A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information. (6a)

Why it is cited here

The waiver point, and it is the case's practical lesson.

Sufficiency requires the approximate date among the six requisites — a matter of form where the date is not an element.

"The accused offered no objection to such evidence. Consequently, the variance was not fatal to the prosecution."

Objections to form are made when the evidence is offered, or they are lost. An accused who sits through proof of a date other than the one alleged, without objecting and without asking for a bill of particulars, cannot raise it afterwards as a defect in the information.

Related notes:

Zapanta v. People — the date of commission need not be precise.
Kummer v. People — same rule on the date.
People v. Delfin — a two-month variance held not fatal.
People v. Domingo — conviction for the offence the charge supports.
People v. Guillen — no finding on an offence not charged.

Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/may1994/gr_108172_1994.html

Cited laws & provisions

Section 11, Rule 110, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Date of commission of the offense

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses)

Why it is cited here

The rule, and the two limits from U.S. v. Arcos that keep it fair.

"It is not necessary to state … the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense."

Those two conditions are what stop the rule from becoming a licence. Approximation is permitted because the date is immaterial, not because pleading may be careless.

Full entry below ↓

Section 4, Rule 120, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 120 (Judgment)

Why it is cited here

What happens when the proof departs from the allegation.

"When there is variance between the offense charged … and that proved," conviction follows for whichever offense is included in the other.

Which is why the date discrepancy did not disturb the conviction: there was no variance of the kind the rules care about.

Full entry below ↓

Section 6, Rule 110, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Sufficiency of complaint or information

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses)

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information. (6a)

Why it is cited here

The waiver point, and it is the case's practical lesson.

Sufficiency requires the approximate date among the six requisites — a matter of form where the date is not an element.

"The accused offered no objection to such evidence. Consequently, the variance was not fatal to the prosecution."

Full entry below ↓

ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic

IV.b — Complaint or Information: Sufficiency Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/may1994/gr_108172_1994.html

⚡ Coverage-sheet citation defect — the sheet points at a different case

Facts

Chanda Lucas y Austria was born on 2 June 1973, to unmarried parents. Her father Jose Conrado Lucas was detained for gunrunning when she was born and "it was only when she was four years old … when he rejoined his 'family.'" Their house in Baesa, Quezon City had "only one bedroom," and "all the members of the family slept in one room."
On 26 November 1983, about 2:00 to 3:00 a.m., Chanda woke to find her father removing her panty and shorts. "He cautioned her to keep quiet," "went on top of her and placed his sexual organ inside her vagina." "She was hurt but did not resist because her father threatened to kill her." Her sister Cynthia witnessed it. Chanda was then ten years, five months and twenty-four days old.
She reported it to her mother and her aunt, but her mother "only got angry but did not do anything," and when the aunt said the father should be jailed, "her mother did not agree."
"The 26 November 1983 incident was only the first of many atrocities."
On 12 February 1991 at 3:00 a.m., the accused — "who had a balisong with him" — moved the other children, threatened her, "removed her shorts and panty and then moved on top of her and inserted 'his organ to her organ.'" That is a consummated rape.
On 19 February 1991 two sworn complaints were filed in the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 104: Q-91-18465 for rape, alleging the offence "on or about the 26th day of November 1982 and sometime thereafter"; and Q-91-18466 for attempted rape, on the 12 February 1991 incident.
So the first complaint understated the year by one, and the second understated the stage of execution.
He pleaded not guilty; the cases were tried jointly; and on 28 October 1992 he was convicted in both. Decided 25 May 1994 (Davide, Jr., J.).

Issue

Secondary issues. Whether the offence in Q-91-18465 was statutory rape, and whether the delay in reporting impaired credibility.

Ruling

(a) The date variance is NOT fatal. "The accused offered no objection to such evidence. Consequently, the variance was not fatal to the prosecution."

"WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision of 28 October 1992 … is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modifications indicated above. As modified: (1) In Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465, accused JOSE CONRADO LUCAS y BRIONES is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Thirty-four (34) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of reclusion perpetua and to pay the offended party the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and (2) In Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466, said accused is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED RAPE only and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from Four (4) years, TWO (2) months and One (1) day of prision correccional maximum as minimum to Ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as maximum and to pay the offended party the sum of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity.

Costs against the accused-appellant. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

An unobjected variance in a non-essential fact is waived, and time is not an essential element unless made so. From U.S. v. Arcos: "Where time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appear that the crime was not committed at the precise time or placed alleged … providing it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint … within the period of the statute of limitations, and at a place within the jurisdiction of the court." Those three provisos are what keep the rule fair.
The remedy for a divergent date is amendment, not acquittal: "[t]he unobjected testimony of another date … could even be the basis for an amendment of the complaint to make it conform to the evidence," Section 14, Rule 110 permitting amendment "as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused."
But the charge caps the conviction, and this is the half students drop. Section 4, Rule 120 lets a court convict either of "the offense proved included in that which is charged," or "of the offense charged included in that which is proved" — here the second limb, so the accused takes the lesser charged offence.
The Court applied this even though the greater offence was fully proved, and even though the point was raised by the accused and conceded by the Solicitor General.
Delay is assessed against the victim's circumstances, not an abstract standard: she "was a victim of poverty and a virtual captive in the only 'home' her natural parents could provide," and her mother's indifference caused "despair."
Relationship is aggravating — "In crimes against chastity, such as rape, relationship is aggravating," the offended party being his descendant.

Doctrine

Date variance.

A variance between the date alleged and the date proved is not fatal where time is not an essential element, the accused does not object, and the offence was committed before filing, within the prescriptive period, and within the court's territory; the pleading may be amended to conform.
The charge caps the conviction. "[A]n accused cannot be convicted of an offence greater than the one charged"; under Section 4, Rule 120, conviction lies for the offence charged that is included in the offence proved.
Statutory rape requires only carnal knowledge where the victim is under twelve.
Relationship is aggravating in crimes against chastity where the offended party is the offender's descendant.

Limits.

The two holdings pull in opposite directions, and that is the point. A defect of detail (the date) is curable and waivable; a defect of charge (attempted versus consummated) is not, because it defines what the accused came to answer. Recite both or the case is only half understood.
The variance here was a full year — wider than Kummer (one month) or Delfin (two months) — but note that the Court leaned on the absence of objection; it did not hold that any variance is immaterial.
The prosecution conceded the second point, so the Rule 120 holding was not adversarial — it is nonetheless the Court's own ruling and is routinely cited.
Do not attribute the "and sometime thereafter" duplicity ruling to this Decision — the 25 May 1994 Decision does not decide it; readers conflate it with the later resolution on reconsideration.
Citation caveat: the coverage sheet cites "G.R. No. 50450, March 16, 1984," which is People v. Lucas Ramos y Macasiray — a different case, with no sufficiency holding at all. The case that fits is G.R. Nos. 108172-73, May 25, 1994.
Read with People v. Guillen (no finding on an offence not charged) and People v. Domingo (conviction for the offence the charge supports).

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Facts

Chanda Lucas y Austria was born on 2 June 1973. Her parents were not married. Her father was under detention for gunrunning when she was born and "it was only when she was four years old (1977) when he rejoined his 'family.'" Their house at 23-X Daropa Road, Baesa, Quezon City had "only one bedroom," and "all the members of the family slept in one room."
On 26 November 1983, at about 2:00 to 3:00 a.m., Chanda awoke to find her father removing her panty and shorts. "He cautioned her to keep quiet." He "went on top of her and placed his sexual organ inside her vagina." "She was hurt but did not resist because her father threatened to kill her." Her older sister Cynthia witnessed the incident. Chanda was then ten years, five months and twenty-four days old.
She reported the incident to her mother and her aunt, but her mother "only got angry but did not do anything." "When her aunt said that her father should be jailed, her mother did not agree."
"The 26 November 1983 incident was only the first of many atrocities." Her father "had been repeatedly molesting her, especially when her mother was not around."
On 12 February 1991, at 3:00 a.m., the accused — "who had a balisong with him" — moved her brothers and sisters who slept in the same room, "laid down beside her, threatened her that she had only one life which he can take away any time; removed her shorts and panty and then moved on top of her and inserted 'his organ to her organ.'" "Thereafter, he stood up holding his balisong and reiterated his earlier threat."
On 16 February 1991 a sworn statement was taken in which Chanda charged her father with attempted rape committed on 12 February 1991, revealing that she was first raped at nine years old, with a handwritten note at the left-hand margin reading "noong Nov. 26, 1982 . . . at naulit ng maraming beses."
On 19 February 1991, assisted by her mother Ofelia Austria-Lucas, Chanda filed two separate sworn criminal complaints in the RTC of Quezon City: Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465 for rape, alleging the offence "on or about the 26th day of November 1982 and sometime thereafter"; and Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 for attempted rape, alleging the 12 February 1991 incident. Both were assigned to Branch 104.
The accused pleaded not guilty and the cases were tried jointly. The prosecution presented Chanda, her sister Cynthia, and Dr. Emmanuel Aranas; the defense presented only the accused.
On 28 October 1992 the trial court convicted him in both cases.
On 25 May 1994 the Supreme Court affirmed with modifications, reducing the conviction in Q-91-18466 to attempted rape.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Accused-Appellant (Jose Conrado Lucas y Briones).

B. Plaintiff-Appellee (People of the Philippines).

C. Common Ground.

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered).

B. Secondary Issues.

Whether the offence proved in Q-91-18465 was statutory rape, Chanda being under twelve; and whether her delay in reporting impaired her credibility.

C. Ancillary/Incidental Issues.

The appreciation of the alternative circumstance of relationship under Article 15, and the computation of the penalties following the amendment of Article 27 by R.A. No. 7659.

Ruling

Dispositive portion (verbatim):

"WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision of 28 October 1992 of Branch 104 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465 and Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modifications indicated above. As modified: (1) In Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465, accused JOSE CONRADO LUCAS y BRIONES is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Thirty-four (34) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of reclusion perpetua and to pay the offended party the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and (2) In Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466, said accused is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED RAPE only and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from Four (4) years, TWO (2) months and One (1) day of prision correccional maximum as minimum to Ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as maximum and to pay the offended party the sum of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity.

Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

An unobjected variance in a non-essential fact is waived. "The accused offered no objection to such evidence. Consequently, the variance was not fatal to the prosecution."
Time is not an essential element unless made so. U.S. vs. Arcos supplies the standard, with the two limits that keep it fair: the crime must have been committed before the filing of the complaint, within the prescriptive period, and within the court's territory.
The remedy for a divergent date is amendment, not acquittal — Section 14, Rule 110 permits conforming the pleading to the evidence.
But the charge caps the conviction. Where the offence proved is greater than the offence charged, the accused is convicted of the lesser offence charged — Section 4, Rule 120. The Court applies this even though the greater offence was fully proved and even though the point was raised by the accused and conceded by the prosecution.
The age element governs the characterisation in Q-91-18465: below twelve, "carnal knowledge alone is sufficient for conviction."
Delay in reporting is assessed against the victim's circumstances, not against an abstract standard of what a reasonable adult would do.

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles.

An accused cannot be convicted of an offence greater than the one charged. Under Section 4, Rule 120, conviction lies for the offence charged that is included in the offence proved.

Statutory rape requires only carnal knowledge where the victim is under twelve.

Relationship is aggravating in crimes against chastity where the offended party is the offender's descendant.

C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications.

The two holdings pull in opposite directions and that is the point. A defect of detail (the date) is curable and waivable; a defect of charge (attempted versus consummated) is not, because it defines what the accused came to answer. Recite both or the case is only half understood.
The variance here was a full year, which makes this the widest date variance in the Week 3 cluster — wider than Zapanta (one month) or People vs. Delfin (two months). Note, though, that the Court leaned on the absence of objection; it did not hold that any variance is immaterial.
The prosecution conceded the second point. The OSG "concurred" in the accused's second assigned error, so the Rule 120 holding was not adversarial. It is nonetheless the Court's own ruling and is routinely cited.
Do not attribute the "and sometime thereafter" duplicity ruling to this Decision. The 25 May 1994 Decision does not decide the effect of that phrase; readers sometimes conflate it with the Court's later resolution on reconsideration.
Verbatim caveats: the reported text prints "at the precise time or placed alleged" (for place), "commencing the commission of a felony by over acts" and "she was sleeping" dates rendered inconsistently — the sworn statement's marginal note says 1982 while the body of the Decision fixes the incident at 26 November 1983.

D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

Separate Opinions

None. Penned by Justice Davide, Jr., with Justices Bellosillo and Quiason concurring; Justices Cruz and Kapunan were on leave.