Adlawan v. Adlawan

j. Ejectment

Subject Home

16px

←Previous: Plasabas v. Court of AppealsPrevious case

Primary source ↗Next: De Guia v. Court of AppealsNext case→

Case DigestChapter III — Co-ownership

Adlawan v. Adlawan

G.R. No. 161916 · January 20, 2006 · Supreme Court

j. Ejectment

Gist

An acknowledged illegitimate son adjudicated his late father's house and lot to himself by affidavit and sued his elderly aunt and uncle, who had lived there since birth, for unlawful detainer. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal: his own theory of succession made him a co-owner with his father's widow's heirs, and Article 487 does not let a plaintiff who "vigorously asserted absolute and sole ownership" sue in that character — his action "operates as a complete repudiation of the existence of co-ownership."

Core Doctrine

The central doctrine is the limit on Article 487. A co-owner may sue alone "because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners" — but "where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed." Tolentino: "If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper." Paras: "if the co-owner expressly states that he is bringing the case only for himself, the action should not be allowed to prosper."

Facts

The dispute is over Lot 7226 and the house on it, covered by TCT No. 8842 registered in the name of the late Dominador Adlawan, at Barrio Lipata, Minglanilla, Cebu.
Petitioner Arnelito Adlawan claimed to be an acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador, who died on May 28, 1987, and, "[c]laiming to be the sole heir," executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself the lot and house. That affidavit is the fact that decides the case. It is a formal declaration that there is no co-ownership — which later bars him from invoking a co-owner's right to sue.
He alleged that "[o]ut of respect and generosity to respondents who are the siblings of his father," he let them occupy the property on condition they would leave when he needed it; that sometime in January 1999 he verbally asked them to vacate; that they refused and instead filed an action for quieting of title; and that after a final demand letter of August 2, 2000 he filed this unlawful detainer suit on August 9, 2000.
Respondents Narcisa and Emeterio Adlawan, then 70 and 59 years old, denied begging to stay and said they "have been occupying Lot 7226 and the house standing thereon since birth." Their "not less than four decade actual physical possession of the questioned ancestral house and lot" is what the Court says "deserves to be respected."
They alleged the lot was originally registered in the name of their father Ramon Adlawan, the ancestral house being owned by Ramon and their mother Oligia Mañacap Adlawan; the couple had nine children, including Dominador and the two respondents, and all of them lived on the property, as did Dominador and his wife Graciana Ramas Adlawan, who died without issue.
In 1961 the parents needed money to renovate the house but could not qualify for a loan, so they transferred the lot to Dominador, "the only one in the family who had a college education," by a simulated deed of sale dated January 31, 1962, enabling him to use the lot as collateral. Dominador "never disputed his parents' ownership of the lot," and he and Graciana "did not disturb respondents' possession" until their deaths on May 28, 1987 and May 6, 1997. (Respondents also alleged Dominador's signature on the petitioner's birth certificate was forged, so he is no heir at all — a question the Court never has to reach.)
On February 12, 2002, the MTC of Minglanilla dismissed the complaint, holding that proof of filiation and settlement of Dominador's estate were conditions precedent, and that since Dominador was survived by Graciana, her legal heirs are also entitled to a share.
On September 13, 2002, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 7 reversed, holding Dominador's title could not be collaterally attacked, and ordered respondents to restore possession and pay ₱500 a month from August 2000. (Persons describing themselves as Graciana's nephew and nieces then sought leave to intervene, asserting a share as her heirs and declaring that as co-owners they were allowing respondents to stay pending partition; the RTC denied leave.)
On September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals set the RTC aside and reinstated the MTC judgment, holding that petitioner and Graciana's heirs are co-owners, so petitioner "cannot eject respondents from the property via an unlawful detainer suit filed in his own name and as the sole owner." Reconsideration was denied January 8, 2004.
Petitioner's complaint alleged that he "was the only son (illegitimate) and sole heir" of Dominador and that "[b]eing the only child/descendant and, therefore, sole heir... the plaintiff became the absolute owner, and automatically took POSSESSION" of the house and lot. These are the words the Court quotes back at him: they are why his suit is "a complete repudiation of the existence of co-ownership."

Issue

Whether the petitioner can validly maintain an action for unlawful detainer over the property.

Ruling

Main issue. NO — the petition is denied and the dismissal stands. The petitioner's own theory defeats him: "the RTC lost sight of the fact that the theory of succession invoked by petitioner would end up proving that he is not the sole owner of Lot 7226," Dominador having been survived not only by him but by his legal wife Graciana, so that "[b]y intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners"; and Graciana's death in 1997 "did not make petitioner the absolute owner... because the share of Graciana passed to her relatives by consanguinity and not to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations." Article 487 does not rescue him. It "covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession" — accion interdictal, accion publiciana and accion de reivindicacion — and "[a] co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be stressed, however, that where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed." Tolentino puts it the same way — "[i]f the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper" — and Paras likewise: "if the co-owner expressly states that he is bringing the case only for himself, the action should not be allowed to prosper." Here "petitioner brought the suit for unlawful detainer in his name alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even executed an affidavit of self-adjudication," so he "cannot validly maintain the instant action considering that he does not recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of succession." His argument that ejectment would benefit his co-owners too fails on the relief he actually sought: "he filed the instant case to acquire possession of the property and to recover damages. If granted, he alone will gain possession of the lot and benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana." And in default of those heirs, "the State will inherit her share and will thus be petitioner's co-owner." His suit "operates as a complete repudiation of the existence of co-ownership and not in representation or recognition thereof. Dismissal of the complaint is therefore proper."

"WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 23, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74921 which reinstated the February 12, 2002 Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, dismissing petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 392, and its January 8, 2004 Resolution, are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The petitioner's theory proves too much. "[T]he theory of succession invoked by petitioner would end up proving that he is not the sole owner of Lot 7226. This is so because Dominador was survived not only by petitioner but also by his legal wife, Graciana, who died 10 years after the demise of Dominador." "By intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of Lot 7226."
Graciana's death did not consolidate the lot in him. It "did not make petitioner the absolute owner of Lot 7226 because the share of Graciana passed to her relatives by consanguinity and not to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations." So the Court of Appeals "correctly held that petitioner has no authority to institute the instant action as the sole owner of Lot 7226."
Article 487's scope, and its condition. Article 487 "covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession... forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion)." A co-owner may sue alone "because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners" — "[i]t should be stressed, however, that where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed."
Tolentino. "A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper."
The controlling precedent. In Baloloy v. Hular the Court dismissed a quieting-of-title suit brought by one who claimed exclusive ownership though he had co-owners: under Section 7, Rule 3 he "was mandated to implead his siblings, being co-owners of the property, as parties," and "the absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment" — ineffective "not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present."
Applied. "[I]t is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for unlawful detainer in his name alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even executed an affidavit of self-adjudication over the disputed property. It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly maintain the instant action considering that he does not recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of succession to the property of his father, Dominador."
The "benefit to co-owners" argument answered on the relief sought. "[P]etitioner forgets that he filed the instant case to acquire possession of the property and to recover damages. If granted, he alone will gain possession of the lot and benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana. Hence, petitioner cannot successfully capitalize on the alleged benefit to his co-owners."
Even the "fictitious heirs" point fails. "[I]n default of the said heirs of Graciana, whom petitioner labeled as 'fictitious heirs,' the State will inherit her share and will thus be petitioner's co-owner entitled to possession and enjoyment of the property."
The distinguishing line across the cases. In Resuena v. Court of Appeals and Sering v. Plazo "the co-owners who filed the ejectment case did not represent themselves as the exclusive owner of the property"; in Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa Santiago the suit "was brought in behalf of the co-owners precisely to recover lots owned in common"; in Vencilao v. Camarenta the amended complaint "specified that the plaintiff is one of the heirs who co-owns the controverted properties." In all of them "the plaintiff never disputed the existence of a co-ownership nor claimed to be the sole or exclusive owner." Here, by contrast, "petitioner vigorously asserted absolute and sole ownership of the questioned lot," pleading that he "became the absolute owner, and automatically took POSSESSION."
Conclusion. "Clearly, the said cases find no application here because petitioner's action operates as a complete repudiation of the existence of co-ownership and not in representation or recognition thereof. Dismissal of the complaint is therefore proper." Paras: "[i]t is understood, of course, that the action [under Article 487] is being instituted for all. Hence, if the co-owner expressly states that he is bringing the case only for himself, the action should not be allowed to prosper."
A closing note on equity. "[R]espondents' not less than four decade actual physical possession of the questioned ancestral house and lot deserves to be respected especially so that petitioner failed to show that he has the requisite personality and authority as co-owner to file the instant case."

Doctrine

Scope of Article 487: It reaches every action for recovery of possession — accion interdictal, accion publiciana and accion de reivindicacion.
The Licence Rests on a Presumption: A co-owner may sue alone "because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners." Destroy the presumption and the licence disappears.
The Sole-Ownership Bar: "[W]here the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed."
Repudiation of Co-Ownership: A suit prosecuted on an affidavit of self-adjudication and pleaded on absolute sole ownership "operates as a complete repudiation of the existence of co-ownership," not in representation of it.
Benefit Is Measured by the Relief Sought: A plaintiff cannot "capitalize on the alleged benefit to his co-owners" where, if he wins, "he alone will gain possession... and benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages."
Indispensable Parties (Rule 3, Sec. 7): Once the plaintiff sues as sole owner, his co-owners become indispensable, and their absence "renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment."
Succession Creates the Co-Ownership (Art. 1078): A surviving spouse and an illegitimate child take as co-owners by intestate succession; the spouse's share on her later death passes to her relatives by consanguinity, or in default of them to the State — never to a stranger in blood.

How to tell this case from Plasabas. Both apply Article 487; they differ on whether the plaintiff owned the co-ownership. In Plasabas the plaintiff pleaded sole ownership but admitted the co-ownership at trial and had the co-owners' authority, so the pleading was immaterial. Here the plaintiff denied the co-ownership throughout, having self-adjudicated the property, and asked for possession and damages for himself alone.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

Relationship to requested topic: DIRECT. Petitioner Arnelito Adlawan, claiming to be the acknowledged illegitimate son and sole heir of the late Dominador Adlawan, executed an affidavit of self-adjudication over Lot 7226 and its ancestral house in Minglanilla, Cebu, and sued his father's siblings — Narcisa and Emeterio, aged 70 and 59, who had lived there since birth — for unlawful detainer. The MTC dismissed, the RTC reversed, and the Court of Appeals reinstated the dismissal; the Supreme Court affirmed. The central doctrine is that Article 487's licence to a lone co-owner rests on the presumption that "the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners," and that "where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed."

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

The controversy concerns Lot 7226 and the house built thereon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8842, registered in the name of the late Dominador Adlawan, at Barrio Lipata, Municipality of Minglanilla, Cebu.
In 1961, spouses Ramon and Oligia Mañacap Adlawan needed money to renovate their house but were not qualified to obtain a loan, so they transferred ownership of Lot 7226 to their son Dominador, "the only one in the family who had a college education."
By a January 31, 1962 simulated deed of sale, title issued to Dominador, "which enabled him to secure a loan with Lot 7226 as collateral." He "never disputed his parents' ownership of the lot," and he and his wife Graciana Ramas Adlawan "did not disturb respondents' possession of the property."
On May 28, 1987, Dominador died. Petitioner Arnelito Adlawan claimed to be his acknowledged illegitimate child and sole heir, "without any other issue," and executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself Lot 7226 and the house.
On May 6, 1997, Graciana, Dominador's legal wife, died without issue.
Sometime in January 1999, petitioner verbally requested respondents to vacate the house and lot; they refused and "filed instead an action for quieting of title" with the RTC (Civil Case No. CEB-23205).
After respondents refused to heed a final demand letter to vacate dated August 2, 2000, petitioner filed the unlawful detainer case on August 9, 2000 (Civil Case No. 392).
Respondents, then 70 and 59 years old, denied having begged to stay, and stressed that they "have been occupying Lot 7226 and the house standing thereon since birth"; that the lot was originally registered in the name of their father Ramon, the ancestral house owned by Ramon and Oligia; that the spouses had nine children; and that petitioner "is a stranger who never had possession of Lot 7226." They also contended that "Dominador's signature at the back of petitioner's birth certificate was forged."
On February 12, 2002, the MTC of Minglanilla dismissed the complaint, holding that "the establishment of petitioner's filiation and the settlement of the estate of Dominador are conditions precedent to the accrual of petitioner's action for ejectment," and that Graciana's legal heirs "are also entitled to their share in Lot 7226."
On September 13, 2002, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 7 reversed, holding that Dominador's title cannot be collaterally attacked, ordered respondents to restore possession, and awarded ₱500.00 a month from August 2000.
The RTC granted execution pending appeal; Graciana's alleged nephew and nieces moved for leave to intervene, contending that as her heirs they have a share, and declaring that "as co-owners of the property, they are allowing respondents to stay in Lot 7226 until a formal partition." The RTC denied leave and later recalled the execution order for loss of jurisdiction.
On September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 74921) set aside the RTC decision and reinstated the MTC judgment, holding that petitioner and Graciana's heirs are co-owners and that petitioner "cannot eject respondents from the property via an unlawful detainer suit filed in his own name and as the sole owner of the property."
On January 8, 2004, reconsideration was denied; on January 20, 2006, the Supreme Court denied the petition.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner (Arnelito Adlawan)

Petitioner averred that he "is an acknowledged illegitimate son and the sole heir of Dominador," having executed an affidavit adjudicating the property to himself; that he had merely tolerated respondents' stay; and that even granting he has co-owners, "he can on his own file the instant case pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code," since the ejectment "would benefit not only him but also his alleged co-owners." His complaint pleaded that he "was the only son (illegitimate) and sole heir" and that he "became the absolute owner, and automatically took POSSESSION."

B. Respondents (Emeterio and Narcisa Adlawan)

Respondents denied begging to occupy the property, asserting occupancy "since birth"; traced ownership to their parents Ramon and Oligia; explained the 1962 simulated deed of sale to Dominador as a device to obtain a loan; contended that petitioner "is a stranger who never had possession"; alleged the birth-certificate signature was forged; and argued that even if petitioner were an acknowledged illegitimate son, "his right to succeed is doubtful because Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana."

C. Common Ground

It was "not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for unlawful detainer in his name alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana," having executed an affidavit of self-adjudication.

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE

"[W]hether or not petitioner can validly maintain the instant case for ejectment."

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE

NO. His own theory of succession "would end up proving that he is not the sole owner of Lot 7226," since "[b]y intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners" and Graciana's share "passed to her relatives by consanguinity and not to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations." Under Article 487, a co-owner may sue alone "because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners," but "where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed." Petitioner "does not recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of succession," and cannot "capitalize on the alleged benefit to his co-owners" when, if he won, "he alone will gain possession of the lot and benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages." His action "operates as a complete repudiation of the existence of co-ownership and not in representation or recognition thereof. Dismissal of the complaint is therefore proper."

"WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 23, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74921 which reinstated the February 12, 2002 Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, dismissing petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 392, and its January 8, 2004 Resolution, are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED."

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

The theory proves too much. "[T]he theory of succession invoked by petitioner would end up proving that he is not the sole owner of Lot 7226. This is so because Dominador was survived not only by petitioner but also by his legal wife, Graciana, who died 10 years after the demise of Dominador on May 28, 1987. By intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of Lot 7226."
Graciana's share went elsewhere. "The death of Graciana on May 6, 1997, did not make petitioner the absolute owner of Lot 7226 because the share of Graciana passed to her relatives by consanguinity and not to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations."
Article 487's reach. It "covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion)."
And its condition. "A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be stressed, however, that where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed."
Tolentino. "If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper."
Baloloy v. Hular. Under Section 7, Rule 3 the plaintiff there "was mandated to implead his siblings, being co-owners of the property, as parties"; and "the absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment," ineffective "not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present."
Applied here. "It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly maintain the instant action considering that he does not recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of succession to the property of his father, Dominador."
Benefit measured by relief. "[P]etitioner forgets that he filed the instant case to acquire possession of the property and to recover damages. If granted, he alone will gain possession of the lot and benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana."
Even the State would be his co-owner. "[I]n default of the said heirs of Graciana, whom petitioner labeled as 'fictitious heirs,' the State will inherit her share and will thus be petitioner's co-owner entitled to possession and enjoyment of the property."
Distinguishing the favourable line of cases. In Resuena, Sering, Celino and Vencilao, "the plaintiff never disputed the existence of a co-ownership nor claimed to be the sole or exclusive owner of the litigated lot. A favorable decision therein would of course inure to the benefit not only of the plaintiff but to his co-owners as well." Here "petitioner vigorously asserted absolute and sole ownership."
Paras. "[I]t is understood, of course, that the action [under Article 487 of the Civil Code] is being instituted for all. Hence, if the co-owner expressly states that he is bringing the case only for himself, the action should not be allowed to prosper."
Equity. "Indeed, respondents' not less than four decade actual physical possession of the questioned ancestral house and lot deserves to be respected especially so that petitioner failed to show that he has the requisite personality and authority as co-owner to file the instant case."

B. Doctrines/Rules

All Recovery Actions (Art. 487): Accion interdictal, accion publiciana and accion de reivindicacion are all covered.
Presumed Benefit Is the Basis: The lone co-owner's standing rests on the presumption that he sues for all.
Sole-Ownership Bar: A suit for the plaintiff's exclusive benefit, on a claim of sole ownership, "should be dismissed."
Repudiation: Self-adjudication plus a pleading of absolute ownership "operates as a complete repudiation of the existence of co-ownership."
Indispensable Parties (Rule 3, Sec. 7): Their absence renders all subsequent proceedings, including the judgment, ineffective.
Intestate Co-Ownership (Art. 1078): Surviving spouse and illegitimate child are co-owners; the spouse's share descends to her blood relatives, or to the State.

C. Limitations/Exceptions

The bar is about capacity, not merits: the Court never resolved whether petitioner's filiation was genuine, whether the 1962 deed was simulated, or who in truth owns Lot 7226.
A co-owner who sues in recognition of the co-ownership — as in Resuena, Sering, Celino and Vencilao — retains the full benefit of Article 487.

D. Topic Integration

The relationship is DIRECT.
Within "j. Ejectment," this is the case for the exception to Article 487, and the natural pair to Plasabas v. Court of Appeals, which is the case for the rule.
The test both cases apply is the same and it is about capacity: for whom does the plaintiff sue? The tell in Adlawan is documentary — an affidavit of self-adjudication and a complaint pleading "absolute owner" — and the tell in Plasabas is equally documentary: an admission at trial plus the co-owners' authority.
It also teaches a trap in pleading strategy. Petitioner needed the succession theory to show any right at all; but that same theory made Graciana his co-owner, and having disowned her heirs he could not fall back on the co-owner's remedy. A claimant who pleads sole ownership forfeits Article 487 in the very act of invoking his title.

VII. Separate Opinions

NOT IN RECORD. The decision was penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, with Chief Justice Panganiban and Justices Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario concurring.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Civil Code

Article 487, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book II (Property, Ownership, and Its Modifications), Title III (Co-Ownership)

Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. (n)

Why it is cited here

The article, and the boundary of its benefit. "Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment." It "covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession" — forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), accion publiciana, and accion de reivindicacion.

The licence to sue alone rests entirely on a presumption about capacity: the suit "is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners." Where the facts destroy that presumption, the licence goes with it.

Two authorities the Court quotes make the point in almost identical words. Tolentino: "If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper." Paras: "[i]t is understood, of course, that the action is being instituted for all. Hence, if the co-owner expressly states that he is bringing the case only for himself, the action should not be allowed to prosper."

Read this page against Plasabas v. Court of Appeals, decided three years later on the same article. There the plaintiff pleaded sole ownership but admitted the co-ownership at trial and sued with the co-owners' authority, so the pleading was "immaterial." Here the plaintiff never recognised the co-ownership — he had executed an affidavit of self-adjudication — and his action "operates as a complete repudiation of the existence of co-ownership."

Implementing Rules

Section 7, Rule 3, Rules of Court

Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Rule 3 (Parties to Civil Actions)

Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. (7)

LawPhil posts the 1997 text. The 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure (A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC) took effect 1 May 2020 and changed several of these rules; a decision promulgated before that date was governed by the text quoted here.

Why it is cited here

Once the plaintiff sues as sole owner, the co-owners stop being optional and become indispensable: "Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants."

The consequence, quoted from Baloloy v. Hular, is severe: "the absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment" — ineffective "not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present."

This is the mirror image of Plasabas. There the co-owners were not indispensable, so their absence was no ground for dismissal. Here the plaintiff's own theory made them indispensable, and he neither impleaded them nor claimed to represent them.

Civil Code

Article 1078, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title IV (Succession), Chapter 4 (Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Successions), Subsection 1 (Partition)

Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. (n)

Why it is cited here

The provision that turns a claimed inheritance into a co-ownership: "Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs."

It is what defeats the petitioner on his own theory. Dominador died in 1987 survived not only by the petitioner but by his legal wife Graciana, so "[b]y intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of Lot 7226." Graciana's later death in 1997 did not consolidate the lot in him: "the share of Graciana passed to her relatives by consanguinity and not to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations."

The Court adds the sting: even if Graciana's relatives are the "fictitious heirs" the petitioner calls them, "the State will inherit her share and will thus be petitioner's co-owner." On no version of the facts is he the sole owner — "the theory of succession invoked by petitioner would end up proving that he is not the sole owner."

Cited laws & provisions

Article 487, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book II (Property, Ownership, and Its Modifications), Title III (Co-Ownership)

Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. (n)

Why it is cited here

Full entry below ↓

Section 7, Rule 3, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Rule 3 (Parties to Civil Actions)

Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. (7)

Why it is cited here

Full entry below ↓

Article 1078, Civil Code

Civil Code

Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. (n)

Why it is cited here

The provision that turns a claimed inheritance into a co-ownership: "Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs."

Full entry below ↓

Facts

The dispute is over Lot 7226 and the house on it, covered by TCT No. 8842 registered in the name of the late Dominador Adlawan, at Barrio Lipata, Minglanilla, Cebu.
Petitioner Arnelito Adlawan claimed to be an acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador, who died on May 28, 1987, and, "[c]laiming to be the sole heir," executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself the lot and house. That affidavit is the fact that decides the case. It is a formal declaration that there is no co-ownership — which later bars him from invoking a co-owner's right to sue.
He alleged that "[o]ut of respect and generosity to respondents who are the siblings of his father," he let them occupy the property on condition they would leave when he needed it; that sometime in January 1999 he verbally asked them to vacate; that they refused and instead filed an action for quieting of title; and that after a final demand letter of August 2, 2000 he filed this unlawful detainer suit on August 9, 2000.
Respondents Narcisa and Emeterio Adlawan, then 70 and 59 years old, denied begging to stay and said they "have been occupying Lot 7226 and the house standing thereon since birth." Their "not less than four decade actual physical possession of the questioned ancestral house and lot" is what the Court says "deserves to be respected."
They alleged the lot was originally registered in the name of their father Ramon Adlawan, the ancestral house being owned by Ramon and their mother Oligia Mañacap Adlawan; the couple had nine children, including Dominador and the two respondents, and all of them lived on the property, as did Dominador and his wife Graciana Ramas Adlawan, who died without issue.
In 1961 the parents needed money to renovate the house but could not qualify for a loan, so they transferred the lot to Dominador, "the only one in the family who had a college education," by a simulated deed of sale dated January 31, 1962, enabling him to use the lot as collateral. Dominador "never disputed his parents' ownership of the lot," and he and Graciana "did not disturb respondents' possession" until their deaths on May 28, 1987 and May 6, 1997. (Respondents also alleged Dominador's signature on the petitioner's birth certificate was forged, so he is no heir at all — a question the Court never has to reach.)
On February 12, 2002, the MTC of Minglanilla dismissed the complaint, holding that proof of filiation and settlement of Dominador's estate were conditions precedent, and that since Dominador was survived by Graciana, her legal heirs are also entitled to a share.
On September 13, 2002, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 7 reversed, holding Dominador's title could not be collaterally attacked, and ordered respondents to restore possession and pay ₱500 a month from August 2000. (Persons describing themselves as Graciana's nephew and nieces then sought leave to intervene, asserting a share as her heirs and declaring that as co-owners they were allowing respondents to stay pending partition; the RTC denied leave.)
On September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals set the RTC aside and reinstated the MTC judgment, holding that petitioner and Graciana's heirs are co-owners, so petitioner "cannot eject respondents from the property via an unlawful detainer suit filed in his own name and as the sole owner." Reconsideration was denied January 8, 2004.
Petitioner's complaint alleged that he "was the only son (illegitimate) and sole heir" of Dominador and that "[b]eing the only child/descendant and, therefore, sole heir... the plaintiff became the absolute owner, and automatically took POSSESSION" of the house and lot. These are the words the Court quotes back at him: they are why his suit is "a complete repudiation of the existence of co-ownership."

Issue

Whether the petitioner can validly maintain an action for unlawful detainer over the property.

Ruling

"WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 23, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74921 which reinstated the February 12, 2002 Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, dismissing petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 392, and its January 8, 2004 Resolution, are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The petitioner's theory proves too much. "[T]he theory of succession invoked by petitioner would end up proving that he is not the sole owner of Lot 7226. This is so because Dominador was survived not only by petitioner but also by his legal wife, Graciana, who died 10 years after the demise of Dominador." "By intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of Lot 7226."
Graciana's death did not consolidate the lot in him. It "did not make petitioner the absolute owner of Lot 7226 because the share of Graciana passed to her relatives by consanguinity and not to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations." So the Court of Appeals "correctly held that petitioner has no authority to institute the instant action as the sole owner of Lot 7226."
Article 487's scope, and its condition. Article 487 "covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession... forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion)." A co-owner may sue alone "because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners" — "[i]t should be stressed, however, that where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed."
Tolentino. "A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper."
The controlling precedent. In Baloloy v. Hular the Court dismissed a quieting-of-title suit brought by one who claimed exclusive ownership though he had co-owners: under Section 7, Rule 3 he "was mandated to implead his siblings, being co-owners of the property, as parties," and "the absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment" — ineffective "not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present."
Applied. "[I]t is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for unlawful detainer in his name alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even executed an affidavit of self-adjudication over the disputed property. It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly maintain the instant action considering that he does not recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of succession to the property of his father, Dominador."
The "benefit to co-owners" argument answered on the relief sought. "[P]etitioner forgets that he filed the instant case to acquire possession of the property and to recover damages. If granted, he alone will gain possession of the lot and benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana. Hence, petitioner cannot successfully capitalize on the alleged benefit to his co-owners."
Even the "fictitious heirs" point fails. "[I]n default of the said heirs of Graciana, whom petitioner labeled as 'fictitious heirs,' the State will inherit her share and will thus be petitioner's co-owner entitled to possession and enjoyment of the property."
The distinguishing line across the cases. In Resuena v. Court of Appeals and Sering v. Plazo "the co-owners who filed the ejectment case did not represent themselves as the exclusive owner of the property"; in Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa Santiago the suit "was brought in behalf of the co-owners precisely to recover lots owned in common"; in Vencilao v. Camarenta the amended complaint "specified that the plaintiff is one of the heirs who co-owns the controverted properties." In all of them "the plaintiff never disputed the existence of a co-ownership nor claimed to be the sole or exclusive owner." Here, by contrast, "petitioner vigorously asserted absolute and sole ownership of the questioned lot," pleading that he "became the absolute owner, and automatically took POSSESSION."
Conclusion. "Clearly, the said cases find no application here because petitioner's action operates as a complete repudiation of the existence of co-ownership and not in representation or recognition thereof. Dismissal of the complaint is therefore proper." Paras: "[i]t is understood, of course, that the action [under Article 487] is being instituted for all. Hence, if the co-owner expressly states that he is bringing the case only for himself, the action should not be allowed to prosper."
A closing note on equity. "[R]espondents' not less than four decade actual physical possession of the questioned ancestral house and lot deserves to be respected especially so that petitioner failed to show that he has the requisite personality and authority as co-owner to file the instant case."

Doctrine

Scope of Article 487: It reaches every action for recovery of possession — accion interdictal, accion publiciana and accion de reivindicacion.
The Licence Rests on a Presumption: A co-owner may sue alone "because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners." Destroy the presumption and the licence disappears.
The Sole-Ownership Bar: "[W]here the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed."
Repudiation of Co-Ownership: A suit prosecuted on an affidavit of self-adjudication and pleaded on absolute sole ownership "operates as a complete repudiation of the existence of co-ownership," not in representation of it.
Benefit Is Measured by the Relief Sought: A plaintiff cannot "capitalize on the alleged benefit to his co-owners" where, if he wins, "he alone will gain possession... and benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages."
Indispensable Parties (Rule 3, Sec. 7): Once the plaintiff sues as sole owner, his co-owners become indispensable, and their absence "renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment."
Succession Creates the Co-Ownership (Art. 1078): A surviving spouse and an illegitimate child take as co-owners by intestate succession; the spouse's share on her later death passes to her relatives by consanguinity, or in default of them to the State — never to a stranger in blood.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

The controversy concerns Lot 7226 and the house built thereon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8842, registered in the name of the late Dominador Adlawan, at Barrio Lipata, Municipality of Minglanilla, Cebu.
In 1961, spouses Ramon and Oligia Mañacap Adlawan needed money to renovate their house but were not qualified to obtain a loan, so they transferred ownership of Lot 7226 to their son Dominador, "the only one in the family who had a college education."
By a January 31, 1962 simulated deed of sale, title issued to Dominador, "which enabled him to secure a loan with Lot 7226 as collateral." He "never disputed his parents' ownership of the lot," and he and his wife Graciana Ramas Adlawan "did not disturb respondents' possession of the property."
On May 28, 1987, Dominador died. Petitioner Arnelito Adlawan claimed to be his acknowledged illegitimate child and sole heir, "without any other issue," and executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself Lot 7226 and the house.
On May 6, 1997, Graciana, Dominador's legal wife, died without issue.
Sometime in January 1999, petitioner verbally requested respondents to vacate the house and lot; they refused and "filed instead an action for quieting of title" with the RTC (Civil Case No. CEB-23205).
After respondents refused to heed a final demand letter to vacate dated August 2, 2000, petitioner filed the unlawful detainer case on August 9, 2000 (Civil Case No. 392).
Respondents, then 70 and 59 years old, denied having begged to stay, and stressed that they "have been occupying Lot 7226 and the house standing thereon since birth"; that the lot was originally registered in the name of their father Ramon, the ancestral house owned by Ramon and Oligia; that the spouses had nine children; and that petitioner "is a stranger who never had possession of Lot 7226." They also contended that "Dominador's signature at the back of petitioner's birth certificate was forged."
On February 12, 2002, the MTC of Minglanilla dismissed the complaint, holding that "the establishment of petitioner's filiation and the settlement of the estate of Dominador are conditions precedent to the accrual of petitioner's action for ejectment," and that Graciana's legal heirs "are also entitled to their share in Lot 7226."
On September 13, 2002, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 7 reversed, holding that Dominador's title cannot be collaterally attacked, ordered respondents to restore possession, and awarded ₱500.00 a month from August 2000.
The RTC granted execution pending appeal; Graciana's alleged nephew and nieces moved for leave to intervene, contending that as her heirs they have a share, and declaring that "as co-owners of the property, they are allowing respondents to stay in Lot 7226 until a formal partition." The RTC denied leave and later recalled the execution order for loss of jurisdiction.
On September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 74921) set aside the RTC decision and reinstated the MTC judgment, holding that petitioner and Graciana's heirs are co-owners and that petitioner "cannot eject respondents from the property via an unlawful detainer suit filed in his own name and as the sole owner of the property."
On January 8, 2004, reconsideration was denied; on January 20, 2006, the Supreme Court denied the petition.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner (Arnelito Adlawan)

B. Respondents (Emeterio and Narcisa Adlawan)

C. Common Ground

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE

"[W]hether or not petitioner can validly maintain the instant case for ejectment."

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

The theory proves too much. "[T]he theory of succession invoked by petitioner would end up proving that he is not the sole owner of Lot 7226. This is so because Dominador was survived not only by petitioner but also by his legal wife, Graciana, who died 10 years after the demise of Dominador on May 28, 1987. By intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of Lot 7226."
Graciana's share went elsewhere. "The death of Graciana on May 6, 1997, did not make petitioner the absolute owner of Lot 7226 because the share of Graciana passed to her relatives by consanguinity and not to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations."
Article 487's reach. It "covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion)."
And its condition. "A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be stressed, however, that where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed."
Tolentino. "If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper."
Baloloy v. Hular. Under Section 7, Rule 3 the plaintiff there "was mandated to implead his siblings, being co-owners of the property, as parties"; and "the absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment," ineffective "not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present."
Applied here. "It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly maintain the instant action considering that he does not recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of succession to the property of his father, Dominador."
Benefit measured by relief. "[P]etitioner forgets that he filed the instant case to acquire possession of the property and to recover damages. If granted, he alone will gain possession of the lot and benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana."
Even the State would be his co-owner. "[I]n default of the said heirs of Graciana, whom petitioner labeled as 'fictitious heirs,' the State will inherit her share and will thus be petitioner's co-owner entitled to possession and enjoyment of the property."
Distinguishing the favourable line of cases. In Resuena, Sering, Celino and Vencilao, "the plaintiff never disputed the existence of a co-ownership nor claimed to be the sole or exclusive owner of the litigated lot. A favorable decision therein would of course inure to the benefit not only of the plaintiff but to his co-owners as well." Here "petitioner vigorously asserted absolute and sole ownership."
Paras. "[I]t is understood, of course, that the action [under Article 487 of the Civil Code] is being instituted for all. Hence, if the co-owner expressly states that he is bringing the case only for himself, the action should not be allowed to prosper."
Equity. "Indeed, respondents' not less than four decade actual physical possession of the questioned ancestral house and lot deserves to be respected especially so that petitioner failed to show that he has the requisite personality and authority as co-owner to file the instant case."

B. Doctrines/Rules

All Recovery Actions (Art. 487): Accion interdictal, accion publiciana and accion de reivindicacion are all covered.
Presumed Benefit Is the Basis: The lone co-owner's standing rests on the presumption that he sues for all.
Sole-Ownership Bar: A suit for the plaintiff's exclusive benefit, on a claim of sole ownership, "should be dismissed."
Repudiation: Self-adjudication plus a pleading of absolute ownership "operates as a complete repudiation of the existence of co-ownership."
Indispensable Parties (Rule 3, Sec. 7): Their absence renders all subsequent proceedings, including the judgment, ineffective.
Intestate Co-Ownership (Art. 1078): Surviving spouse and illegitimate child are co-owners; the spouse's share descends to her blood relatives, or to the State.

C. Limitations/Exceptions

The bar is about capacity, not merits: the Court never resolved whether petitioner's filiation was genuine, whether the 1962 deed was simulated, or who in truth owns Lot 7226.
A co-owner who sues in recognition of the co-ownership — as in Resuena, Sering, Celino and Vencilao — retains the full benefit of Article 487.

D. Topic Integration

The relationship is DIRECT.
Within "j. Ejectment," this is the case for the exception to Article 487, and the natural pair to Plasabas v. Court of Appeals, which is the case for the rule.
The test both cases apply is the same and it is about capacity: for whom does the plaintiff sue? The tell in Adlawan is documentary — an affidavit of self-adjudication and a complaint pleading "absolute owner" — and the tell in Plasabas is equally documentary: an admission at trial plus the co-owners' authority.
It also teaches a trap in pleading strategy. Petitioner needed the succession theory to show any right at all; but that same theory made Graciana his co-owner, and having disowned her heirs he could not fall back on the co-owner's remedy. A claimant who pleads sole ownership forfeits Article 487 in the very act of invoking his title.

VII. Separate Opinions

NOT IN RECORD. The decision was penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, with Chief Justice Panganiban and Justices Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario concurring.