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Barrameda v. CA

V — Venue
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Title

Barrameda v. CA

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 96428 September 2, 1999

The relationship of this case to the requested Topic of Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110) > V. Venue is DIRECT.

Core Doctrine

Estafa is a transitory or continuing offence: where some acts material and essential to it occur in one province and some in another, it may be prosecuted in any territory where any of those essential ingredients took place, and the court that first takes cognizance excludes all the others. Venue so fixed is jurisdictional and cannot be waived. Demand, the essential ingredient at issue, needs no specific, formalistic or sacramental wording — a query as to the whereabouts of the money is tantamount to a demand, so the demand and with it the venue may be localised where the offended party met the accused to receive the funds.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 96428)

Case DigestWeek 3 - Rule 110 - Prosecution of Offenses

Barrameda v. CA

G.R. No. 96428 · September 2, 1999 · Third Division

V — Venue

Petitioner: Wilma T. Barrameda (petitioner)Respondent: The Court of Appeals (public/nominal respondent); Lolita Watanabe (private respondent — real party in interest)
Gist

The relationship of this case to the requested Topic of Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110) > V. Venue is DIRECT.

Core Doctrine

Estafa is a transitory or continuing offence: where some acts material and essential to it occur in one province and some in another, it may be prosecuted in any territory where any of those essential ingredients took place, and the court that first takes cognizance excludes all the others. Venue so fixed is jurisdictional and cannot be waived. Demand, the essential ingredient at issue, needs no specific, formalistic or sacramental wording — a query as to the whereabouts of the money is tantamount to a demand, so the demand and with it the venue may be localised where the offended party met the accused to receive the funds.

ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic
V — Venue Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1999/sep1999/gr_96428_1999.html

Facts

  • On November 15, 1984 Lolita Paguinto Watanabe, a Filipina working in Japan, wrote her mother Papiniana Barrameda Paguinto enclosing US$400.00 and saying she would soon send about P50,000.00 through her aunt, petitioner Wilma T. Barrameda.
  • On November 26, 1984 at 6:00 p.m., in Japan, Watanabe counted US$1,400.00 and 400,000.00 Japanese Yen, placed it in an envelope and handed it to petitioner, who also counted it before placing it in her bag, agreeing to deliver it to Paguinto on arrival. Watanabe then telephoned her mother to say the money was coming.
  • On November 27, 1984 petitioner arrived at the Manila International Airport, in Pasay City. Paguinto fetched her, and on embracing, petitioner said at once: "Ate, it is unfortunate. There is money sent to you by your daughter from Japan but unfortunately I misplaced it. It could have been in the baggages." That pre-emptive statement, made before any formal request, is the whole of the venue holding.
  • They went to a house at Cabrera, Pasay City to search; finding it crowded, petitioner suggested the baggage be opened instead at her own home in San Pedro, Laguna, promising delivery the next morning. From Cabrera, Paguinto telephoned Japan and petitioner told Watanabe she was still looking for the money.
  • On November 28, 1984 petitioner failed to deliver. Paguinto and her husband went to San Pedro, where petitioner said the money had still not been found. Despite repeated demands she never turned it over.
  • On September 5, 1985 an Information§ for estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) was filed in the RTC of Pasay City, Branch 111 (Crim. Case No. 85-8694-P). She pleaded not guilty on April 21, 1986.
  • On May 25, 1989 the RTC convicted her and ordered indemnity of P50,000.00. On August 15, 1990 the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto; reconsideration was denied November 28, 1990. Decided September 2, 1999 (Third Division).

Issue

Whether the RTC of Pasay City had territorial jurisdiction under Section 15(a), Rule 110§, on the ground that the essential element of "demand" was legally and constructively made at the Manila International Airport, within Pasay City.
Secondary issues. Whether a spontaneous query about the money, and petitioner's immediate answer that she had "misplaced" it, constitutes a legal demand under Article 315, par. 1(b); and whether guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt on ex parte letters and foreign-language telephone bills.

Ruling

YES. Estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) being a transitory or continuing offence, it may be prosecuted in any territory where any of its essential ingredients occurred. The recipient's presence at the airport to receive the money, and petitioner's immediate, pre-emptive statement that she had misplaced it, established that the element of demand occurred within Pasay City.
Secondary issues. YES on both. "A specific or sacramental word such as 'demand' is not required"; and guilt was proved to a moral certainty, the letters having been identified by writer and recipient and the phone bills being corroborative of the Japan–Philippines calls.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the petitioner is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum. Accused-petitioner is likewise ordered to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P50,000.00 representing the amount embezzled, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED."

Ratio

  • Venue is a substantive jurisdictional element. Under Section 15(a), the action must be instituted "in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients took place" — and unlike in civil actions, venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional and cannot be waived.
  • Estafa through misappropriation is transitory. It may be prosecuted "where the property was received, where it was misappropriated, where the prejudice was suffered, or where the demand was made" — any one suffices.
  • The Court then located the demand at the airport, approving the appellate finding: "We believe that the presence of Mrs. Paguinto at the airport was for no other purpose but to demand the money which was entrusted to her by Mrs. Watanabe. Logically, it follows that since the international airport is within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court, then jurisdiction over the case vests in the trial court."
  • A query is equated to a demand — the sentence to carry: "It must be noted that the specific word 'demand' need not be used to show that demand had indeed been made upon the person charged of the offense. A query as to the whereabouts of the money, such as the one proven in the case at bench, is tantamount to a demand."
  • The petitioner's own conduct supplied the proof. She did not wait to be asked; she volunteered that the money was "misplaced" the moment she was met. The demand and the response to it were compressed into a single exchange, and both happened in Pasay City.

Doctrine

The transitory-crime venue rule.
  • Crimes transitory or continuing in nature — "where some acts material and essential to the offense occur in one province and some in another" — may be prosecuted "in the courts of any territory where any of these essential ingredients took place," and the court that first takes cognizance excludes all others.
  • Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases and cannot be waived by the parties.
  • Sufficiency of demand in estafa: no "specific, formalistic, or sacramental wording" is required — "[a] query as to the whereabouts of the money … is tantamount to a demand," as is meeting the accused at the designated destination to receive the funds.
Limits.
  • The transitory rule has a floor: if all the material and essential acts — receipt, conversion, prejudice and demand — occur exclusively within a single territory, the court of that territory has sole jurisdiction, and filing elsewhere is a jurisdictional nullity.
  • Demand is not always indispensable: where the prosecution can otherwise prove the actual fact of misappropriation or conversion, demand need not be shown; it becomes indispensable where the misappropriation is concealed or disputed, as evidence of the conversion.
  • The holding is fact-driven: what made the airport the locus was that the recipient was there for no other purpose than to receive the money, and the accused volunteered the loss.
  • Compare AAA v. BBB, which builds directly on this line — psychological anguish there does the same work that damage and demand do here, localising a transitory offence at the victim's end of it.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

The relationship of this case to the requested Topic of Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110§) > V. Venue is DIRECT.
The triggering controversy arose when the petitioner was indicted for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, for failing to deliver US$1,400.00 and 400,000.00 Japanese Yen entrusted to her in Japan by a cultural worker for delivery to the latter's mother in the Philippines. Upon arriving at the Manila International Airport (located in Pasay City), the petitioner was met by the mother (the designated recipient) and immediately declared that she had "misplaced" the money in her baggages. The petitioner moved to dismiss the case on appeal, contending that the Pasay City court lacked territorial jurisdiction§ because the money was received in Japan and the subsequent formal follow-ups occurred at her residence in San Pedro, Laguna. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the conviction, ruling that the Pasay City court validly exercised jurisdiction because the essential element of "demand" was constructively and legally made at the airport, which lies within the court's territorial bounds.
The single central doctrine established in this decision dictates that under Section 15(a), Rule 110§ of the Rules of Court, venue in criminal cases is an essential element of territorial jurisdiction, requiring that the action be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients took place. In a prosecution for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code—which is a transitory or continuing offense—territorial jurisdiction is properly vested in the court of any locality where any of its essential elements, specifically receipt, misappropriation/conversion, or demand, occurred. A verbal inquiry or query as to the whereabouts of the entrusted money by the designated recipient upon the accused's arrival at an airport constitutes a valid legal "demand" for purposes of the crime, thereby vesting territorial jurisdiction in the court exercising authority over the airport's territory.

Facts

  • November 15, 1984: Private complainant Lolita Paguinto Watanabe, a Filipina working in Japan, sent a letter (Exhibit "A") to her mother, Papiniana Barrameda Paguinto, in the Philippines, enclosing US$400.00 and advising her that she would soon be sending an additional sum equivalent to P50,000.00 through her aunt, petitioner Wilma T. Barrameda.
  • November 26, 1984 (6:00 p.m.): In Japan, Lolita Watanabe, accompanied by her brother and Japanese friends, visited the petitioner at the residence of Mr. and Mrs. Edmund Guiking at Atsugi Base. Because the petitioner was returning to the Philippines the following day, Watanabe counted US$1,400.00 and 400,000.00 Japanese Yen, placed it in an envelope, and handed it to the petitioner, who also counted the money before placing it in her bag, agreeing to deliver the sum to Watanabe's mother, Papiniana Paguinto, upon arrival. Lolita subsequently placed a long-distance call to her mother to notify her of the transmittal (Exhibit "B-1").
  • November 27, 1984: The petitioner arrived at the Manila International Airport (MIA), located in Pasay City. Papiniana Paguinto fetched her, and upon embracing, the petitioner immediately stated: "Ate, it is unfortunate. There is money sent to you by your daughter from Japan but unfortunately I misplaced it. It could have been in the baggages."
  • November 27, 1984 (Later that day): Per the petitioner's suggestion, she and Paguinto proceeded to the house of Paguinto's brother at Cabrera, Pasay City, to search for the money. Finding the place crowded because it operated as a beerhouse, the petitioner suggested that the baggage be opened instead at her own home in Pacita Complex, San Pedro, Laguna, promising she would deliver the money the next morning. At Cabrera, Pasay City, Paguinto placed a long-distance call to Japan, during which the petitioner informed Lolita that she was still looking for the money.
  • November 28, 1984: The petitioner failed to deliver the money. Paguinto and her husband traveled to the petitioner’s home in San Pedro, Laguna, where the petitioner reiterates that the money had not yet been found. Despite subsequent repeated demands, the petitioner never turned over the funds.
  • September 5, 1985: The public prosecutor filed an Information§ for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioner before Branch 111 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-8694-P.
  • April 21, 1986: Duly assisted by counsel, the petitioner entered a plea of NOT GUILTY upon arraignment. Trial on the merits ensued.
  • May 25, 1989: The RTC of Pasay City rendered its Decision finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa, sentencing her to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum, and ordering her to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P50,000.00.
  • July 13, 1989: The petitioner appealed her conviction to the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. No. 07512), raising lack of territorial jurisdiction as her first assignment of error.
  • August 15, 1990: The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming in toto the judgment of conviction of the RTC of Pasay City.
  • September 6, 1990: The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' Decision.
  • November 28, 1990: The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
  • Subsequent Date (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD): The petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
  • September 2, 1999: The Supreme Court Third Division promulgated its Decision denying the petition and affirming the conviction with a minor modification on the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner Wilma T. Barrameda.
  • Lack of Territorial Jurisdiction: The petitioner argued that not a single material element of the crime of Estafa occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of Pasay City. She asserted that the complaint should have been filed either in Japan (where the money was received in trust) or in San Pedro, Laguna (where her residence was located and where the subsequent, formal demands were made).
  • Absence of the Element of Demand: She contended that the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) did not even reach its incipient stage because no formal, categorical demand for delivery was ever made by the offended party at the airport.
  • Factual Denial: She claimed she never received the money from Lolita Watanabe, alleging that she was only asked to bring two boxes of assorted goods which she had to leave behind in Japan due to excess baggage and the lack of freight money.
  • Ill-Motive / Conspiracy: She asserted that her estranged husband conspired with his sister (Papiniana Paguinto) and Lolita Watanabe to falsely prosecute her in order to block her return to Japan.
B. Respondent (People of the Philippines / Lolita Watanabe).
  • Proper Laying of Venue: The prosecution argued that venue was properly laid in Pasay City. It asserted that the Manila International Airport (NAIA), where the petitioner arrived and was fetched by the designated recipient, is situated within the territorial boundaries of Pasay City.
  • Consummation of Demand at the Airport: The prosecution contended that the physical presence of Papiniana Paguinto at the airport to meet the petitioner on her arrival was precisely for the purpose of demanding and receiving the entrusted money. The petitioner's immediate, spontaneous claim of having "misplaced" the money upon being met was a pre-emptive response to this demand, constituting a localized element of the transitory offense.
  • Grounded Proof of Guilt: The State maintained that the receipt, misappropriation, and demand were proved beyond reasonable doubt through consistent, interlocking testimonies and documentary evidence (letters and telephone records).
C. Common Ground.
  • Undisputed Fact of Transit: Both parties agreed that the petitioner traveled from Japan to the Philippines, arriving at the Manila International Airport on November 27, 1984, and was met there by her sister-in-law, Papiniana Paguinto.

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered). Whether the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City had territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of and try the criminal case for Estafa under Rule 110§, Section 15(a) of the Rules of Court, on the ground that the essential element of "demand" was legally and constructively made at the Manila International Airport, which lies within the territorial jurisdiction of Pasay City.
B. Secondary Issues.
  1. Whether the spontaneous query regarding the money and the petitioner's immediate response that she "misplaced" it at the airport constitutes a legal "demand" under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
  2. Whether the prosecution proved the petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and whether the ex-parte letters and foreign-language telephone bill receipts were properly admitted into evidence.

Ruling

  • MAIN ISSUE: YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the RTC of Pasay City validly exercised territorial jurisdiction over the case. Because Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) is a transitory or continuing offense, it may be prosecuted in any territory where any of its essential ingredients occurred. The designated recipient's presence at the Manila International Airport (situated in Pasay City) to receive the money, and the petitioner's immediate, pre-emptive statement that she had "misplaced" it, established that the element of demand occurred within Pasay City.
  • SECONDARY ISSUES:
    1. YES. A specific or sacramental word such as "demand" is not required to satisfy the fourth element of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b). A query as to the whereabouts of the money, or meeting the transient courier at the designated arrival point to receive the funds, is legally equivalent to a demand.
    2. YES. The guilt of the petitioner was proved to a moral certainty. The ex-parte letters were properly identified by the writer and the recipient, and the telephone bill receipts were admissible as corroborative evidence of the communications between Japan and the Philippines, as they contained legible English and numerical notations showing the call destinations.
#### VERBATIM DISPOSITIVE PORTION:.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the petitioner is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum. Accused-petitioner is likewise ordered to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P50,000.00 representing the amount embezzled, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED."

Ratio

  1. Venue as a Substantive Jurisdictional Element: The Court began by reiterating the fundamental rule that in all criminal prosecutions, the action must be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients took place under Section 15(a) of Rule 110§. Unlike civil actions, venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional and cannot be waived or compromised by the parties.
  2. The Transitory Character of Estafa: The Court noted that Estafa through misappropriation or conversion under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) is a transitory or continuing offense. It can be prosecuted in any territory where the property was received, where it was misappropriated, where the prejudice was suffered, or where the demand was made. If any of these elements occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasay City, the court's jurisdiction is fully vested.
  3. Constructive and Verbal Demand at the Airport: The Court approved the Court of Appeals' finding that a valid demand occurred at the Manila International Airport (situated in Pasay City). The designated recipient (Papiniana Paguinto) went to the airport for the sole purpose of receiving the money. The moment the petitioner arrived, she pre-empted any formal request by stating she had "misplaced" the money. The Court held that:
    "We believe that the presence of Mrs. Paguinto at the airport was for no other purpose but to demand the money which was entrusted to her by Mrs. Watanabe. Logically, it follows that since the international airport is within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court, then jurisdiction over the case vests in the trial court."
  4. A Query is Equated to a Demand: The petitioner's defense that no formal, categorical demand was made was rejected. The Court ruled that:
    "It must be noted that the specific word 'demand' need not be used to show that demand had indeed been made upon the person charged of the offense. A query as to the whereabouts of the money, such as the one proven in the case at bench, is tantamount to a demand."
    Since the query and the pre-emptive admission of "loss" occurred at the airport, the element of demand was consummated in Pasay City, conferring full territorial jurisdiction upon the RTC of Pasay City.

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules.
  • The Transitory/Continuing Crime Venue Rule: Crimes that are transitory or continuing in nature—where some acts material and essential to the offense occur in one province and some in another—may be validly prosecuted in the courts of any territory where any of these essential ingredients took place. The court that first takes cognizance of the case excludes all others.
  • The Rule on the Sufficiency of Demand in Estafa: For purposes of satisfying the fourth element of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, no specific, formalistic, or sacramental wording is required. Meeting the accused at a designated destination to receive entrusted funds, or making a verbal query regarding the whereabouts of the money, is legally equivalent to a demand.
C. Limitations/Exceptions.
  • The Limits of Transitory Jurisdiction: If all acts material and essential to the crime (receipt, conversion, prejudice, and demand) occur exclusively within a single territory or municipality, the court of that territory has sole and exclusive jurisdiction, and filing the case elsewhere is a jurisdictional nullity.
  • Demand is Not Always Required: While demand is an essential element of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), it is not required if the prosecution can otherwise prove the actual fact of misappropriation or conversion of the entrusted property. However, where misappropriation is concealed or disputed, proof of demand and subsequent failure to deliver is indispensable to establish the conversion.
D. Topic Integration. The relationship of Barrameda v. Court of Appeals to "Venue of Criminal Actions" under Rule 110§, Section 15 is DIRECT.
This case is a classic and frequently cited authority on the territorial jurisdiction of Philippine courts over transitory offenses. It illustrates how the Supreme Court integrates the substantive elements of a crime under the Revised Penal Code with the procedural venue requirements under Rule 110§, Section 15(a). By defining "demand" liberally to include verbal queries or the physical act of meeting a courier at an international transit point (airport), the Court prevented a jurisdictional loophole where an accused could escape liability by claiming the trust agreement began abroad (Japan) and the ultimate refusal to pay occurred in another province (Laguna). Barrameda solidifies the rule that any localized constituent element of a continuing offense, no matter how brief or initial, is sufficient to anchor territorial jurisdiction and establish proper venue.

Separate Opinions

None.
The decision of the Third Division was unanimous. The concurring justices were Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ. No separate concurring or dissenting opinions were recorded.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Implementing Rules

Section 15, Rule 110, Rules of Court

Place where action is to be instituted

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses)

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

(b) Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or other public or private vehicle while in the course of its trip, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such its trip, including the place of its departure and arrival.

(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory where the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted principles of international law.

(d) Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first filed. (15a)

LawPhil posts the text as amended effective 1 December 2000. Later amendments — notably to the bail and preliminary-investigation rules — are not reflected here, so check the date of the decision against the date of the amendment.

Why it is cited here

The rule and its jurisdictional character, stated once more because everything follows from it.

The action "shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients took place."

Unlike civil actions, venue here is jurisdictional — not waivable, not stipulable, not curable by the parties' consent or the court's convenience.

The consequence is that a venue objection is really a challenge to the court's power, and it is tested the same way every jurisdictional question is: against the allegations in the information.

Implementing Rules

Section 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court

Grounds

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 117 (Motion to Quash)

The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (3a)

LawPhil posts the text as amended effective 1 December 2000. Later amendments — notably to the bail and preliminary-investigation rules — are not reflected here, so check the date of the decision against the date of the amendment.

Why it is cited here

The ground, and why it survives everything.

A motion to quash lies where "the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged."

Under Section 9 this is one of the four grounds not waived by failure to raise it before plea — alongside failure to charge an offense, extinction of criminal liability, and double jeopardy.

So an accused who has pleaded, gone to trial, and lost may still raise it. A judgment from a court without territorial jurisdiction is void, and nothing the accused did confers what the law withheld.

Implementing Rules

Section 6, Rule 110, Rules of Court

Sufficiency of complaint or information

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses)

A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information. (6a)

LawPhil posts the text as amended effective 1 December 2000. Later amendments — notably to the bail and preliminary-investigation rules — are not reflected here, so check the date of the decision against the date of the amendment.

Why it is cited here

Where the venue allegation lives.

Sufficiency requires, among the six requisites, "the place where the offense was committed."

That is the requisite the whole venue doctrine runs through. Because jurisdiction is determined from the information, the place allegation is what confers or withholds the court's power.

Two practical consequences. A prosecutor must plead facts showing an essential ingredient occurred in the territory — not merely name the court. And an accused testing venue argues from the four corners of the information, not from the evidence.

Related notes:
Assigned under the same subtopic — V — Venue:
  • Union Bank v. People
  • Macasaet v. People
  • People v. Grospe
  • People v. Guzman
  • People v. Panlilio
  • Calme v. CA
  • Foz Jr. v. People
  • Yalong v. People
(and 2 more under this subtopic — see the Week 3 coverage table.)
Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1999/sep1999/gr_96428_1999.html

Study digest — refer to the full text of the decision for accuracy. https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1999/sep1999/gr_96428_1999.html

Cited laws & provisions

Section 15, Rule 110, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Place where action is to be instituted

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses)

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

(b) Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or other public or private vehicle while in the course of its trip, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such its trip, including the place of its departure and arrival.

(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory where the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted principles of international law.

(d) Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first filed. (15a)

LawPhil posts the text as amended effective 1 December 2000. Later amendments — notably to the bail and preliminary-investigation rules — are not reflected here, so check the date of the decision against the date of the amendment.

Why it is cited here

The rule and its jurisdictional character, stated once more because everything follows from it.

The action "shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients took place."

Unlike civil actions, venue here is jurisdictional — not waivable, not stipulable, not curable by the parties' consent or the court's convenience.

The consequence is that a venue objection is really a challenge to the court's power, and it is tested the same way every jurisdictional question is: against the allegations in the information.

Full entry below ↓

Section 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Grounds

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 117 (Motion to Quash)

The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (3a)

LawPhil posts the text as amended effective 1 December 2000. Later amendments — notably to the bail and preliminary-investigation rules — are not reflected here, so check the date of the decision against the date of the amendment.

Why it is cited here

The ground, and why it survives everything.

A motion to quash lies where "the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged."

Under Section 9 this is one of the four grounds not waived by failure to raise it before plea — alongside failure to charge an offense, extinction of criminal liability, and double jeopardy.

So an accused who has pleaded, gone to trial, and lost may still raise it. A judgment from a court without territorial jurisdiction is void, and nothing the accused did confers what the law withheld.

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Section 6, Rule 110, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Sufficiency of complaint or information

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses)

A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information. (6a)

LawPhil posts the text as amended effective 1 December 2000. Later amendments — notably to the bail and preliminary-investigation rules — are not reflected here, so check the date of the decision against the date of the amendment.

Why it is cited here

Where the venue allegation lives.

Sufficiency requires, among the six requisites, "the place where the offense was committed."

That is the requisite the whole venue doctrine runs through. Because jurisdiction is determined from the information, the place allegation is what confers or withholds the court's power.

Two practical consequences. A prosecutor must plead facts showing an essential ingredient occurred in the territory — not merely name the court. And an accused testing venue argues from the four corners of the information, not from the evidence.

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