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People v. Grospe

V — Venue
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Title

People v. Grospe

Case Decision Date

G.R. Nos. L-74053-54 January 20, 1988

The relationship of this case to the requested Topic of Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110) > V. Venue is DIRECT.

Core Doctrine

Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases and is determined by the allegations of the Information, the action lying where the offence was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. Estafa by bad check and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are transitory or continuing offences, so any court in whose territory an essential ingredient took place may try them. Delivery is the final act essential to a check's consummation as an obligation, and physical receipt by a sales supervisor who cannot take it as a holder is not legal delivery to the payee — the deceit is consummated where an authorised officer with intent to transfer title receives it. Knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is itself a continuing eventuality, so B.P. 22 may likewise be tried where the check was delivered, deposited or dishonoured.

Case Digest (G.R. Nos. L-74053-54)

Case DigestWeek 3 - Rule 110 - Prosecution of Offenses

People v. Grospe

G.R. Nos. L-74053-54 · January 20, 1988 · Second Division

V — Venue

Petitioner: People of the Philippines and San Miguel Corporation (petitioners)Respondent: Nathaniel M. Grospe, Presiding Judge, Br. 44, RTC of Pampanga (public/nominal respondent); Manuel Parulan (private respondent — real party in interest)
Gist

The relationship of this case to the requested Topic of Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110) > V. Venue is DIRECT.

Core Doctrine

Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases and is determined by the allegations of the Information, the action lying where the offence was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. Estafa by bad check and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are transitory or continuing offences, so any court in whose territory an essential ingredient took place may try them. Delivery is the final act essential to a check's consummation as an obligation, and physical receipt by a sales supervisor who cannot take it as a holder is not legal delivery to the payee — the deceit is consummated where an authorised officer with intent to transfer title receives it. Knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is itself a continuing eventuality, so B.P. 22 may likewise be tried where the check was delivered, deposited or dishonoured.

ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic
V — Venue Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/jan1988/gr_l-74053_1988.html

Facts

  • On June 13, 1983 Manuel Parulan, an authorized wholesale dealer of San Miguel Corporation in Bulacan, issued PDB (Santa Maria, Bulacan Branch) Check No. 19040865 for ₱86,071.20 in favour of SMC, handing it to SMC Sales Supervisor Ruben Cornelio at the sales office in Guiguinto, Bulacan.
  • On June 18, 1983 he issued Check No. 19040872 for ₱11,918.80 for a spot sale of beer, likewise handing it to Cornelio in Guiguinto.
  • Cornelio forwarded both checks to the SMC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga, where they were received by the SMC Finance Officer. He was a conduit, not a holder — that distinction decides the venue.
  • The Finance Officer deposited both with BPI, San Fernando Branch, Pampanga.
  • On July 8, 1983 BPI San Fernando received notices of dishonor for "insufficiency of funds" from the drawee bank in Bulacan, and made the corresponding deductions from SMC's accounts in Pampanga.
  • After demands went unanswered, the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga filed Criminal Case No. 2800 (violation of B.P. Blg. 22§) and Criminal Case No. 2813 (estafa§ under Article 315§, par. 2(d)) in the RTC of Pampanga, Branch 44, before Judge Nathaniel M. Grospe.
  • Parulan pleaded not guilty and the two cases were jointly tried to completion.
  • On February 17, 1986 — after trial — Judge Grospe dismissed both, declaring himself "bereft of jurisdiction," since the checks were issued in Guiguinto and dishonored in Santa Maria, so that neither deceit nor damage occurred in Pampanga. He cancelled the bail bonds.
  • The People and SMC brought Rule 65 certiorari. Decided January 20, 1988 (Second Division, Melencio-Herrera, J.).

Issue

Whether the RTC of Pampanga has territorial jurisdiction under Section 15(a), Rule 110§ over the B.P. 22§ and estafa charges, where the checks were delivered to a sales supervisor in Bulacan but forwarded to, received and deposited by the corporation's finance officer in Pampanga.
Secondary issues. Whether certiorari lies against a post-trial dismissal for want of territorial jurisdiction; and whether reinstating the cases offends double jeopardy.

Ruling

YES. Both offences are transitory and continuing, and essential elements — legal delivery (deceit) and depository deduction (damage) — occurred in San Fernando, Pampanga.
Secondary issues. YES, certiorari is proper: the error committed was one of jurisdiction, which renders the order of dismissal null and void, and not a mere error of judgment on the merits. NO double jeopardy: the dismissal "did not resolve the merits," so the proceedings were not lawfully terminated; hence, no first jeopardy attached.
"WHEREFORE, the Decision of Respondent Judge of February 17, 1986 is hereby set aside and he is hereby ordered to reassume jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 2800 and 2813 of his Court and to render judgment of either conviction or acquittal in accordance with the evidence already adduced during the joint trial of said two cases.
SO ORDERED."

Ratio

  • Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional, the action lying where the offence was committed "or where any of its essential ingredients occurred."
  • Estafa under Article 315§, par. 2(d) is transitory: where some acts material and essential to the crime occur in one province and some in another, the court of either province has jurisdiction, and the first court taking cognizance excludes the others.
  • The decisive move is on delivery, not issuance. "What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereat. 'The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation' … For although the check was received by the SMC Sales Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan, that was not the delivery in contemplation of law to the payee, SMC. Said supervisor was not the person who could take the check as a holder, that is, as a payee or indorsee thereof, with the intent to transfer title thereto."
  • The definition is borrowed from the Negotiable Instruments Law: under Section 190 a holder is "the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof." Lacking that capacity, Cornelio had to forward the checks — so legal delivery, and the deceit, occurred in Pampanga.
  • B.P. 22§ is continuing on its own footing. Although the law penalises the making, drawing and issuance — so Bulacan would also be proper — "knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential ingredient of the offense[,] is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another … Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga."
  • On double jeopardy the reasoning is short: a dismissal for want of jurisdiction is void, so it cannot terminate a jeopardy that never lawfully closed, and reinstatement "does not violate the constitutional prohibition."

Doctrine

Legal delivery in criminal cases.
  • Physical receipt by "a field agent or sales supervisor who cannot act as a 'holder' under Section 190 of the NIL" is not legal delivery to the payee; delivery is consummated only on transfer to "an authorized officer (such as a finance officer) … who has the intent to transfer title," and that is where the deceit in estafa is legally consummated.
  • Venue of B.P. Blg. 22§: while the place of issuance is proper, "the essential element of 'knowledge of insufficiency of funds' is a continuing eventuality," so venue is proper in any territory where the check was delivered, deposited, or dishonored.
  • Allegations control: venue "is determined by the allegations in the Information, which are controlling," and where the evidence shows essential ingredients occurred there, the court must decide on the merits.
  • A void dismissal raises no jeopardy.
Limits.
  • Section 15(a) itself has recognised exceptions — offences under Article 2 of the RPC; a Supreme Court change of venue to prevent a miscarriage of justice; offences aboard a train, aircraft or vessel; cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan; and written defamation under Article 360.
  • The double jeopardy bar still needs a valid dismissal: it may be invoked only where the first case ended by final conviction, acquittal, or a valid dismissal without the express consent of the accused by a court of competent jurisdiction.
  • Note the shape of the delivery holding — it is a rule about who may receive, not about where an envelope travels; a supervisor with authority to take title would have fixed venue in Bulacan.
  • And note the sequel this case authorises: the judge was ordered to decide on the evidence already adduced, without retrial.
  • Read with Barrameda v. CA (demand localises estafa) and AAA v. BBB (anguish localises psychological violence) — three applications of the same transitory-offence logic.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

The relationship of this case to the requested Topic of Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110§) > V. Venue is DIRECT.
The triggering controversy arose when the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga dismissed Criminal Case No. 2800 (Violation of B.P. Blg. 22§) and Criminal Case No. 2813 (Estafa under Article 315§, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code) against respondent-accused Manuel Parulan post-trial on the ground that it lacked territorial jurisdiction, ruling that the check§s were physically issued in Bulacan and dishonored by a bank in Bulacan, thereby placing both deceit and damage outside Pampanga. The Supreme Court granted the Special Civil Action for Certiorari filed by the People and San Miguel Corporation, nullified the trial court's dismissal, and ordered the trial court to reassume jurisdiction and render judgment on the merits.
The single central doctrine established in this decision dictates that under Section 15(a) of Rule 110§ of the Rules of Court, venue is an essential element of territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases, and for transitory or continuing offenses—such as estafa§ by bad check and violations of B.P. Blg. 22§—the criminal action may be validly instituted and tried in any court where any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place. In the crime of estafa by bad check, legal delivery is the final act essential to the check's consummation as an obligation, which is completed only when it is delivered to a 'holder' who takes it with the intent to transfer title (such as the corporation's finance officer at its regional office in Pampanga); hence, the intermediate receipt of the check by a local sales supervisor in Bulacan does not constitute legal delivery to the payee. Furthermore, knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in a B.P. Blg. 22§ offense is a 'continuing eventuality' that accompanies the drawer across territories, thereby conferring concurrent jurisdiction upon the court where the check was eventually delivered and deposited.

Facts

  • June 13, 1983: Respondent-accused Manuel Parulan, an authorized wholesale dealer of petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) in Bulacan, issues and signs Planters Development Bank (PDB) (Santa Maria, Bulacan Branch) Check No. 19040865 in the sum of P86,071.20 in favor of SMC. He delivers and hands over this check to the SMC Sales Supervisor, Ruben Cornelio, at SMC's sales office in Guiguinto, Bulacan.
  • June 18, 1983: Respondent-accused Manuel Parulan likewise issues and signs PDB Check No. 19040872 in the amount of P11,918.80 in favor of SMC as direct payment for a spot sale of beer. He delivers and hands over this check also to SMC Sales Supervisor Ruben Cornelio at Guiguinto, Bulacan.
  • After June 18, 1983 (Exact Dates NOT IN RECORD): Ruben Cornelio, acting as a mere representative and not a holder with intent to transfer title, forwards both checks from SMC's Guiguinto Sales Office to the SMC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga, where they are delivered to and received by the SMC Finance Officer.
  • After receipt in Pampanga (Exact Dates NOT IN RECORD): The SMC Finance Officer deposits both checks with SMC’s depository bank, the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), San Fernando Branch, Pampanga.
  • July 8, 1983: BPI San Fernando Branch receives notices of dishonor of both checks for "insufficiency of funds" from the drawee bank, PDB, Santa Maria, Bulacan Branch, which had received them for clearing. BPI subsequently makes the corresponding deductions from SMC's accounts in San Fernando, Pampanga.
  • After July 8, 1983 (Exact Dates NOT IN RECORD): Following repeated demands and Parulan's failure to make good on the checks, the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga files Criminal Case No. 2800 (for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22§) and Criminal Case No. 2813 (for Estafa under Article 315§, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code) against Manuel Parulan before the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 44, presided over by respondent Judge Nathaniel M. Grospe.
  • Arraignment and Trial (Exact Dates NOT IN RECORD): Accused Manuel Parulan enters a plea of "not guilty" to both charges. The two cases are tried jointly by the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 44, with identical witnesses and evidence presented for both suits.
  • February 17, 1986: Respondent Judge Grospe renders his Decision dismissing both Criminal Cases Nos. 2800 and 2813, declaring that the court is "bereft of jurisdiction to pass judgment on the accused on the basis of the merits of these cases." He cancels the accused's bail bonds, reasoning that since the checks were issued in Guiguinto, Bulacan, and dishonored in Santa Maria, Bulacan, none of the essential elements of deceit or damage occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the Pampanga court.
  • After February 17, 1986 (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD): Petitioners People of the Philippines and San Miguel Corporation file a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Supreme Court, challenging the trial court's dismissal of the cases.
  • January 20, 1988: The Supreme Court Second Division, through Melencio-Herrera, J., promulgates its Decision granting the petition, setting aside Judge Grospe's order of dismissal, and directing the trial court to reassume jurisdiction and decide the cases on the merits.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner / Prosecution (People of the Philippines and San Miguel Corporation).
  • Proper Venue in Continuing Offenses: Petitioners argue that venue is properly laid in the RTC of Pampanga because both Estafa by check and Violation of B.P. Blg. 22§ are continuing or transitory offenses where material acts took place in Pampanga.
  • Deceit Consummated in Pampanga: They contend that the element of deceit took place in San Fernando, Pampanga, because the checks were only legally delivered to the payee (SMC) when received by the Finance Officer at the SMC Regional Office in Pampanga. The Guiguinto Sales Supervisor was a mere intermediary and not a holder.
  • Damage Sustained in Pampanga: They assert that damage also occurred in Pampanga because SMC's depository bank (BPI San Fernando Branch) deducted the amounts of the dishonored checks from SMC's accounts in San Fernando, Pampanga.
  • Certiorari as the Proper Remedy: They maintain that certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy since the trial court's dismissal was based on an error of jurisdiction, which is null and void, and does not constitute an acquittal; therefore, double jeopardy cannot attach.
B. Respondent / Defense (Manuel Parulan).
  • Improper Venue: Respondent-accused argues that the Pampanga court is completely devoid of jurisdiction. He asserts that the checks were issued and delivered to Ruben Cornelio at Guiguinto, Bulacan, where false assurances were given, and they were dishonored by Planters Development Bank in Santa Maria, Bulacan, meaning both deceit and damage occurred solely in Bulacan.
  • Double Jeopardy: He contends that the order of dismissal, rendered after plea and trial on the merits, was in effect an acquittal and cannot be reviewed by certiorari. Setting aside the dismissal would subject him to double jeopardy.
C. Common Ground.
  • Fact of Issuance and Dishonor: The parties do not dispute that the two checks were issued by respondent Parulan in favor of SMC, that they were drawn against Planters Development Bank (Santa Maria, Bulacan Branch), and that they were subsequently dishonored due to "insufficiency of funds" (as summarized in the RTC's findings of fact).

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered). Whether the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 44, has territorial jurisdiction and proper venue under Section 15(a) [formerly Section 14(a)] of Rule 110§ of the Rules of Court over Criminal Cases Nos. 2800 and 2813 for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22§ and Estafa, respectively, when the bad checks were delivered to a sales supervisor in Bulacan but were subsequently forwarded to, received, and deposited by the corporation's finance officer in San Fernando, Pampanga.
B. Secondary Issues.
  1. Whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy to set aside a trial court's order dismissing criminal cases for lack of territorial jurisdiction.
  2. Whether the reinstatement and continuation of the criminal proceedings after a post-trial dismissal on jurisdictional grounds violates the accused's constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Ruling

  • MAIN ISSUE: YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the Pampanga court has jurisdiction because both offenses are transitory and continuing in nature, and essential elements—namely, legal delivery (deceit) and depository deduction (damage)—took place in San Fernando, Pampanga.
  • SECONDARY ISSUE 1: YES. Certiorari is the proper remedy because the error committed was one of jurisdiction, which renders the order of dismissal null and void, and not a mere error of judgment on the merits.
  • SECONDARY ISSUE 2: NO. Because the dismissal was based on the trial judge's erroneous conclusion regarding lack of territorial jurisdiction and did not resolve the merits, the proceedings were not lawfully terminated; hence, no first jeopardy attached to bar a continuation of the suits.
#### VERBATIM DISPOSITIVE PORTION:.
"WHEREFORE, the Decision of Respondent Judge of February 17, 1986 is hereby set aside and he is hereby ordered to reassume jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 2800 and 2813 of his Court and to render judgment of either conviction or acquittal in accordance with the evidence already adduced during the joint trial of said two cases.
SO ORDERED."

Ratio

  1. Jurisdictional Character of Venue: The Court began by reaffirming that under Section 14(a) [now Section 15(a)] of Rule 110§ of the Rules of Court, a criminal action must be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. Unlike in civil cases, venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional.
  2. Transitory Nature of Estafa: In transitory or continuing offenses where some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in another, the court of either province has jurisdiction, and the first court taking cognizance excludes the others. Estafa under Article 315§, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code is a transitory/continuing offense where deceit and damage may arise independently in separate places.
  3. Delivery as the Final Act of Consummation: The Court held that while the checks were physically signed and handed to the SMC supervisor in Guiguinto, Bulacan, this physical transfer did not constitute legal delivery to the payee (SMC). The Court explained:
    "What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereat. 'The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation' (People vs. Larue, 83 P. 2d 725, cited in People vs. Yabut, supra). For although the check was received by the SMC Sales Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan, that was not the delivery in contemplation of law to the payee, SMC. Said supervisor was not the person who could take the check as a holder, that is, as a payee or indorsee thereof, with the intent to transfer title thereto."
  4. The Codal Definition of a Holder: Under Section 190 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, a 'holder' is defined as "the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof." Because the sales supervisor had no authority to take the check as a holder with intent to transfer title, he had to forward the checks to the SMC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga. Consequently, the legal delivery and the element of deceit occurred in Pampanga, where the checks were received by the Finance Officer and deposited.
  5. Transitory Nature of B.P. Blg. 22§: Similarly, the offense of Violation of B.P. Blg. 22§ is continuing in nature. Although the offense is committed by the act of its performance and the law penalizes the making, drawing, and issuance of a bouncing check (meaning the case could be filed in Bulacan where the check was issued), the Court ruled:
    "However, it is likewise true that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another (People vs. Hon. Manzanilla, G.R. Nos. 66003-04, December 11, 1987). Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga."
  6. No Double Jeopardy: Since the trial judge dismissed the cases solely due to his erroneous conclusion that he lacked territorial jurisdiction, there was no adjudication on the merits. A dismissal based on a lack of jurisdiction is null and void, meaning the first jeopardy was not lawfully terminated. Reinstatement of the cases to render a judgment on the merits does not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, as a void dismissal cannot serve as a bar to a continuation of the trial.

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules.
  • The Rule on Legal Delivery of Negotiable Instruments in Criminal Cases: The physical receipt of a check by a field agent or sales supervisor who cannot act as a 'holder' under Section 190 of the NIL does not constitute legal delivery to the payee. Delivery is consummated only when the check is transferred to an authorized officer (such as a finance officer) at the principal or regional office who has the intent to transfer title, and this is the location where the element of deceit in Estafa is legally consummated.
  • The Rule on the Venue of B.P. Blg. 22§: While the place of physical issuance is a proper venue for B.P. Blg. 22§, the essential element of "knowledge of insufficiency of funds" is a continuing eventuality. Venue is therefore proper in any territory where the check was delivered, deposited, or dishonored.
  • The Rule on the Control of Venue by Information Allegations: Jurisdiction or venue in criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the Information, which are controlling. If the Information alleges that the crime was committed within the court's territory, and the evidence shows that essential ingredients occurred there, the court must decide the case on the merits.
C. Limitations/Exceptions.
  • Exceptions to Territoriality: While Section 15(a) of Rule 110§ mandates that criminal actions be tried where the offense was committed, this rule is subject to specific exceptions such as: (a) offenses committed under Article 2 of the RPC; (b) Supreme Court orders for a change of venue to prevent a miscarriage of justice; (c) offenses committed on board a train, aircraft, or vessel; (d) cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan; and (e) written defamation under Article 360 of the RPC.
  • Limits on Double Jeopardy: The defense of double jeopardy under Section 7 of Rule 117 can only be invoked if the first case was terminated by a final conviction, acquittal, or a valid dismissal without the express consent of the accused by a court of competent jurisdiction. An erroneous dismissal based on lack of territorial jurisdiction is void and does not terminate the jeopardy.
D. Topic Integration. The relationship of People v. Grospe to "Venue of Criminal Actions" under Rule 110§ is DIRECT.
This case is a foundational authority on the territorial jurisdiction of Philippine courts over commercial and bouncing check crimes. It establishes that courts must not analyze venue as a rigid, static point of physical drawing, but as a dynamic, continuing path of essential ingredients under Rule 110§, Section 15(a). By integrating the Negotiable Instruments Law's rules on delivery with the elements of Estafa and B.P. Blg. 22§, Grospe prevents drawers from evading prosecution by simply crossing provincial borders to issue worthless checks. It provides prosecutors with the vital procedural flexibility to lay venue in the territory where the corporation's regional finance offices actually received, verified, and deposited the checks, aligning procedural rules with the practical realities of modern corporate trade.

Separate Opinions

None.
The decision of the Court was a unanimous Division decision. The concurring justices are listed as Yap (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concurring. No separate concurring or dissenting opinions were recorded or exist in the source text.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Implementing Rules

Section 15, Rule 110, Rules of Court

Place where action is to be instituted

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses)

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

(b) Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or other public or private vehicle while in the course of its trip, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such its trip, including the place of its departure and arrival.

(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory where the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted principles of international law.

(d) Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first filed. (15a)

LawPhil posts the text as amended effective 1 December 2000. Later amendments — notably to the bail and preliminary-investigation rules — are not reflected here, so check the date of the decision against the date of the amendment.

Why it is cited here

The "essential ingredients" limb, which is what makes venue flexible without making it waivable.

The action "shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred."

The second limb matters most for offenses whose elements happen in different places. Where one essential ingredient occurred in a territory, that court has jurisdiction — even if other elements happened elsewhere.

So the analysis is elemental: list the elements, locate each one, and any place holding one of them is a proper venue. More than one court may qualify, and the prosecution may choose among them.

Special Law

Section 1, B.P. Blg. 22

Checks without sufficient funds

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law)

Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.

B.P. Blg. 22 fixes no prescriptive period of its own, so Act No. 3326 supplies it — four years, the offense being punishable by imprisonment of more than one month but less than two years. See People v. Pangilinan. Note also A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC and the earlier Administrative Circulars 12-2000 and 13-2001, which express a preference for fine over imprisonment; they do not amend the penalty clause below.

Why it is cited here

The offense, and how its elements scatter across places.

"Any person who makes or draws and issues any check … knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds … which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank."

Read the elements as events with locations: the making, the issuing and the delivery happen where the parties are; the dishonor happens at the drawee bank.

Each is an essential ingredient, so each place is a proper venue under Section 15(a). That is why B.P. 22 and estafa cases are the standard vehicles for this doctrine — their elements naturally spread.

Special Law

Article 315, Revised Penal Code

Swindling (estafa)

Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815)

Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

2d. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.

3d. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and

4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and.maximum periods, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following means:

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

a. By altering the substance, quantity, or quality of anything of value which the offender shall deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, even though such obligation be based on an immoral or illegal consideration.

b. By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.

c. By taking undue advantage of the signature of the offended party in blank, and by writing any document above such signature in blank, to the prejudice of the offended party or any third person.

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

a. By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.

b. By altering the quality, fineness or weight of anything pertaining to his art or business.

c. By pretending to have bribed any Government employee, without prejudice to the action for calumny which the offended party may deem proper to bring against the offender. In this case, the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty.

d. By postdating a check, or issuing such check in payment of an obligation, the offender knowing that at the time he had no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited by him in the bank were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check, and without informing the payee of such circumstances.

3. Through any of the following fraudulent means:

a. By inducing another, by means of deceit, to sign any document.

b. By resorting to some fraudulent practice to insure success in a gambling game.

c. By removing, concealing or destroying, in whole or in part, any court record, office files, document or any other papers.

Why it is cited here

The companion offense, with the same scattering.

"Any person who shall defraud another" by the enumerated means commits estafa, the elements being deceit and damage.

The deceit occurs where the false representation is made or received; the damage occurs where the offended party parts with his property or suffers the loss. They are frequently in different places.

Holding the two offenses together gives the working method for any multi-place prosecution: do not ask where "the crime" happened — ask where each element happened, and every such place is a court with jurisdiction.

Related notes:
Assigned under the same subtopic — V — Venue:
  • Union Bank v. People
  • Macasaet v. People
  • People v. Guzman
  • Barrameda v. CA
  • People v. Panlilio
  • Calme v. CA
  • Foz Jr. v. People
  • Yalong v. People
(and 2 more under this subtopic — see the Week 3 coverage table.)
Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/jan1988/gr_l-74053_1988.html

Study digest — refer to the full text of the decision for accuracy. https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/jan1988/gr_l-74053_1988.html

Cited laws & provisions

Section 15, Rule 110, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Place where action is to be instituted

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses)

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

(b) Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or other public or private vehicle while in the course of its trip, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such its trip, including the place of its departure and arrival.

(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory where the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted principles of international law.

(d) Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first filed. (15a)

LawPhil posts the text as amended effective 1 December 2000. Later amendments — notably to the bail and preliminary-investigation rules — are not reflected here, so check the date of the decision against the date of the amendment.

Why it is cited here

The "essential ingredients" limb, which is what makes venue flexible without making it waivable.

The action "shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred."

The second limb matters most for offenses whose elements happen in different places. Where one essential ingredient occurred in a territory, that court has jurisdiction — even if other elements happened elsewhere.

So the analysis is elemental: list the elements, locate each one, and any place holding one of them is a proper venue. More than one court may qualify, and the prosecution may choose among them.

Full entry below ↓

Section 1, B.P. Blg. 22

Special Law

Checks without sufficient funds

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law)

Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.

B.P. Blg. 22 fixes no prescriptive period of its own, so Act No. 3326 supplies it — four years, the offense being punishable by imprisonment of more than one month but less than two years. See People v. Pangilinan. Note also A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC and the earlier Administrative Circulars 12-2000 and 13-2001, which express a preference for fine over imprisonment; they do not amend the penalty clause below.

Why it is cited here

The offense, and how its elements scatter across places.

"Any person who makes or draws and issues any check … knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds … which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank."

Read the elements as events with locations: the making, the issuing and the delivery happen where the parties are; the dishonor happens at the drawee bank.

Each is an essential ingredient, so each place is a proper venue under Section 15(a). That is why B.P. 22 and estafa cases are the standard vehicles for this doctrine — their elements naturally spread.

Full entry below ↓

Article 315, Revised Penal Code

Special Law

Swindling (estafa)

Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815)

Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

2d. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.

3d. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and

4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and.maximum periods, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following means:

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

a. By altering the substance, quantity, or quality of anything of value which the offender shall deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, even though such obligation be based on an immoral or illegal consideration.

b. By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.

c. By taking undue advantage of the signature of the offended party in blank, and by writing any document above such signature in blank, to the prejudice of the offended party or any third person.

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

a. By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.

b. By altering the quality, fineness or weight of anything pertaining to his art or business.

c. By pretending to have bribed any Government employee, without prejudice to the action for calumny which the offended party may deem proper to bring against the offender. In this case, the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty.

d. By postdating a check, or issuing such check in payment of an obligation, the offender knowing that at the time he had no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited by him in the bank were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check, and without informing the payee of such circumstances.

3. Through any of the following fraudulent means:

a. By inducing another, by means of deceit, to sign any document.

b. By resorting to some fraudulent practice to insure success in a gambling game.

c. By removing, concealing or destroying, in whole or in part, any court record, office files, document or any other papers.

Why it is cited here

The companion offense, with the same scattering.

"Any person who shall defraud another" by the enumerated means commits estafa, the elements being deceit and damage.

The deceit occurs where the false representation is made or received; the damage occurs where the offended party parts with his property or suffers the loss. They are frequently in different places.

Holding the two offenses together gives the working method for any multi-place prosecution: do not ask where "the crime" happened — ask where each element happened, and every such place is a court with jurisdiction.

Full entry below ↓