Facts

• On September 9, 1985 a robbery was committed in Quezon City, in the house of Jose L. Obillos, Sr., where jewelry "alleged to be worth millions of pesos" was taken.
• On September 30, 1985 an Information for Robbery was filed against the actual perpetrators in the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101.
• The stolen jewelry was found and recovered from the possession of the spouses Danilo A. Alcantara and Isabelita Esguerra-Alcantara — in Antipolo, Rizal. That is the only place any act of fencing occurred.
• On October 22, 1985 an Information for violation of P.D. No. 1612§ (Anti-Fencing Law) was filed against the spouses in the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 93 (Crim. Case No. 42433).
• They moved to quash for want of jurisdiction, the fencing having taken place in Antipolo. The prosecution opposed, asserting there is nothing in the law which prohibits filing a fencing case under the jurisdiction where the principal offense of robbery was committed.
• On February 28, 1986 Judge Jose C. de Guzman granted the motion and dismissed without prejudice to filing in the proper court, the Quezon City court being bereft of jurisdiction to pass judgment on the accused on the merits of these cases. Reconsideration was denied March 21, 1986.
• The People, through the Solicitor General, brought certiorari and mandamus on the theory that fencing is a continuing offense. Decided October 5, 1993 (Third Division).

Issue

Ruling

"WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is DISMISSED, and the orders appealed from are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

• The Court anchored on the territoriality rule of Section 14 (now 15), Rule 110§: "On this point, we should not lose sight of the fact that in all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the Municipality or Province wherein the offense was committed, or anyone of the essential ingredients thereof took place."
• It then tested the "continuing offence" theory against the definition of delito continuado: "A 'continuous crime' is a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division," requiring plurality of acts, unity of the penal provision violated, and unity of criminal intent. Fencing meets none of these in relation to the robbery — it is a completely separate transaction, governed by a different law, and animated by a different criminal intent.
• The elements were then set side by side. Robbery is "the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything." Fencing is the act of one who, "with intent to gain …, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of … any article … which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."
• From that the independence follows: "The crimes of robbery and fencing are clearly then two distinct offenses. The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft. Neither is the crime of robbery or theft made to depend on an act of fencing in order that it can be consummated."
• The prerequisite is not an ingredient. "True, the object property in fencing must have been previously taken by means of either robbery or theft but the place where the robbery or theft occurs is inconsequential."
• The analogy the Court chose makes the point unmistakable (Ganchero v. Bellosillo): "It may not be suggested, for instance, that, in the crime of bigamy which presupposes a prior subsisting marriage of an accused, the case should thereby be triable likewise at the place where the prior marriage has been contracted."

Doctrine

• It "is a separate and distinct offense from robbery or theft, not a mere accessory liability under Article 19"; it is a malum prohibitum special-law violation and the offender is prosecuted "as a principal, not an accessory."
• Fencing is not transitory. It "is consummated at the specific place and time where the accused buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells, or disposes of the stolen property," and venue lies exclusively there, regardless of where the preparatory theft or robbery was perpetrated.
• No extraterritorial jurisdiction via preparatory offences: [j]ust as a bigamy trial cannot be held in the place of the first valid marriage, a fencing trial cannot be held in the place of the original robbery.
• The delito continuado test requires plurality of acts, unity of the penal provision, and unity of criminal intent.

• A change of venue remains possible, but only from this Court. Under Article VIII, Section 5(4) the Supreme Court may order one "whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction … would not result in a fair and impartial trial" — but that is an exceptional power of the Supreme Court and does not authorize a trial prosecutor to file an Information in an improper venue as a matter of course.
• The general rule the case sets out is the negative image of the transitory-offence cases: the test is whether an essential ingredient occurred in the forum, and a prerequisite condition — the stolen character of the goods, a prior subsisting marriage — is not an ingredient.
• Contrast Barrameda v. CA, People v. Grospe and AAA v. BBB, where the second locality supplied an actual element — demand, delivery, anguish.
• And note the dismissal was without prejudice: nothing barred refiling in Antipolo.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Facts

• September 9, 1985: A robbery is committed in Quezon City in the house of Jose L. Obillos, Sr., where various pieces of precious jewelry, alleged to be worth millions of pesos, are taken.
• September 30, 1985: An Information for Robbery is filed against the actual perpetrators in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-42078 (erroneously cited as G.R. No. 42078 in the Supreme Court text).
• Subsequent Date (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD, prior to October 22, 1985): The stolen jewelries are found and recovered from the possession of the accused-respondent spouses, Danilo A. Alcantara and Isabelita Esguerra-Alcantara, in Antipolo, Rizal.
• October 22, 1985: An Information for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) is filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, docketed as Criminal Case No. 42433, against the respondent spouses Alcantara.
• Subsequent Date (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD, prior to February 28, 1986): The accused spouses Alcantara file a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City lacks jurisdiction to try the offense charged, as the alleged crime of fencing took place in Antipolo, Rizal. The prosecution files an opposition, asserting that there is nothing in the law which prohibits filing a fencing case under the jurisdiction where the principal offense of robbery was committed.
• February 28, 1986: Respondent RTC Judge Jose C. de Guzman issues the questioned Order granting the accused's Motion to Quash and dismissing Criminal Case No. 42433 without prejudice to filing in the proper court, ruling that since the alleged act of fencing took place in Antipolo, Rizal, the Quezon City court is "bereft of jurisdiction to pass judgment on the accused on the merits of these cases".
• Subsequent Date (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD, prior to March 21, 1986): The private prosecutor files a Motion for Reconsideration on behalf of the People.
• March 21, 1986: Respondent RTC Judge de Guzman issues an Order denying the private prosecutor's Motion for Reconsideration.
• Subsequent Date (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD): The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General, files a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Supreme Court of the Philippines, assailing the orders of the respondent Judge.
• October 5, 1993: The Supreme Court Third Division promulgates its Decision dismissing the petition and affirming the respondent Judge's orders.

Arguments of the Parties

• The Continuing Offense Theory: The petitioner argues that since an essential element of the crime of fencing is the prior commission of robbery or theft, and in this case the principal robbery was committed in Quezon City, the Information for fencing was properly filed in Quezon City. Fencing is a "continuing offense" that can be prosecuted either where the robbery occurred or where the stolen items were recovered, under the rules on venue for transitory crimes.
• Unified Criminal Purpose: The petitioner explains that the Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. No. 1612) was enacted for the purpose of imposing a heavier penalty on persons who profit from the effects of robbery or theft, treating them no longer merely as accessories under Article 19, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, but as equally guilty with the perpetrators of the principal crimes. Fencing is therefore intimately linked to the principal crime as part of a single continuing sequence of criminal acts.

• Separate and Distinct Offenses: The private respondents argue that a violation of P.D. No. 1612 is an independent crime, separate and distinct from the principal crime of robbery or theft.
• Strict Territoriality of Venue: Pursuant to the rules of criminal procedure, all criminal prosecutions must be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province where the offense was committed, or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.
• Locus of Commission: The respondents contend that because the police investigation and the recovery of the jewelry established that the alleged act of fencing took place exclusively in Antipolo, Rizal, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City has no territorial jurisdiction to try them.

• Factual Basis of Recovery: Both parties stipulate that a robbery occurred on September 9, 1985, in Quezon City in the house of Jose L. Obillos, Sr., and that the stolen jewelries were subsequently found and recovered from the possession of the respondent spouses in Antipolo, Rizal.

Issue

Ruling

• MAIN ISSUE: NO. Fencing is not a continuing offense. It is a separate and distinct offense from robbery or theft. Venue and territorial jurisdiction belong exclusively to the court of the province or city where the act of fencing was actually committed, and the place of the original robbery or theft is completely inconsequential.

"WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is DISMISSED, and the orders appealed from are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

1. Strict Jurisdictional Nature of Venue (Rule 110§, Section 14): The Court anchored its ruling on the fundamental procedural principle under Section 14 (now Section 15) of Rule 110§ of the Rules of Court:

   "On this point, we should not lose sight of the fact that in all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the Municipality or Province wherein the offense was committed, or anyone of the essential ingredients thereof took place."

   For a court to acquire jurisdiction over a criminal case, the offense or any of its essential ingredients must have occurred within the court's limited territorial boundaries. A court cannot take jurisdiction over an offense committed outside its territory.
2. The Delito Continuado Test (People v. Ledesma): The Court analyzed whether fencing constitutes a "delito continuado" or continuing crime, which is defined as:

   ". . . A 'continuous crime' is a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division."

   The Court invoked the three-element test for delito continuado:
   • Plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time;
   • Unity of the penal provision infringed upon or violated; and
   • Unity of criminal intent or purpose, meaning that two or more violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim.
   Applying this test, the Court held that fencing does not meet these criteria in relation to the original robbery or theft. Fencing is a completely separate transaction, governed by a different law, and animated by a different criminal intent.
3. The Autonomy and Independence of Fencing and Robbery: The Court contrasted the statutory elements of the two crimes:
   • Robbery (Article 293, RPC) is "the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything".
   • Fencing (Section 2, P.D. No. 1612) is "the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft".
   The Court concluded that:

   "The crimes of robbery and fencing are clearly then two distinct offenses. The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft. Neither is the crime of robbery or theft made to depend on an act of fencing in order that it can be consummated."

4. Inconsequentiality of the Locus of the Principal Offense: While the property in fencing must have been previously taken via robbery or theft, the location of that principal crime is legally irrelevant to the fencing prosecution:

   "True, the object property in fencing must have been previously taken by means of either robbery or theft but the place where the robbery or theft occurs is inconsequential."

   The Court drew a brilliant analogy to the crime of bigamy (citing Ganchero v. Bellosillo):

   "It may not be suggested, for instance, that, in the crime of bigamy which presupposes a prior subsisting marriage of an accused, the case should thereby be triable likewise at the place where the prior marriage has been contracted."

   Because the act of fencing (possession of the stolen jewelries) occurred solely in Antipolo, Rizal, the RTC of Quezon City had no territorial jurisdiction, and the respondent Judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in quashing the Information.

Doctrine

• The Independence of Fencing: Fencing under P.D. No. 1612 is a separate and distinct offense from robbery or theft, not a mere accessory liability under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. Fencing is a malum prohibitum special law violation, and the offender is prosecuted as a principal, not an accessory, under the decree.
• The Non-Transitory Nature of Fencing: The crime of fencing is not a continuing or transitory offense. It is consummated at the specific place and time where the accused buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells, or disposes of the stolen property. Venue for a fencing prosecution lies exclusively in the court of the territory where such act of fencing was committed, regardless of where the preparatory theft or robbery was perpetrated.
• No Extraterritorial Jurisdiction via Preparatory Offenses: Courts cannot assert territorial jurisdiction over an independent offense merely because a preparatory or prerequisite crime occurred within their territory. Just as a bigamy trial cannot be held in the place of the first valid marriage, a fencing trial cannot be held in the place of the original robbery.

• Change of Venue in Extreme Cases: The Court recognized that the Supreme Court possesses the constitutional authority to order a change of venue or place of trial under Article VIII, Section 5(4) of the 1987 Constitution "whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice". However, this is an exceptional power of the Supreme Court and does not authorize a trial prosecutor to file an Information in an improper venue as a matter of course. No such compelling circumstances existed in this case to justify a change of venue.

Separate Opinions