Facts

• On the night of May 12, 1991 the interisland passenger ship M/V "Cebu City," owned by William Lines, Inc., sailed from the port of Ozamis City for Cebu City.
• At 23:43 hours, while the vessel was at longitude 123°47.1' East, latitude 9°2.3' North — about 8.0 miles off Minalonan Point, Siquijor Island — the Master, Captain Elmer M. Magallanes, was told by the officer on duty that a passenger, Edgardo Bernal, had "jumped overboard."
• The prosecution alleged that Wenefredo Calme and four co-accused killed Bernal by forcibly throwing him overboard.
• Captain Magallanes executed a Marine Protest recording the ship's position at the time he received the report. Note precisely what it records — the position when the captain was informed, not where the killing occurred.
• An Information for Murder was filed against Calme and four others in Branch 12 of the RTC of Oroquieta City, Misamis Occidental.
• Calme moved to quash for want of territorial jurisdiction, arguing that the Marine Protest fixed the locus off Siquijor, so that under the general rule of Section 15(a)§ Siquijor was the only proper venue.
• Presiding Judge Celso Conol denied the motion.
• On December 10, 1993 the Court of Appeals (Former 10th Division) dismissed his certiorari and prohibition petition; on July 14, 1994 it denied reconsideration.
• On August 30, 1996 the First Division denied the Rule 45 petition and affirmed the jurisdiction of the Oroquieta City RTC.

Issue

Ruling

"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

• The Court first dismantled the factual premise of the motion to quash. "The exact location where the alleged offense was committed§ was not duly established. The Marine protest simply adverted that the vessel was within the waters of Siquijor Island when the captain was informed of the incident, which does not necessarily prove that the alleged murder took place in the same area."
• Then it made that question irrelevant: "In any case, where the crime was actually committed is immaterial since it is undisputed that it occurred while the vessel was in transit." And "in transit" carries its literal sense — "on the way or passage; while passing from one person or place to another. In the course of transportation."
• Once the offence is on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, Section 15(c) is triggered and is unqualified: the action "may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage subject to the generally accepted principles of international law." The M/V "Cebu City" traversed the waters of Oroquieta City between Ozamis and Cebu.
• The attempt to read Act No. 400 into the Rule was rejected on the difference in text. "[U]nder the former law, jurisdiction was conferred to the CFI of any province into which the ship … shall come after the commission thereof, while the present rule provides that jurisdiction is vested 'in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage …' This is the applicable provision and since it does not contain any qualification, we do not qualify the same."
• The canon of construction closes it. "It is a basic rule in statutory construction that where the provisions of the law or rule is clear and unequivocal, its meaning must be determined from the language employed. It must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation … The words of Sec. 15(c) being clear, there is no reason to rely on Act 400 in determining its true meaning, regardless of whether said Act was indeed the moving spirit behind it."

Doctrine

• For crimes committed on board a vessel during its voyage, venue is concurrently distributed among (a) the court of the first port of entry, and (b) any court of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during the voyage.
• The exact location of the offence is immaterial once it is established that it occurred in transit — "on the way or passage … [i]n the course of transportation."
• Act No. 400 is superseded: there is no requirement that the territory be one the vessel entered after the crime; traversed territories before its commission or discovery are equally valid venues.
• Literal construction: a clear and unequivocal rule "must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation."

• The rule is expressly "subject to the generally accepted principles of international law." That qualification bites mainly for foreign vessels in transit through territorial waters, where the English Rule (coastal-state jurisdiction if the peace of the port is affected) or the French Rule (flag-state jurisdiction unless the peace of the port is disturbed) governs; for domestic interisland vessels of Philippine registry the domestic venue rule is absolute.
• Concurrence is resolved by priority: the court that first lawfully takes cognizance excludes all other traversed territories and ports of entry.
• Note the evidentiary point that carried the case: the Marine Protest recorded only where the ship was when the captain was told, so the defence never actually proved the locus it relied on — the immateriality holding is an alternative, not the sole, ground.
• And the specialised rules of Section 15(b) and (c) exist precisely for that evidentiary difficulty — a crime in transit is often impossible to fix to a coordinate, which is why the Rule offers the whole route as venue.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Facts

• May 12, 1991 (Night): The interisland passenger ship M/V "Cebu City," owned and operated by William Lines, Inc., departed from the port of Ozamis City en route to Cebu City.
• May 12, 1991 (23:43 HRS): While the M/V "Cebu City" was in transit at longitude 123 degrees 47.1 minutes East and latitude 9 degrees 2.3 minutes North, representing a location approximately 8.0 miles off Minalonan Point, Siquijor Island, the ship's Master, Captain Elmer M. Magallanes, was informed by the officer on duty that a passenger, Edgardo Bernal, had "jumped overboard". It was later alleged by the prosecution that petitioner Wenefredo Calme, along with four other co-accused, killed Edgardo Bernal by forcibly throwing him overboard.
• Subsequent Date (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD): The Captain of M/V "Cebu City," Elmer M. Magallanes, executed and subscribed a formal Marine Protest before a notary public, indicating the ship's position at the time he received the report of the passenger going overboard.
• Subsequent Date (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD): An Information for Murder was filed by the public prosecutor against Wenefredo Calme and four other persons before Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Misamis Occidental, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-28883.
• Subsequent Date (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD): Petitioner Wenefredo Calme filed a Motion to Quash the Information before the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 12, on the ground that the court lacked territorial jurisdiction/venue over the offense charged.
• Subsequent Date (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD): Presiding Judge Celso Conol of the RTC, Branch 12, Oroquieta City, issued an Order denying the petitioner's Motion to Quash, holding that the court possessed territorial jurisdiction.
• Subsequent Date (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD): Petitioner Calme filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 28883, seeking to annul the RTC's denial of his Motion to Quash.
• December 10, 1993: The Court of Appeals (Former 10th Division, with Hon. Antonio M. Martinez as chairman and Hon. Cancio C. Garcia and Hon. Ramon Mabutas as members) rendered its Decision denying due course to and dismissing the petitioner's petition for certiorari and prohibition.
• Subsequent Date (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD): Petitioner Calme filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' decision.
• July 14, 1994: The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
• Subsequent Date (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD): Petitioner Calme elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
• August 30, 1996: The Supreme Court First Division promulgated its Decision denying the petition and affirming the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City.

Arguments of the Parties

• Locus Delicti is Determinable: Petitioner argued that while the alleged crime occurred aboard a vessel in transit, the general venue rule in Section 15(a) of Rule 110§ (locus of commission) must apply instead of Section 15(c) (vessel in transit rule) because the exact location of the offense was known.
• Siquijor as the Exclusive Venue: He contended that the Marine Protest of Captain Magallanes, placing the vessel 8.0 miles off Minalonan Point, Siquijor Island, when the incident was reported, established that the crime occurred within Siquijor’s territorial waters; thus, Siquijor was the only proper venue.
• Reckoning Point of Voyage (Act No. 400): He argued in the alternative that even if Section 15(c) of Rule 110§ governed, Oroquieta City must be excluded because under the historical spirit of Act No. 400 (the predecessor of the rule), the proper venue is restricted to the first port of entry or the territories through which the vessel passed after the commission or discovery of the crime, not before.

• Unestablished Exact Location: The respondents maintained that the exact coordinate where the crime occurred was not established since the Marine Protest merely recorded when the captain was informed of the incident, which does not prove the actual murder occurred at that exact point.
• Vessel-in-Transit Rule is Absolute: They argued that Section 15(c) of Rule 110§ is the applicable provision because the offense indisputably occurred aboard a vessel in the course of its voyage.
• No Qualification Traversed: The respondents contended that Oroquieta City was a proper venue because the vessel passed through its territorial jurisdiction during the voyage from Ozamis City to Cebu City. They argued that Section 15(c) is clear and contains no requirement that the traversed territories be only those passed after the commission of the crime, and that Act No. 400 has been amended and superseded by the Rules of Court.

• Both parties stipulated that the alleged crime took place on the night of May 12, 1991, aboard the M/V "Cebu City" while it was in transit and sailing on an interisland voyage from Ozamis City to Cebu City.

Issue

Ruling

• MAIN ISSUE: YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City has proper territorial jurisdiction and venue over the Murder charge. Under Section 15(c) of Rule 110§, any court of a territory through which the transiting vessel passed during its voyage can validly try the case, making the alleged specific location of the crime immaterial.
• SECONDARY ISSUE: NO. The Supreme Court held that Act No. 400 was amended and superseded by Section 15(c) of Rule 110§ of the Revised Rules of Court, which does not carry the restrictive qualification of "after the commission of the crime" found in the old statute.

"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

1. Immateriality of Exact Coordinate in Transit: The Court dismissed the petitioner's argument that the general venue rule of Section 15(a) must apply simply because a Marine Protest noted the ship's coordinate when the captain was informed of the incident. The Court held:

   "The exact location where the alleged offense was committed§ was not duly established. The Marine protest simply adverted that the vessel was within the waters of Siquijor Island when the captain was informed of the incident, which does not necessarily prove that the alleged murder took place in the same area. In any case, where the crime was actually committed is immaterial since it is undisputed that it occurred while the vessel was in transit."

   The Court defined the phrase "in transit" using its literal meaning:

   "'In transit' simply means 'on the way or passage; while passing from one person or place to another. In the course of transportation.'"

2. Absolute Nature of Section 15(c), Rule 110§: Once it is established that the offense occurred on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the specialized rule of Section 15(c) is triggered. The legal basis of the decision rests on the literal language of the provision:

   "Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage subject to the generally accepted principles of international law."

   Because the M/V "Cebu City" traversed the waters of Oroquieta City during its voyage from Ozamis City to Cebu City, the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City was statutorily vested with concurrent territorial jurisdiction.
3. Amendment and Supersession of Act No. 400: The Court rejected the petitioner's attempt to read the restrictive qualifications of Act No. 400 into Rule 110§. Under Act No. 400, jurisdiction was limited to the Court of First Instance of any province into which the vessel "shall come after the commission of the crime". The Court ruled that:

   "Obviously, Act No. 400 was amended by Sec. 15(c), Rule 110§ of the Revised Rules of Court in that under the former law, jurisdiction was conferred to the CFI of any province into which the ship or water craft upon which the crime or offense was committed shall come after the commission thereof, while the present rule provides that jurisdiction is vested 'in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage . . . .' This is the applicable provision and since it does not contain any qualification, we do not qualify the same."

4. Literal Statutory Construction of Clear Rules: The Court applied the fundamental canon of statutory construction that where the rule is plain, clear, and unequivocal, the court must apply its literal meaning without any attempted interpretation:

   "It is a basic rule in statutory construction that where the provisions of the law or rule is clear and unequivocal, its meaning must be determined from the language employed. It must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation... The words of Sec. 15(c) being clear, there is no reason to rely on Act 400 in determining its true meaning, regardless of whether said Act was indeed the moving spirit behind it."

Doctrine

• The Vessel-in-Transit Venue Rule: For crimes committed on board a vessel during its voyage, venue and territorial jurisdiction are concurrently distributed among: (a) the court of the first port of entry, or (b) any court of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during the entire voyage. Siquijor is not the exclusive venue simply because it was the proximate location of the throwing-overboard incident. The prosecution has the statutory option to select any of the traversed territories as the venue.
• Supersession of Prior Venue Laws: Section 15(c), Rule 110§ completely amended and superseded Act No. 400. Unlike the old law, there is no requirement that the court of the province where the ship arrives after the crime has exclusive jurisdiction. Traversed territories before the discovery or commission of the crime are equally valid venues.

• Subject to International Law: The application of Section 15(c), Rule 110§ in maritime offenses is explicitly subject to the "generally accepted principles of international law". This limitation applies primarily to foreign vessels in transit through territorial waters, wherein the "English Rule" (retaining coastal state jurisdiction if the crime affects the peace and order of the port) or the "French Rule" (retaining flag state jurisdiction unless the peace of the port is disturbed) must be observed. For domestic interisland vessels of Philippine registry, the domestic venue rule is absolute.
• First Court Excludes Others: Under the general rules of concurrent jurisdiction, the court that first lawfully takes cognizance of the case excludes all other courts of traversed territories or ports of entry.

Separate Opinions